





How to be a child, and bid lions and dragons farewell:  
The consequences of moral error theory 
 
 











A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Philosophy 
College of Arts & Law 
















This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 






Moral error theorists argue that moral thought and discourse are systematically in error, and 
that nothing is, or can ever be, morally permissible, required or forbidden.  I begin by 
discussing how error theorists arrive at this conclusion.  I then argue that if we accept a moral 
error theory, we cannot escape a pressing problem – what should we do next, metaethically 
speaking?  I call this problem the ‘what now?’ problem, or WNP for short.  I discuss the 
attempts others have made to respond to the WNP, and in each case I show that the responses 
fail to be satisfying.  I then propose a new response to the WNP, which I call revolutionary 
relativism.  I define revolutionary relativism, explain why it is preferable to the existing 
responses to the WNP, and defend it against the most problematic objections I anticipate that 
opponents might raise.  I conclude that revolutionary relativism succeeds where previous 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
Moral error theorists invite us to imagine a world not without religion, countries or 
possessions, but without something arguably even more fundamental – morality.  At least, 
that is one way of reading the conclusion error theorists reach, which is that all of morality is 
systematically, unavoidably in error, and that as a result there is nothing – indeed there can 
never be anything – which is morally required, permitted or forbidden.1  As conclusions in 
philosophy go, this is about as dramatic as it gets.  Yet if the error theorists are right, we cannot 
simply accept their conclusion and leave it at that.  A profound and daunting question 
immediately looms: what on earth should we do about it?  This thesis is an attempt to provide 
a new answer to that question. 
One of the functions of the introduction to a thesis such as this is often to explain why the 
subject under examination is important, and why the contribution which the thesis makes to 
the topic matters.  In this case, this step almost seems redundant.  If issues in philosophy can 
ever be important at all, and surely they can, then there must be few issues more important 
than whether there is any kind of moral reason why, for example, we shouldn’t all just murder 
each other right now.  And there can be few philosophical questions more pressing than what 
we should do if we come to accept the potentially shocking conclusion that no such reason 
exists.  If it also turns out that none of the answers to that question which people have offered 
so far is satisfactory, as I will argue, then finding a new answer which is satisfactory is a near-
vital task. 
 
1 Although error theories about other domains of discourse exist (see e.g. Miller 2013 pp. 105-108 for 
a discussion of an error theory of colour), throughout this thesis I will refer almost exclusively to moral 
error theory.  That being the case, I will sometimes omit the word moral and refer to just the error 
theory, an error theory, or simply error theory.  Unless specified otherwise, wherever terms such as 
error theory or error theorist are used, it may be assumed that it is a moral variety I am referring to. 
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Broadly speaking, the thesis has three parts.  The first part, comprising chapters 2 and 3, sets 
the stage by outlining why and how moral error theorists argue that we must accept an error 
theory of traditional morality.  Not only is this important in allowing the reader to orient 
themselves within the philosophical terrain at hand, it also introduces and defines the terms 
of debate and thus the conceptual underpinnings and commitments of many of the 
arguments in the chapters which follow.  It is not my aim here to defend error theory, but it 
is crucial to what follows to explain how and why others do so.  And one cannot have a 
comprehensible error theory of something without being clear from the outset what that 
something is. 
Accordingly, chapter 2 introduces moral error theory and explains in detail how error theorists 
typically view traditional morality – the nature of moral thought and discourse, whether and 
how moral judgements can be true, what is really going on when we utter a sentence such as 
‘torture is wrong’, and so on.  And at the end of the chapter I will offer a formulation of the 
error theory which cuts across the variations between different error theorists, and forms the 
basis for the discussion throughout the rest of the thesis. 
Having established what exactly it is that error theorists typically believe morality consists in, 
chapter 3 will lay out why they think it is infected with systematic error.  I will focus on two 
sophisticated and influential arguments for a moral error theory, and show why I believe that 
the shortcomings of one argument highlight why the other argument is effective.  I will also 
take note of the commitments error theorists typically take on in the course of their 
arguments, and which we must therefore be careful not to violate as we go on to figure out 
what to do if error theorists are right. 
In the next broad section of the thesis in chapters 4 and 5, I will prepare the ground for my 
own proposed response to the truth of a moral error theory, and then offer the response 
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itself.  In chapter 4, I explain why coming to accept a moral error theory means that we are 
unavoidably confronted by something I call the ‘what now?’ problem.  While others have 
discussed the existence of such a problem and sought to respond to it, I feel that it can 
sometimes be under appreciated quite how pressing a problem it is.   I attempt to correct this 
by explaining in some detail what the problem is, why we cannot avoid confronting it, and 
how important it is that we do so successfully.  I lay out some ‘ground rules’ for how we might 
respond to the ‘what now?’ problem, including highlighting several of the commitments of 
the arguments for error theory.  I then discuss the main responses to the ‘what now? problem 
proposed by others to date.  In each case I argue that the response in question fails to respond 
adequately to the problem at hand.  The failure of all of the main ways of responding to the 
‘what now?’ problem which others have argued for to date means that we must find a new 
way of responding. 
In chapter 5, I describe in detail my own, new response, which I call revolutionary relativism.  
Briefly, I argue that if we accept an error theory of morality, we should respond to this by 
adopting a form of relativism which replaces the beliefs about moral reasons for action which 
we previously embraced with beliefs about practical norms which are accepted by our 
communities.  The precise form of relativism I argue we should adopt has numerous features 
which may not be typical among conventional relativist views.  I therefore explain in detail 
what the atypical or novel features of my proposed form of relativism are, and why they are 
advantageous in the post-error-theory context. 
The final main part of the thesis in chapters 6 and 7 is devoted to defending the proposal I 
make in chapter 5, bearing in mind the commitments ‘inherited’ from the arguments for error 
theory and the reasons for the failure of previous responses to the ‘what now?’ problem.  In 
chapter 6 I argue that my proposal is preferable to the existing responses to the ‘what now?’ 
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problem.  For each existing response, I recap the objections I raised in chapter 4, and then 
show why revolutionary relativism can avoid or better cope with each objection. 
In chapter 7 I defend my proposal against several key direct objections.  First I discuss the 
strongest challenges to traditional forms of relativism, and show that my proposal can cope 
with them and thus stand on its own two feet, philosophically speaking.  Then I discuss the 
strongest objections to my proposal which could be made specifically in the post-error-theory 
context.  No one can predict and anticipate every potential objection to any view, but the 
objections I discuss in this chapter are the most problematic I can foresee.   
In chapter 8 I draw all of the above together and offer my conclusion.  To state my conclusion 
as succinctly as possible, I believe that revolutionary relativism can succeed where others fail 
and be a satisfying response to the ‘what now?’ problem.  As such, revolutionary relativism is 
an important new contribution to this area of metaethics.  
 5 
Chapter 2.  Introduction to Moral Error Theory 
While its roots stretch back much further in time, the point of departure for moral error theory 
in most contemporary debates is J. L. Mackie’s 1977 book, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.2  
In Ethics, Mackie argues that we cannot avoid the conclusion that morality itself is 
fundamentally and systematically flawed, and as a result, that all affirmative first order moral 
judgements (for example that torture is wrong) are in error (1977 p. 49).  In modern parlance, 
Mackie and subsequent error theorists ultimately argue that that there is nothing – nor can 
there ever be anything – which is morally permitted, required or forbidden.  As a result, error 
theorists conclude that whenever anyone judges that torture is wrong or that we are morally 
obliged to help others in need, they are always mistaken. 
The impact and implications of this, both in terms of debates within philosophy and in terms 
of our everyday moral lives, cannot be underestimated.  Indeed, Simon Robertson is hardly 
exaggerating when he writes ‘The opening chapter of John Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right 
and Wrong reset the metaethical agenda of the late twentieth century’ (2008 p. 107).3  Moral 
thought and discourse are so fundamentally intertwined with human society and psychology 
that many people would find it difficult to accept that there is nothing which we morally ought 
or ought not to do.  After all, the committed moral error theorist must agree that not only is 
there no moral reason to pay taxes or to refrain from breaking promises, but also that there 
is nothing morally wrong with rape, that we have no moral grounds on which to criticise the 
 
2 For an insightful commentary on some of the historical precursors to Mackie’s moral error theory, see 
Olson 2014, part 1. 
3 Also deserving of a mention in this context is John Burgess, who was working along similar lines to 
Mackie at around the same time, but whose paper Against Ethics remained unpublished until much 
later (see Burgess 2007).  
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state-ordered crucifixion of teenagers, and conversely that there is nothing morally good 
about acting to prevent children – even one’s own children - dying of starvation.4 
Virtually anyone capable of understanding moral error theory will find these latter claims 
jarring, even alarming.  We have grown up in societies where many kinds of action, especially 
actions which are brutally violent or predatory, are seen as simply evil – never, ever to be 
permitted and always to be emphatically opposed.  Likewise, the idea that some actions are 
morally good arguably plays an important role in our wellbeing by contributing towards a 
feeling that we are doing the right thing; that we are living good lives.  Whether absorbed 
from our societies or arrived at by independent thought, moral considerations are deeply 
embedded in our identities as human beings. 
Probably the most natural reaction to learning about moral error theory, then, is to wonder 
how exactly the error theorists can arrive at such stark conclusions.  As compelling as all this 
may be, however, my aim here is not to defend a moral error theory.  Mackie’s original 
arguments have been the subject of no small amount of discussion already, and numerous 
philosophers have subsequently taken up - and significantly advanced - the cause of error 
theory.  Most influential among them is Richard Joyce, who, along with others such as Jonas 
Olson and Bart Streumer, has re-presented moral error theory in a way which avoids many of 
the pitfalls which commentators find in the arguments presented by Mackie in Ethics.  In this 
thesis I will have little to add to the excellent work of these philosophers and others like them 
in discussing arguments for and defences of error theory.  Rather, my aim here is to consider 
what we can or should do if the error theorists are right.  If there is indeed nothing which is 
morally required, permitted or forbidden, and we come to accept and understand this, then 
 
4 The crucifixion of teenagers has been the subject of outcry in recent years, see e.g. Mezzofiore 2015. 
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what, if anything, should we do about it?  I call this the ‘what now?’ problem, and the ultimate 
aim of this thesis is to propose a new response to this problem. 
In order to prepare the way for my proposal, however, we must first get clear about what 
today’s error theorists actually say.  Only then will we be equipped to consider possible 
responses to the ‘what now?’ problem from an informed position and in a way which will 
allow us to check for inconsistencies with arguments deployed by error theorists en route to 
an error theory, and so be sure that the responses we are considering are not self-
undermining.  I will begin in sections 2.1 to 2.1.4 by outlining the nature of traditional morality, 
i.e. the morality which most people currently believe in, according to error theorists.5  Then 
in section 2.2, I will draw together the chapter as a whole and give a clear and concise 
statement of the error theory as I will understand it throughout the rest of this thesis. 
I will then move on in chapter 3 to explain why error theorists argue that a moral error theory 
is inescapable.  I will start with a brief overview of Mackie’s seminal discussion, and then move 
on to present what most current commentators take to be the best kind of argument for a 
moral error theory.  Having established all of this, we will then be in a position to consider the 
motivating question behind this thesis in an appropriately informed and rigorous way – if the 
error theorists are right, what should we do about it? 
 
5 A note on terminology which it will be important to bear in mind throughout this thesis.  Whenever I 
use the term morality without qualification, I am referring to this ‘traditional’ or ‘folk’ morality which 
error theorists claim is the best analysis of moral thought and discourse as understood and used by 
most people who have not yet accepted the truth of a moral error theory (or otherwise come to 
understand moral thought and discourse in a way which is relevantly consistent with accepting a moral 
error theory). 
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2.1  The nature of morality according to error theorists 
A persuasive argument for an error theory of any domain of thought or discourse must begin 
with an analysis of the target domain. Only if that analysis a) is more plausible than any 
competing analyses of the target field and b) leads inevitably to an error theory should we 
accept the error theory in question is true.6  Accordingly, moral error theorists must begin by 
arguing for a particular analysis of traditional morality.  It is not my task to argue for or against 
error theorists’ typical analysis of traditional morality.  But for my thesis to make sense to the 
reader as we move on, it is vital to establish exactly what error theorists claim about morality.  
In other words, if we are going to consider what we should do if the error theorists are right, 
we will need to know exactly what the error theorists are right about.  
Probably the most direct way to approach this is to examine what error theorists typically 
claim is going on when we sincerely make a judgement which can be expressed by a simple 
indicative subject-predicate sentence, such as ‘torture is wrong’.  I will run through and briefly 
explain each of the important features of error theorists’ typical claims about this kind of 
judgement and about sincere utterances of sentences which express this kind of judgement.  
In what follows, we should bear in mind that error theory is a second order view.  Error 
theorists are not primarily concerned with the moral status of one kind of action versus 
 
6 I draw here form Daly & Liggins’ discussion (2010 p. 219) of an argument by Crispin Wright against 
error theory.  That discussion is couched in terms of discourse, whereas here I also include moral 
thought, i.e. moral judgements as well as moral sentences.  Note that Daly & Liggins refer to the best 
analysis, as opposed to one which is more plausible than any competing analyses.  I prefer my own 
formulation because I believe that it can be doubted whether any analysis of a domain of discourse 
which leads to an error theory can be properly called the best analysis unless is it also plausibly the 
correct analysis.  For if two analyses are very nearly as plausible as one another, but one of them leads 
to an error theory, I believe a significant proportion of people would consider this a reason to find the 
analysis which does not result in an error theory the more plausible of the two.  This is similar but 
slightly different to Wright’s worry which Daly & Liggins discuss.  However for economy’s sake I set this 
issue aside here. 
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another.  Rather, error theorists are concerned initially with analysing what rightness and 
wrongness are, and whether anything can instantiate them. 
2.1.1.  Assertion 
In non-moral contexts, basic subject-predicate sentences are typically used to make 
assertions.  For example, when we speak the words ‘the earth is flat’, the most straightforward 
interpretation of this utterance is as an assertion of the proposition the earth is flat, i.e. as the 
speaker presenting this proposition as true.7 This interpretation is borne out by the way we 
use such sentences in conversational contexts – conversationally appropriate responses to 
‘the earth is flat’ might include ‘no it isn’t’ or ‘I couldn’t agree more’. These responses are not 
how we respond to non-assertoric uses of language, such as commands or expressions of 
desire, which are not truth-apt.  Rather, they are typical of how we respond to assertions 
which present propositions as true, and which can be doubted or believed. 8 
Moral error theorists typically claim that the same is true in the moral case. Joyce in particular 
is very explicit about the fundamental assertoricity of moral discourse, saying that at their 
most basic level, ‘moral utterances turn out to be assertions’ (2001,p. 15, emphasis original). 
According to error theorists, when we say ‘torture is morally wrong’, we are (typically 
primarily) asserting – i.e. presenting it as true - that torture is morally wrong, or alternatively 
that people morally ought not to torture others.  Again, this interpretation is plausibly borne 
out by the way we use basic indicative moral sentences in conversational contexts.  Burgess 
 
7 See e.g. Wright’s claim that there is a ‘basic, platitudinous connection of assertion and truth: asserting 
a proposition-a Fregean thought-is claiming that it is true’ (1992 p. 23). 
8 There are of course numerous other uses for this kind of sentence which would be permissible in 
English – a speaker uttering ‘the earth is flat’ could be being sarcastic, or could be lying, and so on.  But 
these are not the most basic primary uses of such sentences, and their effect arguably depends on a 
background linguistic convention of interpreting subject-predicate sentences as assertions. These non-
assertoric uses of language are something I will return to in later chapters.  But for now, we need only 
consider the most basic, sincere use of this kind of sentence. 
 10 
offers examples: ‘One who says “Abortion is as wicked as murder,” may meet with the 
response, “I doubt that very much!” or “Do you sincerely believe that?”’ (2007 p. 429).  These 
responses are conversationally appropriate, and support the claim that moral discourse is 
primarily assertoric.9 
2.1.2.  Belief 
At the same time as making an assertion, when we sincerely utter ‘the earth is flat’, we are 
also typically expressing a mental state - a judgement about the flatness or otherwise of the 
earth.  There are numerous kinds of mental state which we can express through language – 
hopes, fears, beliefs, expectations, demands and so on.  But in the non-moral case of sincerely 
uttering ‘the earth is flat’, it seems most reasonable to take the relevant mental state to be a 
belief.  As with assertion, this is borne out by the way we use such sentences in conversational 
contexts; if someone says ‘the earth is flat’, it would be conversationally appropriate to agree 
or to contradict them, whereas it would be nonsensical to reply as if to an expectation or 
command or by saying ‘don’t worry, one day you’ll look back on it and laugh’. 
This is not the place for a full account of the exact nature of beliefs. But a reasonably standard 
account of beliefs would include that belief is a mental state which consists in having an 
attitude towards some proposition such that the believer takes the proposition to accurately 
represent the state of affairs in the world.  One common way of putting this is to say that 
beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of fit, i.e. that what is in the mind – the propositional 
content of the mental state of belief - aims to fit with the way things are in the world.10  
Typically, this means that beliefs are sensitive to evidence; should we believe that p, and then 
 
9 The term assertoric is often connected with speech act theory.  Indeed it would be possible to rephrase 
some of the above in terms of speech acts, e.g. in terms of perlocutionary aims (see e.g. Austin 1962 p. 
94ff.).  But I take the term assertoric to be sufficiently intuitive that further digression into such territory 
is not required here.  For an overview of speech act theory, see Green 2017. 
10 See e.g. Railton 1994 for a discussion of the influential idea that beliefs by definition ‘aim at truth’. 
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encounter evidence that not-p, we will typically cease to believe that p, and instead come to 
believe that not-p.  Thus if we believe that the world is flat, but then encounter conclusive 
evidence that the world is round, we will typically cease to believe that the world is flat, or 
else risk of being considered irrational or delusional.  This contrasts with non-cognitive 
attitudes such as desires, which are commonly thought to have a world-to-mind direction of 
fit, and so to not be sensitive to evidence in the same way - if we desire that p, and have 
evidence that not-p, then we will typically continue to desire that p, and be motivated to 
change the way things are in the world such that p obtains.11    
This brings out a further distinction between beliefs and other mental states such as desires, 
namely that beliefs are commonly thought to be motivationally inert, i.e. there seems to be 
no necessary link between having a belief and being motivated to act.  By contrast, desires 
are commonly thought to be motivational, i.e. my having a desire seems to play an important 
causal role in my acting so as to bring that desire about.  For example, if I have a desire relating 
to the printer on my desk, say a desire to print a document, then this seems to play a key role 
in causing me to use the printer on my desk to print a document.  Yet my belief that there is 
a printer on my desk seems unlikely to result in any action in particular unless it is 
accompanied by a desire which would be satisfied by using the printer. 
Again, moral error theorists typically think the same is true in the moral case, and argue that 
moral judgements are beliefs.  This view is known as moral cognitivism.12  According to 
cognitivists, when we sincerely say ‘torture is morally wrong’, we are expressing a belief that 
 
11 For an overview of belief, see Schwitzgebel 2015.  For more on direction of fit and the sensitivity of 
beliefs to evidence, see Humberstone 1992 (which includes discussion of various authorities in the field, 
hence my claim that a standard view of belief would include the features discussed above) and Smith 
1994 p. 7 & §4.6, pp. 111-116. 
12 Since I will hereafter use the unqualified term cognitivism exclusively to refer to cognitivism about 
morality, i.e. the view that moral judgements are beliefs, and will not use it to refer to other domains 
of cognitivism (e.g. the school of thought in psychology which sought to respond to behaviourism), I 
will frequently omit the ‘moral’ from here onwards. 
 12 
acts of torture have a property of moral wrongness, or alternatively that it is morally 
obligatory for all agents to refrain from torture.  And again, this is borne out by our use of 
moral terms, and Burgess’ examples quoted above serve to support a cognitivist 
interpretation of morality as well as the view that moral discourse is assertoric. 
A further reason why error theorists are typically cognitivists about morality is that, if torture 
is wrong, it is commonly thought that this is somehow an objective matter.  We speak and 
apparently think as if whether or not torture is wrong is something we know, not as if the 
wrongness of torture is a matter of our non-cognitive attitudes such as our desires, 
expectations, hopes and so on.  There is an apparent objectivity or externality about putative 
moral facts which is consistent with moral facts being the kind of thing we believe in, and thus 
with moral judgements being beliefs.13 
This is not to say that moral error theorists, or cognitivists more generally, deny that moral 
utterances can express mental states other than beliefs.  For it is abundantly clear from 
observing our moral discourse that we do indeed use it to express emotions, issue commands 
and so on.  But these other ways in which we may use moral discourse are pragmatic rather 
than semantic – they are matters of what we can do with moral utterances rather than what 
the linguistic meaning of moral utterances is.  In terms of their linguistic meaning, cognitivists 
hold that moral utterances conventionally express beliefs.  Analogies can readily be drawn to 
many other areas of discourse, for example an exasperated parent shouting ‘two plus two is 
four!’ at a child who has got their sums wrong can easily be interpreted as expressing 
emotions, or demanding something of the child.  But this does not affect the fact that the 
primary, conventional role of ‘two plus two is four’ in our discourse is to assert a proposition 
 
13 As Mackie puts it, ‘It is a very natural reaction to any non-cognitive analysis of ethical terms to protest 
that there is more to ethics than this, something more external to the maker of moral judgements, 
more authoritative over both him and those of or to whom he speaks’ (1977 p. 32).  This 
phenomenology, i.e. the apparent ‘externality’ of moral facts is also discussed by Smith (1993). 
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and (arguments in the philosophy of mathematics notwithstanding) express a belief.  And 
moral error theorists take this to be the primary role of indicative sentences in our moral 
discourse. 
2.1.3.  Moral normativity 
Now we turn to moral normativity, the sense in which if torture is morally wrong, that means 
in some way or other that one ought not or is obliged not to torture.  There is a quality to 
moral obligation which, although intuitively quite easy to understand, is tricky to pin down 
and isolate when discussing metaethics.14  Suppose that we believe that torture is wrong, and 
we encounter a person who habitually tortures others.  The moral wrongness of torture, 
according to our belief, means that we will likely condemn the torturer’s actions, and perhaps 
we will attempt to convince or even compel her to refrain from torture in the future.  We may 
well also feel outrage or a desire to punish her for her moral transgressions.  Underlying all of 
these reactions is a sense in which we believe that the wrongness of torture somehow makes 
it the case that people should not engage in torture; that there is an authoritative moral 
obligation or reason for all agents not to torture other agents.  And it is a distinctive feature 
of moral reasons that they apply to all agents, regardless of agents’ desires or ends.   
Various terms are used to attempt to capture this sense of normativity, such as ‘objective 
prescriptivity’, ‘authority’, the somewhat colloquial ‘non-evaporatibility’ (Joyce 2001 p. 35) 
and ‘practical clout’ (Joyce 2006 p. 57), or the more formal ‘count[ing] in favour of or 
requir[ing] certain courses of behaviour, where the favouring relation is irreducibly normative’ 
(Olson 2014 p. 118).  Olson even gives a list (2014 p. 117) of further attempts by others to find 
an appropriate term.  All of these locutions are intended to convey the sense in which 
 
14 Cf. Hattiangadi 2006, p. 228: ‘The distinction between hypothetical and categorical ‘oughts’ is difficult 
to draw’. 
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according to error theorists, if one is morally obligated to pursue a course of action, one has 
that obligation regardless of one’s desires, ends, interests or, often, beliefs.  Moral facts entail 
(or simply are) reasons for action which apply to all moral agents simply by virtue of the fact 
that they are moral agents.15 
The term I will use is non-institutional categorical reason, or categorical reason for short.  To 
make it as clear as possible what categorical reasons are, consider the following three kinds 
of practical reason.  First, a hypothetical reason, i.e. one which depends on an agent’s desires 
or ends.  Say you want to get to town by 11 o’clock, and I know that the bus which stops at 
the nearby bus stop at 10.30 will get you to town on time.  I might say ‘you ought to get the 
10.30 bus’.  This ‘ought’ implies that you have a reason to do something, but that reason is 
dependent on your desire to get to town by 11 o’clock.  Anyone who lacks such a desire, 
including you if you change your mind about your plans, also lacks a reason to catch the 10.30 
bus. 
Second, consider what is often called an institutional categorical reason, i.e. one which applies 
to agents regardless of their desires or ends, but only in virtue of some institution they are 
participating in or a role they are playing.  For example, if I am playing chess, it is my turn, and 
I am playing as black, then I have a reason not to move any white pieces, regardless of whether 
I might wish to do so.  The rules of chess and the fact that I am currently playing the game 
dictate that this is the case.  So the reason I have is independent of my desires, but it only 
applies because I am playing chess, and it does not apply to anyone who is not playing chess.  
 
15 ‘Moral agent’ will be taken here to mean any agent capable of moral deliberation and practical 
choice, i.e. anyone who can make a judgement about what the morally right and/or wrong course of 
action might be, and who can choose to act accordingly.  Further refinements of the terminology of 
agency etc. are unnecessary for present purposes. 
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Finally, consider torture.  If we believe that torture is morally wrong, according to error 
theorists this means we believe that all agents are obliged – that is, have a moral reason – not 
to torture others.  And this reason is categorical in a non-institutional sense in that it is an 
authoritative reason for all agents, no matter what their desires or ends, and no matter what 
role they might be playing.  So to return to our torturer, if she replies to our moral outrage by 
saying ‘But I really want to torture people!’, we will not reply ‘Oh, in that case it’s fine, go 
ahead’.  And neither will our moral condemnation lessen if we discover that the torturer has 
significantly different moral beliefs, according to which torture is morally permissible. Rather, 
it seems intuitively plausible that we would say that the torturer was wrong, and we were 
right. 
Moral error theorists typically hold that this inescapability, this normative independence from 
an agent’s desires, ends or interests which I am calling categorical normativity is an essential 
part of morality.16  Joyce goes so far as to claim that ‘we might well think that it is the whole 
point of having a moral language’ (2000 p. 463).  Joyce’s point is that if we attempt to analyse 
moral discourse and behaviour in any way which leaves this definitively moral characteristic 
out of the picture, moral error theorists typically respond that it is not morality which we are 
analysing, but rather something weaker which merely appears to be morality.  In Joyce’s 
parlance (e.g. 2001 p. 3), it is a ‘non-negotiable’ commitment of moral thought and discourse 
that moral reasons are categorical. 
2.1.4.  Truth conditions 
Error theorists’ commitments to the assertoricity of moral discourse and to cognitivism entail 
that moral beliefs are truth-apt, i.e. can be true or false.  But what are the truth conditions of 
 
16 See e.g. Olson 2010 p. 3, ‘What makes moral facts queer is that they make demands from which we 
cannot escape’. 
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moral beliefs - in virtue of what are they true or false?  As before, consider a non-moral belief 
that the earth is flat.  This can be understood as a belief that the earth has a certain property 
of flatness.  This belief will be true or false dependent on the (natural) facts of the matter - if 
we think of all of the possible worlds in which there is an earth, then the belief will be true in 
all those possible worlds in which the earth has the property of flatness, and false otherwise. 
For error theorists, the same is true of moral beliefs.  That is to say, a belief which ascribes a 
moral property, e.g. a belief that torture is wrong, is true or false depending on the (moral) 
facts of the matter - if the actual world is one in which torture has the property of moral 
wrongness, then the belief is true, otherwise it is false. 
For Mackie, moral properties and facts (facts about whether the relevant properties are 
instantiated) cannot be natural properties and facts, i.e. the kinds of properties and facts 
which are the domain of the natural sciences.  This is because the kinds of natural properties 
which feature in scientific descriptions of the world do not include any normative properties, 
i.e. properties which make it the case that we ought or ought not to do anything in particular.  
Even the natural fact that torture causes suffering does not, according to Mackie (1977 p. 33), 
make it the case that I ought to refrain from torture unless I also have some desire or end 
which would be served by so refraining.  This, Mackie argues, falls short of the way we think 
and speak about morality – if torture is wrong, we typically regard that as somehow normative 
for all agents, regardless of their desires or ends.  That someone really wants to torture others 
is not generally thought to affect whether torture is morally wrong and therefore ought not 
to be engaged in. Thus moral properties must be, according to Mackie, non-natural 
properties.17 
 
17 Here Mackie is drawing on a famous passage in Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (Hume 1739 
SBN469/T 3.1.1.27), wherein Hume observes that although many philosophers overlook it, there can 
be no causal link between an ‘is’ and an ‘ought’, that is, between a natural and a moral fact.  When 
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More modern error theorists have tended to focus less on the natural or non-natural 
properties which certain acts or situations may instantiate, and have concentrated instead on 
the categoricity of moral normativity.  Comparatively slight differences in focus or terminology 
aside, this is the basis of Joyce’s sustained argument for an error theory (2001), the most 
substantial part of Olson’s argument (2014 chapter 6), and is the strategy recommended to 
all would-be error theorists by Robertson (2008).  Thus for today’s error theorists, for a moral 
belief such as torture is wrong to be true, i.e. for torture to have the property of moral 
wrongness, it must be the case that there exists a reason for all agents not to torture others 
which is authoritative for all agents, regardless of those agents’ desires or ends, and regardless 
of any institution they might be participating in. 18 
2.2.  Summary, and statement of the error theory 
To briefly recap, then, error theorists typically make various claims about the nature of 
traditional morality – the morality which we, the ‘folk’ typically speak and think in terms of 
today.  Error theorists claim that the way we think and talk about morality demonstrate that 
when we judge that torture is wrong, that judgement is a belief, and so is truth apt, i.e. capable 
of being right or wrong.  Accordingly, error theorists typically hold that moral discourse is 
 
considering the example of a cruel act, Mackie says that we think that ‘it is wrong because it is a piece 
of deliberate cruelty.  But just what in the world is signified by this “because”?’ (1977 p. 41, emphasis 
original).  Following Hume, Mackie sees no way in which the natural facts of a situation could give rise 
to normative facts. 
18 It is a matter of debate whether problematic features such as categorical normativity are entailed by 
the content/truth conditions of moral claims, or are presupposed by moral claims.  I have framed the 
matter here broadly along the lines of the entailment view (i.e. that ‘x is wrong’ entails that there are 
categorical reasons not to x, because there being such reasons is part of the truth conditions of ‘x is 
wrong’).  But it should be noted that it is also possible to formulate moral error theory in terms of moral 
claims presupposing, rather than entailing, the existence of relevant categorical reasons.  According to 
this variant of error theory, since there are no categorical reasons, this presupposition fails.  Yet the 
existence of categorical reasons is not part of the truth conditions of moral claims, and so moral claims 
are not false, but rather fail to refer, and are thus meaningless. See e.g. Kalf 2013, Perl & Schroeder 
2019, Olson 2014 p. 14-15, Sobel 2019, p. 3.  Nothing here is intended to turn on this distinction.  But 
readers who take issue with this may substitute ‘fail to be true’ or ‘meaningless’ where appropriate 
without, I believe, fatally undermining my discussion. 
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assertoric – when we express a moral belief that torture is wrong, we are making a positive 
claim about the world, and not simply expressing our feelings on the matter or speaking as if 
there were some kind of moral fact about torture.  To be more precise, error theorists claim 
that when we assert that torture is wrong, we are (possibly inter alia, but nonetheless vitally) 
claiming that it is a fact that torture has some kind of moral property such that all agents, 
regardless of their desires or ends, have inescapable, authoritative reason to refrain from 
torture.  One upshot of this group of claims about traditional morality is that moral beliefs and 
moral claims can be true only if the relevant kinds of normative properties exist.  But – and 
this is a very weighty philosophical ‘but’ indeed – error theorists then claim that there are not 
- and in fact cannot be - any properties of the kind required for beliefs and claims which ascribe 
moral properties to be true. 
Drawing all this together more formally, I can now offer a formulation of the error theory 
which I will treat as typical for the rest of this thesis.  Naturally individual error theorists will 
have their own more detailed and specific formulations, but mine is a broad formulation 
which captures the key features of modern moral error theories while avoiding taking sides in 
the more intricate debates between defenders of specific error theories. 
1. Moral judgements are beliefs. 
2. Moral utterances are typically assertoric, and express moral beliefs. 
3. Moral beliefs ascribe moral properties. 
4. Moral beliefs are true only if the actions or situations they are about have the 
moral properties which those beliefs ascribe to them. 
5. No action or situation has or could ever have moral properties. 




The foregoing sections have laid out premises 1-4.  While these premises are not universally 
accepted, they are broadly plausible, and are accepted by many philosophers.  However 
premise 5 is quite a philosophical bombshell, and is the focus of intense debate.  It is also the 
crux of the error theory as a whole.  Therefore, having laid out the key features of error 
theorists’ view of traditional morality in this chapter, I will turn in the next chapter to the 
arguments error theorists deploy in support of premise 5, and thus in support of the 
conclusion that a moral error theory is unavoidable.  This will conclude the ‘stage setting’ part 
of my thesis, and I will then move on to discuss what we can and should do if we accept that 





Chapter 3.  Arguments for a Moral Error Theory 
In the previous chapter I established what typical error theorists claim are the key features of 
morality, and offered a formulation of a ‘master’ argument for error theory which broadly 
captured the main features of the various more nuanced arguments advanced by error 
theorists to date.  At the heart of all moral error theories is a claim which I rendered as 
5.  No action or situation has or could ever have moral properties. 
In this chapter, I will explain how error theorists defend this claim, and thus how they move 
from their analysis of morality to the conclusion that we must embrace an error theory to the 
effect that there are no affirmative moral facts, no authoritative moral obligations, and 
nothing which we are, or can ever be, morally required, permitted or forbidden to do. 
The foundational serious and sustained attempt to argue for a moral error theory comes from 
Mackie in Ethics (1977).  Most famously, Mackie deployed an ‘argument from queerness’, i.e. 
an argument that if we examine various aspects of moral thought and discourse, we find that 
in order for our moral thought and discourse to be successful, moral facts must be unlike 
anything else with which we are acquainted.  This gives us strong grounds, Mackie argues, to 
be sceptical that moral facts exist. 
As seminal as Mackie’s discussion was, however, subsequent error theorists have largely 
abandoned most of the avenues of argument Mackie identified, and have concentrated on 
one central aspect of Mackie’s discussion.19  Therefore, while what Mackie has to say is 
 
19 For a detailed discussion of the arguments found in Ethics, including reasons why error theorists 
should abandon most of Mackie’s lines of thought and focus mainly on the normativity issue, see Olson 
2014, chapters 5 and 6.  Robertson  makes a similar argument (2008).  And Joyce actually presents a 
version of one of Mackie’s other arguments even though he admits that he finds it implausible, simply 
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interesting, and important as the basis of the subsequent debates which led to more refined 
and detailed arguments for error theory, it is not economical in the context of this thesis to 
dwell on Mackie himself other than to give him due credit as one of the main figures in the 
history of moral error theory.  Having done so, I will now move directly on to discuss moral 
normativity, and what most metaethicists today take to be the best argument for a moral 
error theory.  
Section 3.1 will introduce the normativity arguments.  I will discuss two main varieties of 
normativity argument, Olson’s argument in §3.2, and Joyce’s argument in §3.3.  It will be 
important for later chapters to be very clear about these arguments, and so the discussion I 
will present will be quite detailed - especially Joyce’s argument, which will occupy §3.3.1-
3.3.8.  Finally in §3.4 I will draw together chapters 2 and 3 by summing up the key features of 
moral error theory and the principal argument for it, and so conclude the ‘stage setting’ part 
of my thesis.  I will then move on in chapter 4 to argue that the error theory confronts us with 
a significant problem: if we accept that the error theorists are right, what now? 
3.1.  Introduction to the normativity arguments 
As a general strategy, error theorists’ arguments for a moral error theory typically have two 
parts.  First, error theorists seek to identify one or more commitments of moral thought and 
discourse which are definitive of moral thought and discourse per se.  Joyce calls these ‘non-
negotiable’ commitments (2001 p. 17.).20  Should any theory fail to take account of even one 
non-negotiable commitment of moral thought and discourse, it will fail to be a theory of 
 
to demonstrate the structure of the argument about normativity which is his actual argument for error 
theory (2001 chapter 1). 
20 Note that I will be assuming the analysis of morality described in the previous chapter from here on, 
even if I do not specify this.  Essentially any characterisations of morality may hereafter be read with 
an implicit preface of ‘according to typical error theorists, as outlined in chapter 2’ unless stated 
otherwise. 
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morality.  Second, error theorists then attempt to show that at least one of the identified non-
negotiable commitments is fatally problematic, for example that it is sufficiently queer in 
some way that we should be sceptical that it exists (as e.g. Olson argues), or that we can make 
no sense of it (as Joyce argues). In combination, these two steps lead us to an error theory of 
morality.   
According to typical error theorists, a key non-negotiable commitment of moral thought and 
discourse which can be shown to be fatally problematic is the kind of non-institutional 
categorical normativity I described in §2.1.3.21  To show how, I will discuss the two most 
developed and effective normativity arguments deployed by error theorists to date, those 
from Olson and Joyce.  I believe that Joyce’s argument is the more successful of the two, and 
covers key areas which Olson’s argument cannot address.  However, the reader may disagree, 
and in any event it is instructive to contrast the two, and so both arguments have a place here. 
3.2. Olson’s argument 
3.2.1.  Reducible versus irreducible normativity 
We saw earlier in §2.1.3 that one way to understand the desire/end independence of moral 
facts is to draw a distinction between hypothetical, institutional (also called weak categorical) 
and categorical reasons for action.  Prior to 2014, Olson observed this distinction, and 
‘maintained that moral facts are queer because they are or entail categorical reasons’ (2014 
p. 117, referring to Olson 2010, emphasis original).  However, more recently he came to 
believe that the distinction is better articulated in terms of reducibly and irreducibly 
 
21 I leave open the possibility of identifying multiple non-negotiable commitments of moral discourse.  
Though error theorists typically agree that (at least some variant of) the normativity argument 
presently under discussion is sufficiently conclusive to underwrite a moral error theory, we should not 
rule out other arguments which could be made. 
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normative favouring relations.  Thus his view is that ‘moral facts are queer [to the extent that 
we should be skeptics about their existence] in that they are or entail facts that count in favour 
of or require certain courses of behaviour, where the favouring relation is irreducibly 
normative’ (2014 p. 118).  We can simplify this terminology to a distinction between reducibly 
and irreducibly normative reasons.22 
Reducibly normative reasons are reasons which reduce to non-normative facts about what 
promotes the satisfaction of an agent’s desires, non-normative facts about correctness norms, 
or non-normative facts about an agent’s roles or rule-governed activities.23  Slightly expanding 
on the explanation I gave in the previous chapter, consider the following examples of how 
reasons can reduce in relevant ways.  In the case of desire, we might say that if I desire to get 
to town before 12.30, then I have a reason to catch the train at 11.30.  This reason is reducible 
to the non-normative fact that the 11.30 train gets to town at 12.15, the non-normative fact 
that I wish to get to town before 12.30, and what Olson calls the favouring relation between 
these facts and the action of catching the train.  This favouring relation is itself reducible to a 
further non-normative fact, namely that performing the relevant action (i.e. catching the 
11.30 train) while the other facts obtain will (very likely) satisfy my relevant desire.  Hence 
Olson calls this kind of favouring relation a reducibly normative favouring relation.  Given the 
way these facts combine to constitute my reason to catch the train, I will cease to have a 
reason to do so if I cease to have the relevant desire. 
Similarly, in the case of correctness or rule-governed activities, we might say that a tennis 
player has a reason to serve the ball such that it bounces in a particular marked area of the 
 
22 Olson himself simplifies his terminology in this way (ibid.). 
23 It could be argued that rather than ‘the satisfaction of an agent’s desires’, this might be better 
phrased as ‘the fulfilment of agents’ non-cognitive attitudes’ or something similar.  For example, a 
desire-like attitude such as hope could ground agents’ reasons in a similar manner to desires.  I limit 
the discussion here to desires in order to avoid complicating matters too much at this early stage. 
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court when they are serving.  This reason is reducible to the non-normative fact that hitting 
the ball in this fashion is correct according to the rules of tennis, the non-normative fact that 
the agent is currently playing tennis, and a favouring relation between these facts and hitting 
the ball in the prescribed fashion – a relation which in turn reduces to the non-normative fact 
that performing the prescribed action while the other facts obtain will conduce to successfully 
playing tennis.  So long as the agent is playing tennis, these facts ground a practical reason for 
the agent to hit the ball as prescribed.  But facts about the rules of tennis cannot ground 
similar practical reasons for any agent not currently serving in a game of tennis.   
And in the case of an agent’s roles, we might say that a ship’s helmsman has a reason to steer 
the ship according to the captain’s orders.  This reason is reducible to the relation between 
the non-normative fact that performing such tasks is part of the role of being a ship’s 
helmsman, the non-normative fact that the agent is indeed a helmsman, and the favouring 
relation between these facts and performing the action of steering the ship as the captain 
orders – a relation which in turn is reducible to facts about properly carrying out the duties of 
helmsmen.  This does not hold for any agent who is not a helmsman (or for the agent in 
question if she ceases to be a helmsman).24 
None of these reducibly normative kinds of reasons are problematic for error theorists like 
Olson.  This is because these reasons reduce to facts and relations about which there are no 
queerness worries – natural, non-normative facts and about agents’ desires, roles and so on, 
and the relevant relations between them, are fine.  Yet contrast these types of reason with 
moral normativity.  If we take a putative moral fact, say that it is morally wrong to torture 
people for fun, then according to error theorists’ view of how morality works, this entails that 
 
24 I am assuming in these examples that the agent is engaging sincerely in these activities/roles.  It is of 
course possible to complicate the picture by stipulating that the agent intends to throw the tennis game 
for a bet, or intends to be a disobedient helmsman.  But hopefully there are enough sporting tennis 
players and diligent helmsmen that the examples make sense as presented and therefore do their job! 
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we have a reason to refrain from torture.  This reason is irreducibly normative in that it is not 
reducible to the above kinds of non-normative facts and relations.   
If it is a fact that torture is morally wrong, then according to error theorists’ analysis of  
morality, we have reason to refrain from torture.  And unlike the above examples, this reason 
does not cease to apply to us if we have or lack any particular desires, if we are playing a game 
whose rules require torture, if we are professional torturers and so on.  In all of these cases, 
the reason to refrain from torture which is entailed by the fact that torture is morally wrong 
continues to be a reason for any agent, regardless of any contingent facts about that agent.25  
In Olson’s parlance, the fact that torture is wrong entails facts which count in favour of 
refraining from torture.  Yet moral facts and the favouring relations they may bear to agents’ 
actions cannot be reduced to non-normative facts in the same way as the examples above.  
Rather, if we attempt to break down moral normativity in the same manner, we will always 
encounter a putative favouring relation which essentially tells us ‘you just have to f, whether 
you like it or not’ (where f denotes an action of some kind), and which cannot be further 
explained in terms of non-normative facts.  Thus we can see that the target of Olson’s 
normativity argument, the location of the queerness he attributes to moral facts, is the 
favouring relation between moral facts and the courses of action they count in favour of. 
 
25 Strictly speaking, according to Olson the moral wrongness of torture entails a fact (which does not 
itself need to be normative), say that torture causes human suffering, and that fact grounds a reason 
for all agents to refrain from torture, irrespective of whether they want to avoid inflicting suffering.  
That any agent has such a reason is entailed by the fact that torture is morally wrong.  Thus there is an 
extra link or two in Olson’s chain of reasons.  I omit this detail because I worry that this potentially 
equates to a circularity along the lines of ‘the reason torture is morally wrong is that torture is morally 
wrong’.  Whether this is an issue is not important for my discussion.  I take the above discussion to get 
the presently required point across even with this omission. 
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Olson formulates his normativity argument accordingly (2014 p. 123-4) (I will add the prefix 
O, denoting Olson, to the steps in order to avoid confusion with other arguments which 
follow): 26 
O1.  Moral facts entail that there are facts that favour certain courses of 
behaviour, where the favouring relation is irreducibly normative. 
O2. Irreducibly normative favouring relations are queer. 
O3. Hence, moral facts entail queer relations. 
O4. If moral facts entail queer relations, moral facts are queer. 
O5. Hence, moral facts are queer 
If this argument is sound, then Olson takes himself to have successfully made the case for the 
queerness of moral facts and properties, and can then move on to pressing the argument that 
we should be skeptics about the existence of anything which is queer in the specified way. 
3.2.2.  Problems with Olson’s normativity argument 
Let us appraise Olson’s argument.  Olson points out (2014 p. 124-135) that error theorists may 
not have to agree with O1, and that at least one commentator, Stephen Finlay, has disagreed 
with it at length (Finlay 2008, 2009 & 2011). However my task is not to defend error theory, 
and in this chapter we are explicitly examining those arguments for an error theory which are 
predicated on something like the view of moral normativity captured by O1. That being the 
case, and since in the context of the foregoing sections here Olson’s premise is plausible, I will 
 
26 I have amended Olson’s numbering system of P12, C5 etc. in order to avoid confusion in the present 
context. 
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grant O1.  If O2 is true, then O4 seems unlikely to be particularly contentious.  The premise I 
wish to focus on is therefore O2.  It seems to me that this is the key premise in Olson’s 
argument, since if it cannot be defended, his argument fails to locate any queerness in moral 
normativity, and hence fails to provide any support for the overall argument that moral facts 
are queer in a fatally problematic way.  Given this, Olson’s whole argument would seem to 
ride on whether O2 can be satisfactorily defended. 
The issue with O2 is that Olson actually says very little to defend it.  Essentially, his support 
for this premise boils down to a few sentences culminating in ‘When the irreducibly normative 
favouring relation obtains between some fact and some course of behaviour, that fact is an 
irreducibly normative reason to take this course of behaviour.  Such irreducibly normative 
favouring relations appear metaphysically mysterious.  How can there be such relations?’ 
(2014 p. 136).  At face value, this is not an argument at all, but simply a rhetorical question.  
And as is universally acknowledged in philosophy, rhetorical questions are not arguments.  
Olson seems to be saying that irreducibly normative reasons are queer because they appear 
mysterious.  This kind of near-synonymic table thumping does not tell us anything. 
Olson observes that opponents (specifically non-naturalists, who claim that morally normative 
facts or properties exist, though are unlike the kind of natural facts or properties which are 
the domain of the natural sciences) can refuse to acknowledge that there is anything queer 
about such favouring relations, and suggests that their strategy for establishing this could be 
a ‘companions in guilt’ argument.  This would involve locating other, less contentious 
examples of irreducible normativity, and claiming that their existence shows that instances of 
irreducible normativity are not therefore puzzling.27  However, why should non-naturalists 
respond in this way?  They could reply much more directly that Olson’s assertion about the 
 
27 For an example of this kind of strategy, see Cuneo 2010. 
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queerness of irreducible normativity is seriously impoverished, and needs considerable 
supplementation before it presents a challenge which they would have to counter.  I will 
highlight five areas which non-naturalists might point to. 
The first area is the unqualified use of ‘appear metaphysically mysterious’.  When used in this 
way, the word ‘appear’ implies that we apprehend the mysteriousness in question via some 
kind of intuition.  Yet while Olson may have this intuition, many philosophers do not.  Olson 
therefore owes us an explanation of why we should have the same intuition he does.  While 
it might be extravagant for opponents to respond to Olson by demanding an entire theory of 
epistemic intuition, it seems they would be warranted in demanding an explanation of how 
intuition shows us that irreducibly normative reasons are queer.  For Olson to simply state 
that he has such an intuition (if this is even how we should read him) is unlikely to convince 
anyone else.  And if Olson does not intend his use of ‘appear’ in this intuitive way, it is not 
clear how he does intend it. 
Second, whatever it is that Olson means by queer, it is not clear that it amounts to the same 
thing as mysterious.  Many things are mysterious in the sense that they are difficult or even 
impossible to understand for most people.  Numerous phenomena described by quantum 
mechanics, for example, are certainly mysterious in this way.  Yet we do not take this 
mysteriousness to be reason to doubt their existence.  On a much more mundane scientific 
level, it is a mystery to me why moving certain metals in a magnetic field generates an 
electrical current.  However I do not doubt for a moment that it does.  Thus even if we did 
share Olson’s intuition that irreducibly normative reasons are mysterious, this does not force 
us to accept that they are queer in any way which makes them ontologically suspect. 
Third, we might read Olson as suggesting that the queerness of irreducibly normative reasons 
lies in their difference to other forms of (reducible) normativity.  Yet there is no reason to 
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think that simply because something is different to other things that it does not exist.  
Examples are ubiquitous – stones are different to colours, mass is different to money, and so 
on.  Even if something is so different from all other things that it is of a unique kind, this is not 
necessarily a bar to believing it exists.  Theists would claim that God was entirely unlike other 
entities, but this difference can hardly be claimed to support atheism in and of itself.  Olson 
owes us an account of why irreducibly normative reasons are different in a way which is 
problematic. 
Fourth, we might think that Olson is appealing to parsimony. In short, if we can explain moral 
thought and discourse without reference to irreducibly normative reasons, then those kinds 
of reasons may seem queer because they are surplus to our explanatory requirements.  But 
we must be careful to note where this appeal to parsimony occurs in the argument.  At this 
stage, we are still arguing about whether irreducibly normative relations are queer.  Non-
naturalists are yet to be convinced that they are queer, and such relations are therefore still 
on the table as part of a non-naturalist explanation of moral discourse and behaviour.  To say 
that they are surplus to explanatory requirements at this stage is to beg the question against 
the non-naturalist.28  Given that irreducibly normative reasons appear in non-naturalists’ 
explanation of moral discourse and practice, Olson needs to show that irreducible reasons are 
queer without reference to them being explanatorily surplus.  
Finally, and most basically, Olson has not demonstrated that the burden of proof lies on non-
naturalists.  We can read his question ‘How can there be such relations?’ as a demand for a 
general theory of reason relations which explains irreducibly normative favouring relations.  
Yet non-naturalists can respond with their own question – why should there not be such 
 
28 David Enoch, for example, argues that ‘irreducibly normative truths [are] deliberatively indispensable 
– they are, in other words, indispensable for the project of deliberating and deciding what to do’ (Enoch 
2011a chapter 3). 
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relations?29  If Olson’s analysis is correct, we already have widespread acceptance of 
irreducibly normative reasons, evinced by the putative belief that moral facts exist.  The 
burden of proof would appear at best to be in no mans’ land.  If the charge of queerness is to 
be made to stick, Olson needs to demonstrate that the burden of proof lies with non-
naturalists, in order that they have a charge to answer.  Until he does so, it is not clear that 
non-naturalists should have any reason to question their existing theories of practical reason. 
The general worry highlighted by these five points is that in order for Olson’s normativity 
argument to be convincing, he needs to supply a lot more argumentation to explain why 
exactly irreducibly normative favouring relations are problematically queer, and why non-
naturalists should bear the burden of proof of explaining how such relations might work.  This 
is where I will turn to discuss Joyce, as his normativity argument takes this as its principal 
theme. 
3.3.  Joyce’s normativity argument 
To refresh our memory by making the terms of the debate explicit again, as is typical of error 
theorists, Richard Joyce would largely agree with the last chapter’s characterisation of moral 
discourse as a field of discourse which aims at asserting facts about the world and of moral 
judgements as beliefs about those facts.  He also agrees that one of the most important, 
definitive features of moral discourse is that moral obligations are or entail practical reasons 
– that is, reasons for action – which are irreducibly normative (2006 p. 191).  Admittedly Joyce 
favours terms such as ‘strong categorical imperative’ (2001 p. 37), but by this he means 
something very similar to an irreducibly normative reason.30  He summarises this by saying ‘In 
 
29 Indeed, several people have tried to give an account of how there can be such relations – see 
Wedgewood (2007), Enoch (2011a) and McDowell (1985) for examples. 
30 It might be desirable to unify Olson’s and Joyce’s terminology here.  However, given the complex and 
nuanced nature of the arguments, I fear this ‘translation’ would be in danger of leading to confusion.  
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short, when we say that a person morally ought to act in a certain manner, we imply 
something about what she would have reason to do regardless of her desires and interests, 
regardless of whether she cares about her victim, and regardless of whether she can be sure 
of avoiding any penalties’ (2001 p. 134, emphasis original).  Observing the discussion of 
institutional roles above, and the later polemic between Joyce and Finlay (Finlay 2008 2011 & 
Joyce 2011, 2012), we should perhaps add ‘and regardless of any institutions she may be 
participating in’. 
Accordingly, Joyce formulates his normativity argument as follows (2001 p. 77), where x is any 
moral agent, and ɸ is a placeholder for an action which a moral agent may be required to 
perform or refrain from performing as a result of their moral obligations (I have added the 
label J to the steps to denote Joyce): 
J1.  If x morally ought to ɸ, then x ought to ɸ regardless of what his desires and 
interests are. 
J2. If x morally ought to ɸ, then x has reason for ɸing 
J3. Therefore, if x morally ought to ɸ, then x can have a reason for ɸing 
regardless of what his desires and interests are. 
J4. But there is no sense to be made of such reasons. 
J5. Therefore, x is never under a moral obligation. 31 
 
Suffice it to say that for the purposes of this section, we can read Olson-circa-2014’s ‘facts that count 
in favour of or require certain courses of behaviour, where the favouring relation is irreducibly 
normative’ as functionally equivalent to Joyce’s (and Olson’s previous) talk of ‘non-institutional 
categorical reasons’ – noting as we do so (and as I noted above) that Olson’s updated terminology helps 
us to be clearer about the targets of moral error theory in some ways. 
31 Joyce later (2012 p. 2) puts his argument in a more stripped down form, as follows: 
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Comparing this with Olson’s argument in §3.2.1, we can clearly see that J4 is very similar to 
O2, the key step in Olson’s argument, which I argued he failed to adequately support.  Where 
Joyce differs crucially from Olson is that in order to support J4, he does indeed supply a theory 
of normative reasons which goes beyond asserting that such reasons are queer, and actually 
seeks to show that we cannot make sense of them at all.  Therefore Joyce’s normativity 
argument is not intended to support an argument from queerness.32  Rather it is intended to 
be a standalone argument for a moral error theory.  Unless non-naturalists (or anyone else) 
can respond with an account of practical reasons which shows that sense can be made of 
moral obligation, Joyce argues that a moral error theory is inescapable.  The burden of proof, 
according to Joyce (ibid.) lies firmly on his opponents. 
3.3.1.  Joyce’s theory of normative reasons 
In order to see how Joyce’s theory of normative reasons supports his conclusion that we must 
accept a moral error theory, I will run through the theory quite briskly.  This will then frame 
the discussion in later chapters, forming the basis of what I will take to be an analysis typical 
among error theorists unless they specify otherwise.  Before I begin, we should be careful to 
observe that Joyce does not take his normativity argument to be definitive of moral error 
theory.  As the later polemic between Joyce and Stephen Finlay (Finlay 2008, 2011 & Joyce 
2011, 2012) illustrates, Joyce sees his normativity argument simply as a strong argument in 
favour of moral error theory.  But if his (or indeed any) normativity argument fails, this does 
not mean that error theory is false (cf. Joyce 2012 pp. 2-3).  To be clear, I am focusing on 
 
A. Conceptually, morality requires non-institutional categorical imperatives.  
B. But such things are indefensible.  
C. Therefore, moral discourse is bankrupt. 
I have chosen to use the slightly fuller version above since it makes it clearer that normativity is the 
focus. 
32 This is not to say that a proponent of a queerness argument could not make use of Joyce’s arguments 
in this area; there is no obvious incompatibility. 
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Joyce’s normativity argument here not because it is the only possible way to support an error 
theory, but because it is Joyce’s main argument, and is one of the most sophisticated, 
successful and influential arguments deployed in support of a moral error theory thus far. 
Joyce’s strategy is to investigate the concept of having a reason, and establish a plausible 
theory of how we can make sense of an agent having an authoritative reason to act, in virtue 
of which they ought to act in a specific way (i.e. a theory of normative reasons).  He then 
compares this theory with the kind of reason for action entailed by moral obligation.  As we 
have seen, the crucial point of comparison with moral reasons will be whether, given a 
plausible theory of normative reasons, we can make sense of non-institutional categorical 
moral reasons and obligations having any authority.  Put more simply, the question is whether 
moral reasons can have the ‘practical oomph’ our moral discourse commits us to them having. 
As noted above, Joyce’s arguments in this area are mainly intended to support J4.  I will 
present a distillation of Joyce’s arguments in order to pick out the salient points, with the 
discussion proceeding via the following stages:33 
H1.  Moral reasons purport to be non-institutional categorical reasons, and thus 
authoritative for all agents (i.e. they are inescapable). 
H2. If x is a reason for an agent, S, x must be authoritative for S. 
H3. Institutional and hypothetical reasons are authoritative, but not for all agents 
(i.e. they are escapable). 
 
33 I have used the label H to denote Hunt, i.e. my own presentation of Joyce’s discussion.  A more 
economical formulation may be possible (cf. footnote 31 above), but my presentation here should help 
to make things clearer. 
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H4. Reasons based on practical rationality are the best candidates for reasons 
which are authoritative for all agents. 
H5. Practical rationality cannot give rise to the same reasons for all agents. 
H6. Because of H4 and H5, there are no authoritative non-institutional categorical 
(i.e. inescapable) reasons. 
H7. H1, H2 and H6 taken together entail that there are no categorical reasons of 
the kind required by moral normativity. 
Premises H1 and H3 were explained in the previous chapter (see §2.1.3).  To unpack and 
explain the remaining premises, I will proceed as follows: section 3.3.2 will discuss H2 and 
how it leads into H4 and H5.  I will then explain the reasoning behind H4 in §3.3.3.  The 
arguments supporting H5 are more complex, and so I will split them into several sections to 
help clarify things.  First, §3.3.4 will introduce the various kinds of reason an agent can have, 
according to Joyce, and will examine how Joyce views the question of whether an agent is 
practically rational.  Then §3.3.5 will specify how the various kinds of reason which an agent 
may have are to be defined.  Following this, I will pause in section 3.3.6 to take stock of the 
argument thus far. 
There will then be two sections looking at the various facets of the question whether practical 
rationality can yield authoritative reasons for all agents, which is the bone of contention in 
H5.  Section 3.3.7 will consider whether the account up to this point might suggest that moral 
reasons can be grounded in desires which all agents have, and why Joyce dismisses this notion.  
Section 3.3.8 will consist in a discussion of whether practical rationality can nonetheless yield 
reasons which are authoritative for all agents in virtue of what it means to be practically 
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rational, a suggestion Joyce rejects.  Finally, in section 3.4 I will discuss the implications of 
Joyce’s theory of normative reasons for moral error theory in general. 
3.3.2.  Reasons for 
We begin the discussion of H2 with a question: what is it for an agent to have a reason for 
action which is authoritative; which is a genuine reason for them?  Another way of 
understanding this is to consider whether, when deliberating upon a suggested reason for 
action, an agent can sensibly reply ‘But what does that mean to me?’.34  If an agent can 
sensibly respond with a question like this, Joyce believes that the reason in question cannot 
be authoritative for them. 
Consider a reason which we uncontroversially accept is a reason for us to act.  If I were to say 
‘I understand that the fact that the 11.30 train will take me where I want to go at the time I 
want to go there means I have a reason to catch it, but why should I get on that train?’, then 
I would appear to either be failing to understand the terms I was using, or more simply failing 
to say anything sensible.  The fact that I have a goal I wish to accomplish, and a true belief that 
actions are available to me which are a way of accomplishing it, is one way of understanding 
what having a normative reason is. 
Contrast this with the fact that we can acknowledge and fully understand that, say, tennis 
players have a reason to serve the ball in a particular way.  But if we are not tennis players, it 
makes no sense to consider that to be a reason for us to do anything in particular.  Thus when 
told that one should serve in the manner prescribed, we can sensibly ask, ‘But why should I 
 
34 Joyce 2001 employs various formulations of this question - ‘Why?’, p. 39, ‘But what’s that to me?’, p. 
41, ‘So what?’, p. 81, ‘In virtue of what?’, p. 82, ‘Why should I ɸ?’, p. 83 and so on.  I take it that, given 
the context, the equivalence of variations on this theme is clear to the reader. 
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do that?’.  Asking this question demonstrates that we do not consider ourselves to have a 
reason which is a genuine reason for us to act. 
In order for a normative reason to be a genuine, authoritative reason for us, the reason must 
resemble the train example; it cannot be the case that we can both acknowledge it and yet 
still ask ‘But what is that to me?’.  As Joyce puts it, ‘Any adequate theory of normative reasons 
must make out reasons to be precisely those things that forestall a “So what?” response’ (2001 
p. 81). 
If we are to make sense of the concept of having a reason which fits with the non-institutional 
categorical nature of moral reasons, we should expect moral reasons to resist this questioning 
in the same way.  Moral reasons purport to be reasons for all moral agents; according to error 
theorists’ analysis of traditional morality, an agent’s moral reasons do not track standards of 
correctness-according-to-morality which can be dismissed if we see ourselves as acting 
outside of the institution of moral conduct.  Rather, moral obligations entail (or simply are) 
reasons which are authoritative for everyone, regardless of their desires, ends, or any 
institution in which they may be participating.  The tyrant who orders genocide does not 
escape censure from others by claiming that other people’s moral obligations have no 
authority over tyrants.  On the contrary, a moral transgressor who says ‘yes, I am fully aware 
that my actions are morally abhorrent, but what has that got to do with me?’ seems to typical 
participants in moral discourse to have made an error, or to be trying to ‘worm their way out’ 
of censure which is nonetheless still deserved.  This is precisely because we, the outraged 
observers, take the reasons entailed by moral facts to be authoritative for everyone, including 
tyrants. 
Joyce’s strategy is therefore to find the theory of normative reasons which has the best chance 
of grounding moral reasons in such a way that they can forestall ‘So what?’ responses.  Then, 
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if he can show that even this theory of normative reasons cannot underwrite the putative 
categorical authority of moral reasons, then he will have demonstrated that the kind of 
categorical normativity to which morality is non-negotiably committed cannot be made sense 
of, and so an error theory must follow.  Section 3.3.3 will explain why Joyce focuses on 
practical rationality, and will provide support for what I have labelled H4.  Subsequent sections 
will provide support for H5, and then give the conclusions to be drawn from Joyce’s theory of 
normative reasons.  
3.3.3.  Practical rationality: authoritative for all 
Joyce suggests (2001 p. 49-51) that the best chance of forestalling ‘so what?’ responses might 
be offered by grounding moral reasons in the requirements of practical rationality, which he 
calls ‘the framework that tells us what our reasons for acting are’ (2001 p. 49).  The thought 
here is that requirements of practical rationality can forestall ‘so what?’ responses, and so 
constitute reasons which are authoritative for all agents because the very act of asking the 
question ‘but what does that mean to me?’ in response to a suggested reason for action 
commits one to practical rationality.35  Thus to ask a question like ‘I know that’s a requirement 
of practical rationality, but what has it got to do with me?’ makes no sense.  This is because 
asking that question in itself demonstrates that one is ‘in the business’ of considering and 
potentially accepting reasons, of taking them to be authoritative, and so on.  Therefore no 
agent can sensibly accept that they have a reason to ɸ which is a requirement of practical 
rationality but then reply ‘but what has that got to do with me?’.  Practical rationality, Joyce 
argues, thus offers hope of grounding the kind of universally authoritative reasons which 
morality requires. 
 
35 While Joyce goes on to disagree with the specifics of what she says on the matter (2001 §5.4), this 
idea of tying the authority of practical reasons to rationality recalls influential work by Christine 
Korsgaard (1996, especially chapter 3).  I will return to this shortly, in §3.3.8. 
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In fact, this basis in practical rationality seems to be the only promising candidate for 
successfully forestalling ‘so what?’ responses, since the authority of normative reasons is 
always likely to be questionable unless the very act of questioning commits one to the 
principles on which the theory of normative reasons under consideration is founded.  If moral 
reasons turn out not to be requirements of practical rationality, it is hard to see how they 
could ever escape the ‘So what?’ problem and have legitimate authority for all moral agents. 
Joyce’s task therefore becomes one of analysing practical rationality to see if we can use it to 
make sense of the kinds of universally authoritative categorical reasons it promises to ground.  
If we can, then it may be possible to forge an appropriate link between moral reasons and 
requirements of practical rationality and so to rescue morality from error.  But if we cannot, 
a moral error theory beckons. 
3.3.4.  What it is to be practically rational: Molly and the cake 
The question which therefore arises is, ‘what does being practically rational consist in?’.  
Joyce’s answer is that one is practically rational to the extent that one is guided by one’s 
subjective reasons (2001 p. 54).  This, of course, requires a taxonomy of reasons which defines 
and explains what an agent’s subjective reasons are, and how they might differ from any other 
kinds of reasons an agent could have.  In order to show how Joyce lays his taxonomy out, let 
us consider one of his examples, Molly.36 
Molly spies a cream cake.  She likes eating cream cakes, and has a desire to eat it.  She is 
tempted by it, we might say.  Absent any other considerations, it seems to fit our everyday 
 
36 I have condensed and/or paraphrased Joyce’s discussions of ‘Molly’ somewhat here for economy.  I 
have also changed Molly’s motivation from losing weight to avoiding hyperlipidaemia. 
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way of thinking about reasons to think that Molly therefore has a reason to eat the cake.  
However Molly is also watching her diet.  She has thought about this at length, and has 
decided it is in her best interests to limit her intake of saturated fats (i.e. doing so conduces 
to her long term ends), and desires to do so.  She believes that eating the cake is likely to 
frustrate this desire.  So, we can say that on a different level to her initial reason to eat the 
cake, she also has a reason not to eat it.  On top of this considerable quandary, unbeknownst 
to Molly, she will be marooned on a barren desert island tomorrow, and would in fact benefit 
from the extra calories gained by eating the cake now (assuming, plausibly, that not dying of 
starvation is also something she wants).  This is commonsensically understood as constituting 
another reason for Molly to eat the cake. 
There seem to be various kinds of reason which might guide Molly’s conduct here.  In order 
to see how Joyce accounts for each of them, and how to understand what Molly’s subjective 
reasons are, we must start with a brief discussion of Hume. 
3.3.5.  Non-Humean instrumentalism 
According to Joyce’s reading of Hume, the reasons which it is rational for an agent to be guided 
by must be grounded in the agent’s desires and beliefs.  Furthermore, a genuine reason for 
an agent consists in the conjunction of a desire and a belief about how to satisfy that desire.37  
To desire a state of affairs and to believe that ɸing will bring about that state of affairs is to 
have a reason to ɸ.  There is, on Joyce’s reading of Hume, very little more that can be said, 
since Hume considers what an agent desires to be beyond rational appraisal, hence the 
famous quote that ‘’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to 
the scratching of my finger.’ (Hume 1739 T 2.3.3.6, SBN 415-416).  Joyce (2001 chapter 3) 
 
37 It must be pointed out that this is not an uncontroversial reading of Hume, and it is not clear that 
Hume would have accepted it.  See e.g. Sayre-McCord 2008 for an alternative view.  Nonetheless, Joyce 
proceeds in this vein. 
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develops this Humean account into what he calls non-Humean instrumentalism via a critical 
engagement with Michael Smith’s views, primarily those put forward in The Moral Problem 
(1994) and ‘Internal Reasons’ (1995a). 
For Joyce, Hume’s account is slightly impoverished in that it cannot explain certain common 
sense features of what it is to have a reason.  For example, it suggests that when we have 
competing desires, the thing we have the ‘real’ reason to do is simply whatever will satisfy our 
strongest current desire.  But this does not seem to be able to make sense of the competing 
reasons Molly has in the example given above.  Yes, we could interpret Molly’s case in this 
way, and say that in the end her choice boils down to a straight forward competition between 
her desire to eat the cake and her desire to watch her diet.  But it seems a richer account, 
according to which we can in fact rationally appraise an agent’s reasons, will describe the 
situation better.  
 To provide this richer account, Joyce draws on Smith, and makes a distinction between an 
agent’s objective, subjective and irrational reasons. An agent’s objective reasons are those 
which conduce to the satisfaction of the desires the agent would have if they were fully 
rational (see Smith 2010 p. 2).  Smith considers being fully rational to mean deliberating 
flawlessly and in full knowledge of all the relevant facts.38  Since Molly, were she in this 
epistemic position, would know about her impending sojourn on a desert island, she would 
acknowledge that she has a reason to eat the cake now.  Yet it is not reasonable to expect 
Molly to have this level of knowledge, thus we would not call her irrational if she did not act 
upon this objective reason.   
 
38 Note, this is Smith’s view of full rationality.  Joyce’s view differs crucially, but at this stage Joyce 
borrows Smith’s terminology for the sake of clarity.  These arguments are complicated, and it helps the 
reader to get a grip on one thing at a time before going into further subdivisions of the theory.  The 
differences between Smith’s and Joyce’s views and how they affect the argument will be explained 
shortly. 
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Subjective reasons are those reasons which are based on those desires an agent has which 
would survive (or have survived) a process of deliberation.  To put this another way, they are 
the reasons an agent takes on reflection to be their objective reasons, given their epistemically 
restricted viewpoint.  In our example, Molly has thought about her various desires and 
appetites and decided upon a goal of watching her diet, and therefore refraining from eating 
cream cakes (presumably among other things).  We might say that she has adopted this as an 
end or a project.  This desire, coupled with a belief, which Molly thinks is justified, that eating 
the cake will frustrate her desire, constitutes a subjective reason to refrain from eating the 
cake.  Having no knowledge of what tomorrow will bring, she takes this to be an objective 
reason. 
Finally, Molly’s desire (which I have called a temptation) to eat the cake is what Joyce calls an 
irrational desire, in that although she may satisfy a current desire by eating it, she would also 
be frustrating an end which she has adopted after significant deliberation.  Therefore while 
her desire to eat cake, coupled with a belief that eating the cake will satisfy this desire, 
constitutes a reason for Molly, it is not a reason which would survive deliberation. In fact, 
acting upon it would frustrate the ends and desires which Molly has thought long and hard 
about. Thus Joyce calls it an irrational reason (albeit one which it would be fortunate for Molly 
if she acted upon it, given that she will soon become a castaway). 
3.3.6.  Summary thus far 
So, how does this account of the various reasons an agent might have fit into Joyce’s theory 
of normative reasons, and then into the wider argument for a moral error theory?  Remember 
that Joyce’s overall strategy is to build the most plausible analysis of moral normativity he can, 
and show that even this analysis leads to an error theory because we cannot make sense of 
it.   
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At the current point in this process, the aim is to build a picture of a kind of practical reasons 
which can fulfil the role of moral reasons in our thought and discourse.  In order to underwrite 
the form of normativity to which traditional moral thought and discourse are non-negotiably 
committed, this must include a way to avoid the possibility of agents evading the authority of 
normative reasons by forestalling any ‘but what does that mean to me?’ response. The only 
apparent viable route to an account of reasons which can deliver this inescapable quality 
required of moral normativity was taken to be via understanding the reasons in question as 
requirements of practical rationality.  Therefore the theory of normative reasons developed 
here must provide a way of discerning what it is practically rational for an agent to consider a 
reason for them to act. 
In my reconstruction of Joyce’s argument, the tripartite subjective/objective/irrational 
classification of reasons vitally serves this strategy because it establishes two main ideas.  
First, it establishes what Joyce considers an agent’s subjective reasons to be.  As we saw 
above, Joyce’s view is that an agent is practically rational insofar as they are guided by their 
subjective reasons, and we now have a fuller definition of what ‘practically rational’ means 
for him.   
In the context of the wider argument, this definition will therefore allow Joyce to specify how 
we are to understand requirements of practical rationality, i.e. the kinds of reasons which can 
forestall ‘So what?’ responses, and thereby be inescapable.  If moral obligations are to entail 
inescapable reasons, the existence of which our moral discourse commits us to, we now know 
how Joyce thinks they must be formed, i.e. that they must function as subjective reasons and 
be appropriately based on agents’ desires.  If, on the other hand, moral reasons cannot be 
shown to function as subjective reasons do here, they cannot be requirements of practical 
rationality.  This means they will be unable to forestall ‘so what?’ responses, and will therefore 
 44 
fail to be inescapable.  Given the commitments of our moral discourse, this will point towards 
a moral error theory. 
Second, this three-way classification of reasons introduces the idea that an agent’s 
authoritative practical reasons can encompass reasons which are grounded in the desires of 
a counterfactual, epistemically improved version of themselves.  Namely, the definition of 
objective reasons given includes the desires an agent would have if they were fully rational.  
In simple terms, this means that we can have reasons to pursue what we would want if we 
thought about the matter properly, even if we have not actually thought about it properly 
ourselves.  However this is deceptively simple.  Much turns on how we interpret ‘properly’, 
and how demanding a view of full rationality we can take.   
We will turn to this shortly, and investigate how different views of full rationality can affect 
what reasons we have, and how Joyce’s view on this issue leads to H5.  First, however, section 
3.3.7 will briefly discuss another implication of the instrumentalist view described above, an 
implication Joyce rejects. 
3.3.7.  Universal reasons, part 1: Universal desires 
Joyce’s theory so far suggests that there may be an opportunity to rescue moral thought and 
discourse from an error theory by weakening the claim that morality entails or presupposes 
the existence of practical reasons which are authoritative for all agents, regardless of those 
agents’ desires or ends.  We saw in §2.1.3 that error theorists typically have no issue with the 
authority of hypothetical reasons.  Consider, then, what could happen if there were ‘a desire 
which all humans have (reliably, on all occasions), a desire from which no human could escape’ 
(Joyce 2001 p. 61, emphasis original).  If this desire – whatever it might be - were served by 
acting in apparently morally good ways such as refraining from murder and torture, keeping 
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promises and so on, then an error theory could be avoided.  For universally authoritative 
moral reasons could be grounded by hypothetical imperatives based on this universally felt 
desire, with no reliance on the problematic kind of categorical reasons with which the likes of 
Joyce and Olson take issue. 
The problem here is in specifying what the relevant desire might be.  Joyce considers and 
rejects both self-interest and any sense of ‘natural sympathy’ with others.  We can too easily 
imagine an agent (Joyce uses the example of Plato’s character Gyges) who is sincere and 
secure in their community, part of a loving family, but who in their secret dealings with others 
outside their community is driven by selfish motivations to break promises, murder and so on, 
and who is unfazed by the suffering this causes.39  So long as they can keep their skulduggery 
secret, it seems that hypothetical reasons to act morally can have no authority for such an 
agent.  They will enjoy the material (and possibly, depending on their psychology, emotional) 
benefits of their antisocial behaviour without cost to the sense of community and fulfilment 
which their life at home affords.  Thus agents’ self-interest can be served without their having 
to avoid putatively immoral behaviour.  And any sense of natural sympathy seems at best a 
very limited brake on agents’ conduct.  If this seems implausible, we need only to think back 
to historical examples of widespread slavery to find examples where even secrecy was not 
required to retain the love and respect of family and friends, and where natural sympathy 
clearly failed to ground any desires strong enough to reliably prevent the enslavement of 
other human beings.  Indeed, I think there is an even more problematic case than those Joyce 
discusses – we cannot even depend on all agents reliably, on all occasions, having a desire to 
keep living.  If even so basic a desire is not universal, then avoiding an error theory by invoking 
an inescapable desire shared by all agents at all times is surely a doomed endeavour.40 
 
39 For the original depiction of the character Gyges, see Plato 2008, book 2. 
40 Mark Schroeder attempts to deal with something like this problem on behalf of the Humean in his 
book Slaves of the Passions (2007).  Since my task in this section is to explain error theory rather than 
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3.3.8.  Universal reasons, part 2: The limits of ‘full rationality’ 
Returning to my reconstruction of Joyce’s argument, I said above that one way opponents 
might try to reject H5 and therefore avoid an error theory is to show that it could be possible 
to ground authoritative, categorical moral reasons in the requirements of practical rationality.  
This is sometimes called constitutivism, and has been influentially defended by Smith (e.g. 
1994) and Korsgaard (e.g. 1999).  While the details differ significantly, constitutivists share the 
idea that rational agency, when defined in a particular way which they describe, can give rise 
to authoritative practical reasons for all fully rational agents.  Thus if all fully rational agents 
as such have authoritative reasons to behave morally, a moral error theory can be avoided. 
To see how this works, we begin with practical rationality itself.  It is common to begin with a 
relatively undemanding view of practical rationality.  Not least, this is because defending a 
comparatively simple, undemanding view is easier and often more successful than defending 
a more demanding view when the simpler view would have sufficed to explain the 
phenomenon at hand.  Thus standard views of practical rationality include that a practically 
rational agent must be instrumentally rational (i.e. can understand a link between their 
actions and their outcomes) and must be responsive to reasons which they take to be 
authoritative for them.  A practically rational agent must also be capable, through 
deliberation, of arriving at and intending to act upon a minimally coherent set of authoritative 
reasons – for example they must be able to understand that they cannot routinely act so as 
to bring about both p and not-p by the same action.41  A hugely influential view of practical 
 
defend it, I will avoid digression into discussing Schroeder’s arguments.  But for a detailed discussion, 
see e.g. Enoch (2011b). 
41 Failure to grasp this principle is sometimes colloquially referred to as ‘cakeism’, referring to the saying 
that one cannot have one’s cake and eat it. 
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rationality along these lines was famously set out by Bernard Williams in ‘Internal and External 
Reasons’ (1981).42 
The problem with this undemanding view of rationality in the current context is also 
highlighted in Williams’ paper – it cannot be used to show that all agents share specific 
practical reasons, and so cannot underwrite the kinds of reasons to which morality is non-
negotiably committed.  As we saw above, Joyce rejects the suggestion that there might be 
desires or motivations which are shared by all agents.  And Williams sums up the implications 
of this quite bluntly, ‘Can we define a notion of rationality where the action rational for A is in 
no way relative to A's existing motivations? No.’ (1981 p. 112). 
The solution for constitutivists is to defend a richer view of practical rationality which can yield 
authoritative practical reasons for all agents and thus underwrite moral normativity.43  
Korsgaard bases her view on Kant’s Categorical Imperative, and argues that for an agent to be 
an agent and thus genuinely to act, that agent must be able to will that there were a 
universalisable law that all agents must act as the agent intends to act.  Korsgaard then hopes 
that all agents who constitute themselves as agents by having a will of this form will pursue 
the same kinds of goals as a result, and thus demonstrate that practical reasons which are 
grounded in rational agency itself can be universally authoritative. 
In a similar fashion, Smith introduces the notion of ‘fully rational’ (i.e. fully informed, flawlessly 
deliberating and having no relevant false beliefs) counterparts of current agents (1994 §5.9).  
Consider an agent, Anne, and her fully rational counterpart, Anne+.  Smith argues it is part of 
the concept of having a reason that in order for Anne to have a reason to ɸ,  it must be the 
 
42 I will return to Williams in significantly more detail in §5.2.3. 
43 More specifically, constitutivists may defend views of what actions are, or what agency is, or other 
similar related notions.  But in the present context, these are all sufficiently closely related to practical 
rationality that I am content to gloss over the differences in order to focus on the general idea which 
underlies the various specific formulations. 
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case that Anne+ would want Anne to ɸ.  But more than this, it must also be the case that all 
fully rational agents would want Anne to ɸ – the desires of all fully rational agents about what 
current agents are to do must converge (ibid. p. 166-167).  So long as the desires of all fully 
rational agents would converge in this way, this then allows Smith to argue for the existence 
of authoritative universal practical reasons which escape an error theory.44 
These are of course very sophisticated, detailed views which it would be inappropriate to 
delve into in great detail here.45  But they face a common objection highlighted by Enoch 
(2006) which cuts across the detail.  We already saw in §3.3.5 that Joyce rejects Smith’s 
argument that agents must be fully informed to be fully rational.  But Enoch argues more 
generally (2006 §3) that all constitutivist views fail to provide the sense of authority for 
practical reasons which could ground the kind of categorical reasons morality requires.  This 
is because whatever constitutivists add to an undemanding view of practical rationality in 
order to arrive at their richer view, we can essentially respond in a now familiar vein: ‘so 
what?’.   
In Korsgaard’s case, Enoch argues that we can reply that agency and action may well require 
all sorts of things including universalizability and so on, but that if so, we are quite content 
with failing to act or to be agents.  We can go on our merry way, failing to will that our actions 
should be universalised and so on, with no apparent meaningful penalty.  Likewise, as I 
discussed in §3.3.5, we can apparently be perfectly practically rational, yet still reply to Smith 
‘fine, an idealised version of me, with information I do not have, may want me to do x or y.  
 
44 Initially Smith was not necessarily committed to the claim that the desires of all fully rational agents 
actually would converge (see e.g. Smith 1994 p. 173-174), and has admitted that he was tempted to 
embrace an error theory (Smith 2010).  But in more recent work (starting approximately with the 
aforementioned 2010 article), he has moved to arguing that the required convergence would emerge.  
Smith’s later view remains controversial (see e.g. Smith 2015 and Bukoski’s 2016 critique thereof), and 
since my task is to explain rather than defend error theory, I omit further discussion of the topic here. 
45 For a more detailed discussion of constitutivism in general, see Katsafanas 2018. 
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But I don’t have that information, and it makes most sense to me to do z’.  Enoch’s point is 
that whatever ‘enrichment’ is proposed by constitutivists in their search for the requisite kind 
of normativity, that enrichment itself will always undermine the authority of the reasons 
which the view in question can yield. 
Drawing together these last two subsections, then, we can see that premise H5 in my 
reconstruction of Joyce’s argument is credible - practical rationality cannot give rise to the 
same reasons for all agents.  And even if it can, then we should be suspect about the authority 
of those reasons.  Since the strategy here was to seek a way of grounding practical reasons 
which are authoritative for all agents, the strategy fails. 
3.4.  Conclusion 
I said earlier that that Joyce’s overall strategy is to build the most plausible analysis of moral 
normativity he can, and show that an error theory is unavoidable because we cannot make 
sense of moral normativity even on this analysis.  Drawing the various subsections of §3.3 
together, it seems that Joyce is arguably successful in this.  In the wider context, this means 
that Joyce succeeds where I argued that Olson fails, in providing a theory of practical reasons 
which results in a moral error theory.  In doing so, Joyce provides what is often regarded as 
the strongest argument for a moral error theory defended to date. 
I do not believe that this description of Joyce’s view would be controversial among most 
commentators.  But for the avoidance of doubt, some evidence to back up the claim:  as well 
as the explanation I have provided here of why Joyce’s arguments succeed where others fail, 
at the time of writing, a Google Scholar search yields over 900 citations for The Myth of 
Morality.  Simon Robertson argues that error theorists in general are best advised to take an 
approach along Joyce’s lines, and he explicitly sees the aim of his article ‘How to be an Error 
 50 
Theorist’ as providing additional justification for Joyce’s approach (2008 footnote 22).  Joyce 
is taken alongside Mackie as a paradigmatic error theorist by Stephen Finlay (2008), and Russ 
Shafer-Landau describes Joyce’s view as ‘surely the most elegantly written, comprehensive 
and well-argued defense of a moral error theory yet to appear’ (2005 p. 108). 
In what follows, then, when I discuss what we should do if we accept a moral error theory, I 
will have roughly Joyce’s view in mind unless indicated.46  Specifically, this will typically mean 
an error theory based on the view that non-institutional categorical practical reasons (such as 
the reasons implied by moral obligations) cannot be authoritative for agents.  I will now move 
on in the next chapter to argue that if we accept the truth of a moral error theory, this 
confronts us with an urgent problem which demands a response. 
  
 
46 It is vital to present Joyce’s argument here, as it frames important parts of the debates that will 
follow.  But it should be noted that even if we are not convinced by Joyce’s argument, the question of 
what we should do if some other version of a moral error theory turned out to be true would still be 
independently interesting. 
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Chapter 4 – What Now? 
4.1.  Why the ‘what now?’ problem arises, and how we might respond 
to it 
The impact of accepting a moral error theory should not be underestimated.  Moral thought, 
discourse and behaviour are so fundamentally intertwined with human society that many 
people would find it difficult to accept that there are no positive moral facts, much less know 
what to do in their absence.  Our moral practices are so important to us that one may even 
doubt that we could get by without them without descending into some kind of murderous, 
debauched chaos.  After all, as I pointed out at the start of chapter 2, the committed moral 
error theorist must agree that not only is there no moral reason to refrain from breaking 
promises or to pay taxes, but also that there is nothing morally wrong with rape, that we have 
no moral grounds on which to criticise the state-ordered crucifixion of teenagers in Saudi 
Arabia, and conversely that there is nothing morally good about working to prevent even 
one’s own children dying of starvation. 
Moreover, morality plausibly plays an important role in our wellbeing by contributing towards 
a feeling that we are doing the right thing and living good lives.  And we frequently manifest 
powerful reactive attitudes such as violent resentment or profound gratitude which revolve 
around the moral relationships we have with others. 47  Moral considerations inarguably 
 
47 See Strawson’s classic paper on relationships and reactive attitudes ‘Freedom and Resentment’ 
(1962).  Strawson argues that It may indeed be psychologically (or even phenomenologically) 
impossible for us to abandon what he calls ‘reactive attitudes’ or ‘participant attitudes’, at least for 
more than just short periods of time.  Such attitudes would, according to Strawson, include much of 
what we might typically think comes under the heading ‘moral considerations’.  See Strawson 1962, 
particularly §4.  Strawson’s paper was itself recently the subject of a volume of critical discussion to 
mark its 50th anniversary, Shoemaker & Tognazzini 2015. 
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colour and inform the way virtually everyone acts and understands their relationship with the 
wider world. 
This creates two major problems for error theorists.  The first is that their arguments will often 
be met with fierce opposition or even dismissed purely because of the conclusion they 
support.  This is highly emotive territory.  Therefore, error theorists must be exceedingly 
careful to build their arguments from firm, believable foundations and to state their case with 
clarity and thoroughness.  The foregoing chapters should have given the reader an 
appreciation that contemporary error theorists are indeed painstaking about these things, 
and this is partly why I devoted as much space to explaining error theory as I did.  Recall that 
I began by discussing some very basic features of moral discourse and only after that did I 
build towards presenting some quite detailed, more difficult material.  When arguing for a 
conclusion which will almost inevitably be difficult for others to accept, or when presenting 
such arguments in a credible light as I have tried to do, one must attempt to make an especially 
convincing case.48 
The second major problem is the one I will turn to now, and with which the remainder of this 
project will be concerned:  if we accept a moral error theory, what should we do next?49  I will 
begin by arguing that a problem confronts error theorists which defenders of most other 
metaethical theories do not obviously face.  I call this problem the ‘what now?’ problem (for 
economy I will frequently abbreviate this to WNP).  The philosophers involved in the WNP 
debate clearly agree that if a moral error theory is true, we need to think about what to do 
next.  Otherwise, there would be no WNP debate about what we should do post-error-theory.  
 
48 It has even been argued that the error theory is impossible to believe, but that that does not stop it 
being true – see Streumer 2013a & 2017 chapter 9. 
49 Various formulations of this question will be summed up in what follows by the phrase ‘what now?’.  
These two words should be read as encompassing everything from their comparatively polite, literal 
meaning to the sort of crushing, awe-stricken despair which afflicts Nietzsche’s madman in The Gay 
Science (2001 §125). 
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Yet in the literature to date there has been little in the way of explicit articulation of the 
problem itself, and quite how pressing a problem it is for error theorists.  Sections 4.1.1-4.1.3 
will move towards plugging this hole.  In my view, there are three key questions about the 
WNP, each of which I will seek to answer.  First, how does the problem arise?  Second, what 
is the ‘what now?’ question really asking?  And third, how are we to evaluate responses to the 
problem – what are the rules of the game?  Armed with answers to these questions, we will 
be much better placed to assess responses to the WNP - both others’ responses and my own. 
I will then move on to examine the main responses to the problem offered by others to date.  
Broadly speaking there are four main kinds of response which have been defended: 
abolitionism, conservationism, revolutionary fictionalism and revolutionary expressivism.  I 
believe that all of these responses to the WNP are inadequate for various reasons.  In sections 
4.2-4.5 I will discuss each in turn, and in each case I will argue that the position described is 
fatally problematic.  Section 4.6 will then conclude this chapter by highlighting the need for a 
new response to the WNP which does not face the same fatal objections which beset the 
other responses.  I will then go on in the next chapter to introduce my own, new response to 
the ‘what now?’ problem, revolutionary relativism.  It is important to remember that 
throughout the rest of this thesis, I will assume the truth of a moral error theory, i.e. that there 
are no moral facts or properties, nothing we morally ought or ought not to do, and so on.50 
 
50 Mackie may seem to be curiously absent in what follows.  This is not because he did not offer views 
on what might follow after accepting error theory.  Quite the contrary – a large part of Ethics discusses 
just that.  Rather, it is because there is some confusion as to what his position was.  He seemed to 
consider himself broadly a conservationist in Ethics, whereas later he spoke in terms of a ‘moral 
overlay’, which could be thought to suggest fictionalism.  It has also been suggested that he was a 
substitutionist (Jaquet & Naar draw attention to remarks from 1976 which might support this, 2016 
footnote 7), and that he became an abolitionist before his death (see Hinckfuss 1987 chapter 1, 
footnote 24 & Garner 2007 p. 501ff.).  To add to the confusion, Nolan et al. read Blackburn as claiming 
that Mackie was an abolitionist, despite using a quote from Blackburn which rather suggests to me that 
Blackburn thought Mackie wanted to preserve morality in some modified form (Nolan et al. 2005 
footnote 5).  This confusion over Mackie’s true position means it is more straightforward to largely omit 
him here.  There is plenty of material on the topic from other philosophers for present purposes. 
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4.1.1.  Why the WNP arises 
The WNP arises from error theory in two ways.  The first, which appears commonly in the 
relevant literature, grows out of an intuitive sense that moral beliefs are useful to us, that they 
help regulate our conduct in beneficial ways by acting as constraints on our more malevolent 
or short-sightedly self-interested impulses.  If, for example, there is a widespread, deeply 
rooted belief which tells us not to steal, then most people would find it intuitively plausible 
that less stealing will occur.  Alternatively, mutually beneficial cooperation may seem more 
likely (or is even made possible) if we have moral beliefs which tell us that we ought to keep 
our promises and uphold agreements.51 
Yet if we accept a moral error theory, we thereby take ourselves to have established that the 
moral beliefs which may have previously guided our behaviour cannot be true.  And it is often 
thought that we tend to give up beliefs which we know to be false.52  Yet without moral beliefs, 
one may well worry that there will be insufficient non-moral reasons to regulate our 
behaviour in these beneficial ways.  And if our behaviour is not so regulated, the worry goes, 
human society could descend into chaos.  This powerful worry places a perceived burden on 
error theorists to show why, even if their theory is true, it does not come at a catastrophic 
cost.  In contrast with other metaethical views, if we accept a moral error theory, it seems we 
 
51 This echoes David Gauthier’s contractarianism, according to which, even if we are motivated 
principally or exclusively by self-interest, we will be better off if we treat each other morally.  This is 
because individuals who cooperate can achieve more beneficial outcomes than individuals acting alone, 
and therefore we can realise much greater aggregate benefits if we agree to adhere to moral norms 
such as keeping our word, refraining from predating upon one another and so on, despite the fact that 
this might curb what we would otherwise want to do out of short-term selfish motives.  See e.g. 
Gauthier 1987.  I will return to Gauthier in more detail in chapter 7. 
52 There will be more to say about whether or not we must jettison false beliefs in what follows, both 
as we progress through this chapter and later in chapter 6.  But for now, I think it plausible that we do 
have this intuition. 
 55 
are in danger of losing something hugely important.  This is one reason why error theorists 
appear to face a WNP when other metaethicists do not.53 
Bolstering this point is the fact that it will be significantly to error theorists’ advantage if they 
can show us a way forward whereby at least some significant subset of the apparent benefits 
of traditional morality can be retained.  Matt Lutz even suggests (2014) that it is part of the 
role of WNP responses to make error theory more palatable to those who might doubt its 
veracity because of their distaste for its conclusions (e.g. the positions on rape and starving 
children I just mentioned) by seeking to convince opponents that some of the potential 
negative consequences of error theory can be avoided if we respond to the WNP in the right 
way.  I take a slightly less accommodating line in that I believe that, if the arguments for error 
theory are sound, whether their conclusions are unpalatable is irrelevant.  The truth is 
sometimes ugly.  Having said that though, even if undermining opposition to error theory is 
not what WNP responses are for, it might nonetheless be an effect they have which is 
favourable for error theorists.  Thus it behoves error theorists to have something substantial 
to say about the WNP even if only as a way of reducing the potential psychological barriers to 
accepting their theory.  And for those who accept error theory, responding adequately to the 
WNP may show that we can retain important benefits which might have been thought lost. 
The second way the WNP arises has not, as far as I am aware, been noted in the literature, 
but to my mind makes finding a solution even more pressing.  It is that we cannot escape the 
WNP.  If we accept the error theory, we will do something next.  It does not matter whether 
we abandon moral thought and discourse, or try to replace them with something else, or even 
 
53 An argument might be made that other metaethical theories do face a less obvious WNP, but that 
they respond to it so immediately that it goes unnoticed.  For example, non-cognitivists argue that 
moral judgements are not beliefs.  If they stopped there, the obvious question would be ‘well what are 
they, then?’ – a close variation of the ‘what now?’ question discussed here.  It is only because non-
cognitivists automatically to go on to tell us what they think moral judgements are that a WNP does 
not obviously arise for non-cognitivism. 
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try to forget about the error theory altogether and carry on as we were before – each of these 
alternatives constitutes a response to the WNP even if we do not realise the problem exists.  
It is therefore incumbent upon metaethicists in general, and particularly upon error theorists, 
to seriously consider what the available responses to the WNP are, and which might be the 
best among them. 
It is part of the core activity of philosophy to make sense of the world.  So if we are to be 
abolitionists and abandon so important (and so elaborately contested) a field of thought and 
discourse as morality, I would argue that we ought to know why we are doing so.  A case must 
be made, to show why it is the best thing we could do out of the available options.  And if we 
are not to abandon morality, or if we are to seek to retain some key aspects of it while 
jettisoning the rest, then we need to truly understand what it is we are doing in those cases 
too.  Whatever we do in response to the WNP, we need to know what our options are and 
whether what we are doing is the best thing we could do under the circumstances – whether 
it brings about the greatest benefits and generally promotes human flourishing more than the 
alternatives.  Otherwise we fail as philosophers. 
4.1.2.  What the ‘what now?’ in the WNP is really asking 
My second question was about what is really being asked in the question ‘what should we do 
if we accept a moral error theory?’.  There are two key things to mention here.  One is that 
the ‘should’ here cannot be read as a moral ‘should’.  To ask a moral error theorist what we 
should morally do if error theory is true is to negate the very grounds for asking the question.  
Beyond this constraint, however, there is no onus on those who may pose the WNP to specify 
what sense of ‘should’ is intended – at this stage it can be left vague.  Rather, the onus is on 
those who wish to respond to the WNP to specify the sense of ‘should’ on which their 
response relies (which I will discuss in §4.1.3.). 
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The second key thing to consider is to whom responses to the WNP should be addressed.  Is 
it a question about what metaethicists should do, or perhaps society more generally?  Again, 
error theory is different from most other metaethical theories in this respect.  Traditional, 
descriptive metaethical theories and the resultant arguments between metaethicists need 
not necessarily concern society in general very much.  Metaethicists focus on analysing a 
commonplace phenomenon (i.e. morality), but for the most part, the rest of society simply 
gets on with its moral affairs.  ‘The folk’ do not need to know about sophisticated theories of 
action or normativity to be competent users of moral terms and to legitimately consider moral 
judgements an important part of their lives.  Consider an analogy: two biologists happen upon 
an egg while walking in a park.  One says ‘This egg is merely a vessel for the bird which will 
one day hatch from it, it is the beginning of an existence, a promise which has yet to be 
fulfilled’.  The other shakes her head and replies ‘No, not at all.  This egg is the culmination of 
a fascinating process of fertilisation, a complex construct of albumen, calcite and so on.  It is 
the raison d’être of the bird which laid it’.  While they argue, the egg continues to be simply 
an egg.  And to a passer-by, none of this debate necessarily affects whether they think of eggs 
as things to be incubated and hatched, or as breakfast.  In fact, to make the analogy more 
realistic we might add that although they can see the egg, the passer-by hasn’t noticed the 
biologists and can’t hear the debate. 
Error theory is different.  When a claim is made about what we should do in response to the 
WNP, the ‘we’ in question cannot be limited to metaethicists.  The upshot of error theory is 
not that moral judgements should be analysed as x or y kind of attitude, but that there can be 
no true moral judgements.  The phenomenon being examined has been destroyed in the 
course of the examination, one might say.  Thus, if error theory is true, then that fact (and 
what we should do about it) concerns anyone and everyone who ever makes a moral 
judgement.  Of course, the community of metaethicists involved in these debates is not all 
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that large, but the material discussed in those debates is of direct relevance to the everyday 
lives of virtually all human beings.  The ‘we’ in ‘what should we do?’ potentially includes 
everyone, whether they are metaethicists, whether they are error theorists, or whether they 
are unaware of anything discussed in the course of this project.54 
4.1.3.  The rules of the game for WNP responses 
My final question was about how we should evaluate responses to the WNP.  Several 
responses have been proposed, and of course my overall aim here is to provide a new 
response. So, what are the rules of the game in this endeavour, and how are we to tell a good 
response from a bad one?  I will highlight several issues which must be borne in mind as we 
go on. 
i) Normative Circularity Constraint 
Perhaps the most obvious issue to highlight is the counterpart of the ‘no moral ‘shoulds’’ 
constraint I mentioned above.  Just as the question ‘what should we do?’ may not invoke a 
moral sense of should, neither may the responses to the WNP rely on any sense of ‘should’ 
about which we accept an error theory.  Most glaringly, this includes any moral sense of 
‘should’.  For it would be inconsistent for moral error theorists to respond to the WNP in terms 
of what we should morally do.  So the ‘what should we do now?’ question can be neither 
asked nor answered in a moral sense.  But we must also bear in mind the commitments of 
error theorists en route to their error theories.  For example, Joyce relies on the incoherence 
 
54 This assumes that having true beliefs is something which matters to or is in the interests of most or 
all people. While I consider this intuition respectable at this point in the discussion, it may run contrary 
to arguments for conservationism and for a niche view known as propagandism (see e.g. Cuneo & 
Christy 2011 & Joyce 2005 §5).  I will have much more to say about conservationism in §4.2 and in 
subsequent chapters.  And I will touch upon propagandism in §4.5, though I will not engage too 
extensively with it, for reasons I will give in that section. 
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of not just moral norms, but of the broader category of non-institutional categorical norms in 
making his case for a moral error theory.  Therefore he cannot consistently give an answer to 
the WNP which relies on any kind of non-institutional categorical sense of ‘should’ (and, since 
his way of arguing for error theory is quite influential, neither can a lot of other error 
theorists).  Thus we can establish a general constraint on all WNP responses: 
Normative Circularity Constraint: No response to the WNP may rely upon any form 
of normativity about which the philosopher in question claims an error theory holds, 
or which contradicts any commitment of the arguments for said error theory.55 
This may not be too much of a problem for typical moral error theorists, since as we saw in 
§2.1.3, they have no issue with instrumental norms which predicate authoritative reasons for 
action based on securing things which we desire.  Thus arguing that we should adopt a given 
WNP response because it will deliver benefits which we plausibly desire - for example, that 
adopting it would promote mutually beneficial cooperation among agents, when the 
alternative is murderous chaos - is not problematic for typical moral error theorists.  Whereas 
arguing that we should adopt a WNP response because that would be the moral thing to do 
would be self-undermining for moral error theorists.   
This may be more subtle than it initially appears.  For example a WNP response based on 
desire satisfaction may end up recommending that we adopt a given strategy on the basis that 
it will bring about the greatest degree of desire satisfaction for the greatest number of people.  
This would be very close to a form of utilitarianism – an ethical theory – and will therefore 
require careful argumentation in order to avoid violating the normative circularity constraint.  
Similarly, there are those who defend error theories which extend beyond morality to all 
 
55 Later on in chapter 5, I will further refine and subdivide this constraint (see §5.2).  But for the time 
being, the NCC captures the relevant idea without complicating matters prematurely. 
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normative judgements and discourse, for example Bart Streumer (2017).  I am interested in 
specifically moral error theorists and so will not dwell on this here, but for obvious reasons it 
will be particularly tricky for error theorists about all normative judgements to argue that we 
should do anything at all in response to the WNP. 56 
ii) Previously dismissed views 
Next, although it may seem to go without saying by this point, it bears repeating that 
responses to the WNP occur only in a post-error theory context.  This might be thought to give 
some extra leeway to WNP responses, as opposed to views about the metaethics of 
conventional morality.  The theories here no longer need to describe conventional moral 
thought and discourse.  In the current context, that job has already been done, and the matter 
has been decided – in the WNP context, error theory is true.  The task now is to consider what 
attitudes we can and should have towards matters about which we previously held traditional 
moral beliefs.  Therefore many of the theoretical options ruled out by error theory – for 
example expressivism, rejected as a descriptive theory by Mackie for lacking a way to account 
for the apparent normativity of moral facts and properties – are back on the table.  For, while 
error theorists might consider them inadequate as descriptions of conventional morality, it is 
open to philosophers operating in the WNP context to show that such previously rejected 
theories might nonetheless preserve certain benefits of morality, and therefore be worth 
adopting as we move into a post-error theory world. 
 
56 See §4.5, footnote 108 of this thesis for an example of a WNP response which seeks to do this and, I 
argue, falls foul of the NCC despite efforts to avoid doing so. 
 61 
iii) Plausible implementation 
The above does not mean, however, that those who respond to the WNP can say anything 
they like, so long as they can show that their view might provide certain benefits.  Post-error 
theory recommendations must be strategies which we could actually adopt in our everyday 
activities.  Bluntly put, recommendations which cannot consistently or plausibly be acted 
upon cannot help us solve the WNP.  Therefore responses to the WNP must be consistent 
with the commitments of error theory, and must be coherent theories which plausibly and 
directly bring about (or at least substantively contribute to) the benefits claimed.  This is why 
I again take a slightly firmer view than might seem to be implied by Lutz, for example.  He can 
be read (2014) as suggesting that a cost/benefit analysis is the primary way to assess WNP 
responses.57  I take a more stringent line, examining each response for inconsistency and 
questioning whether it could realistically be implemented before reaching any kind of 
cost/benefit analysis.  Should a response fail either of these tests, it will be ruled out entirely. 
For example, if a given WNP response suggests that we should adopt a view based on the fact 
that it would be the morally right thing to do, it will thereby violate the Normative Circularity 
Constraint (NCC) discussed above.  It will therefore be rejected as inconsistent with error 
theory and/or the commitments of the arguments for error theory.  If the response satisfies 
the NCC, but suggests that we should do something which we are not capable of doing – as a 
flippant example, let’s say the response is that we should grow wings and fly around because 
doing so will bring about a more cohesive society, and we desire societal cohesion - it will be 
rejected as being incapable of plausibly being implemented. 
 
57 I do not mean to claim that Lutz really is willing to ignore inconsistency or implausibility when 
assessing WNP responses.  Rather I wish to underline that my approach is somewhat more demanding 
than simply asking ‘which theory gets us the most benefits?’. 
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iv) Delivery of claimed benefits 
When it comes to considering the claimed benefits of adopting a given WNP response, there 
are a number of things to bear in mind.  At this preliminary stage I do not wish to lay out a 
comprehensive list, as it serves both my overall argument and the reader better to let those 
who seek to respond to the WNP have their say, and then to judge the arguments on their 
own merits.  But even from the outset, we can anticipate certain issues around the claimed 
benefits of each response.  Most obviously, there is the question of whether the proposed 
response actually would deliver (or at least substantially contribute to delivering) the claimed 
benefits.  To return to the exaggerated example I just gave, it is not obvious that flying around 
would help deliver a more cohesive society, even if we could do it.  Responses to the WNP 
must show that there is a plausible connection between adopting their recommendations and 
realising the benefits claimed.  Otherwise there may be no point adopting them. 
v) Costs and benefits 
Additionally, we will need to know for whom the claimed benefits will accrue.  If everyone in 
society will benefit, then that is all well and good.  But things are seldom so clear cut, and 
where there may be disparities, we will need to be aware of them if we are to make properly 
informed choices.  Relatedly, we might consider the subject of the ‘should’ in any suggestion 
that ‘we should ɸ’.  I mentioned above that WNP responses must be addressed (or at least 
addressable) to all of us in a broad sense, but should they be interpreted as advice that we 
each follow individually, or as collective advice for groups of people – i.e. is it a matter of each 
individual ɸing, or does the proposal require that groups ɸ en masse?  In each of these cases, 
there may be varying consequences, including potential effects on whether the suggestion in 
question can plausibly be implemented. 
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We will also need to consider not only the implementation of the strategy in question, but 
also whether we need to worry about the inculcation costs involved – if a strategy would bring 
about certain benefits if implemented, but the costs of doing so in terms of education and so 
on would be enormous, perhaps we would be left with a negative aggregate benefit.58 
vi) Is morality beneficial? 
Finally, it must be noted that we should not assume that traditional morality delivers 
unqualified, universal benefits.  As we will see, there is at least one way of responding to the 
WNP which strenuously argues against the claim that conventional morality is beneficial at all.  
And as reflected by the NCC above, in the WNP context, morality itself cannot be thought to 
be intrinsically good, and therefore to provide us with categorical reasons to include it (or 
something closely resembling it) in our lives.  It is therefore up to each philosopher to argue 
for the specific benefits (or costs) they think traditional morality provides, and then to argue 
why their chosen WNP response delivers those benefits (or avoids those costs).  Any 
responses to the WNP which suggest retaining moral thought and discourse (or anything 
closely resembling them) must show us why we should retain them.  Moral thought and 
discourse (or anything closely resembling them) must earn their place in our lives. 
To draw all of this together, then, the ‘what now?’ problem is real, and confronts error 
theorists in a way in which it does not obviously confront defenders of other metaethical 
theories.  Responses to the WNP, while of primary interest to metaethicists, must be 
addressed (or at least addressable) to the whole of society.  And good responses must have 
certain features – inter alia, they must be consistent with the commitments of error theorists, 
 
58 Brad Hooker discusses similar issues using the term ‘internalization costs’, see Hooker 2000, 
especially chapter 3. 
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they must make a case for the benefits they claim to secure rather than just assume them, 
and they must be strategies which can be implemented in real life situations.   
To date, there have been four principal varieties of WNP response, which I will call 
conservationism, abolitionism, revolutionary fictionalism and revolutionary expressivism.59  In 
§4.2-4.5, I will explain each of them, and show why they are inadequate.  I will also touch in 
§4.5 on a couple of other more niche WNP responses which have appeared in the literature, 
and explain why I will not be engaging further with them.  I will then conclude this chapter by 
arguing that a new WNP response is required, and by drawing out the lessons which can be 
learned from the failure of the responses discussed.  I will then move on in the next chapter 
to begin to present and defend my own response. 
4.2  Conservationism 
Having accepted a moral error theory, and thus taking ourselves to have established that there 
are no moral values, we might find ourselves worried that there will be insufficient non-moral 
reasons to regulate our behaviour.  As I wrote above, we might fear that in the absence of 
moral rules, human society will descend into chaos.  Without a moral injunction against 
murder, won’t people be much more likely to become murderers?  At the heart of this worry 
is a sense that moral rules are useful to us, that they help regulate our conduct in beneficial 
ways by acting as constraints on our more malevolent or short-sightedly self-interested 
impulses.60  This is intuitively quite plausible for many people. If, for example, there is a 
 
59 It is common to use terms such as ‘revolutionary’ to describe the post-error-theory variants of 
fictionalism and expressivism, in order to distinguish them from their hermeneutic cousins.  While I will 
sometimes include the ‘revolutionary’ in what follows, the firmly post-error-theory WNP context here 
means that wherever I use the terms fictionalism and expressivism without qualification, the 
revolutionary variant is the one I have in mind unless specified otherwise. 
60 This view of morality’s usefulness is certainly well known to error theorists from Mackie onwards (see 
e.g. Mackie 1977 p. 43: ‘We need morality to regulate interpersonal relations, to control some of the 
ways in which people behave towards one another, often in opposition to contrary inclinations’) but is 
also found outside error theory.  For example Gauthier’s influential view in Morals by Agreement (1987) 
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widespread, deeply rooted social institution (e.g. a moral rule) which tells people not to steal, 
then most people would be willing to believe that less stealing will occur.  One might also 
think that keeping promises and sticking to agreements at least most of the time are practices 
which make mutually beneficial cooperation possible in the first place, and so having 
widespread moral beliefs that everyone ought to do so is likely to be very useful indeed.    This 
usefulness is the motivation for conservationism – conservationists’ motivation is 
fundamentally prudential.  Pigden claims (2007 p. 445) that he is a conservationist, and that 
Mackie was one as well (though see footnote 50, above).  But the most developed account of 
conservationism to date comes from Olson (most recently, 2014 ch.9), and therefore Olson’s 
account will be my focus here. 
Olson argues that moral beliefs are of (at least net) benefit to society, and that the most 
straight-forward way to access the benefits of having moral beliefs after we accept a moral 
error theory is by continuing to have moral beliefs, even if they are false.  As he puts it, ‘I argue 
that moral error theorists are [best] advised to recommend what I call conservationism, i.e. 
preservation of ordinary (faulty) moral thought and discourse’ (2014 p. 178, emphasis 
original).  As I understand it, Olson’s argument (2014 §9.3) can be summarised as follows (OC 
stands for Olsonian conservationism): 
OC1. Having moral beliefs (i.e. beliefs which entail or presuppose that there are moral 
properties and facts) at least most of the time is of net benefit to society. 
OC2.  We can form and/or maintain beliefs not only for evidential reasons, but also 
for prudential reasons which are independent of any evidence we might have.  
 
bases morality on the constraint of self-interested individuals’ behaviour for mutual benefit.  I will 
return to Gauthier’s view in §7.4.1. 
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OC3.  For a proposition, p, we can have an occurrent belief that p in one context, while 
simultaneously being disposed to believe that not-p in other contexts. 
OC4.  Therefore, if we accept error theory, we should on prudential grounds choose 
to have moral beliefs in most contexts (i.e. in everyday life), while simultaneously 
remaining disposed to believe that all positive moral beliefs are false in other contexts 
(i.e. in the philosophy seminar room). 
Many people will find OC1 plausible, as I discussed above.  Crucially, abolitionists will not, but 
given that it seems quite intuitive, and that numerous philosophers agree with it, we can grant 
it for present purposes.61   As support for OC2, Olson discusses several parallels, the most 
informative of which is with Pascal’s Wager.62  Olson writes, ‘As is well known, Pascal argued 
on prudential grounds that we ought to believe in God, even though there is insufficient 
evidence that God exists’ (2014 p. 191).  Those prudential grounds can be expressed as a series 
of conditionals:  If God exists and we are observant theists, then we stand to benefit massively 
by being admitted to heaven.  If God does not exist and we are observant theists, we will have 
lost comparatively little due to our mistaken theism.  On the other hand, if God exists and we 
are atheists, then we stand to incur a catastrophic cost by being condemned to hell.  While if 
God does not exist and we are atheists, we will have gained comparatively little from our 
atheism.  The standard reading of Pascal’s Wager is that when we consider these 
counterfactuals, we will conclude that it is most prudent to be observant theists, since that is 
the option with the greatest potential rewards and the least downsides. 
The idea that we can alter our beliefs in this way, known as doxastic voluntarism, is not as 
simple as merely choosing what to believe as if we were choosing what clothes to wear.  
 
61 As well as himself, Olson cites Warnock, Mackie, Joyce, Nolan, Restall & West (2014 p. 180). 
62 For a fuller discussion of Pascal’s Wager than space permits here, see Hájek 2018. 
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Rather, it is a matter of orthopraxy; according to the standard reading of Pascal, if we do the 
right things – go to church regularly, pray to God, think pious thoughts, and so on – genuine 
theistic belief will follow.  Olson argues that this analogises to the moral case, taking the view 
that we can bring ourselves to have genuine moral beliefs through developing habits such as 
making moral assertions and thinking ‘moralized thoughts’ (2014 p. 191-192). 
However, even if we are persuaded by doxastic voluntarism, Olsonian conservationism also 
requires OC3.  Olson argues that the phenomenon OC3 describes is entirely possible, and calls 
it ‘moral compartmentalization’ (2014 p. 192).  It is worth quoting him at moderate length, as 
I will discuss several features of the argument as we progress. 
In general, it does not seem impossible simultaneously to have an occurrent 
belief that p and a disposition to believe that not-p in certain contexts.  
Indeed, we can go further and maintain that it is a psychologically familiar 
fact that we sometimes temporarily believe things we, in more reflective and 
detached contexts, are disposed to disbelieve.  In such cases, the more 
reflective beliefs are suppressed or not attended to. [...] For instance, 
someone might say truly the following about a cunning politician: “I knew 
she was lying, but hearing her speech and the audience’s reactions, I really 
believed what she said.” [...]  Hence we are sometimes taken in by what 
people say [...] in the sense that we believe what is said, even though we are 
disposed to believe, upon detached and critical reflection, that it is false. 
(2014 p. 192-193, emphasis original). 
From this, we can see that Olson is not claiming that we ought to have simultaneous, mutually 
contradictory beliefs (which would threaten to make us irrational).  Rather, what Olson is 
suggesting is what I have summarised above as OC3, that we have mutually contradictory 
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beliefs at different times.  And given OC2, Olson seems to think that whether those beliefs are 
true or false makes no difference to whether or not we can come to have them if we make an 
appropriate effort. 
4.2.1.  Criticisms of conservationism 
If OC1 - OC3 are true, OC4 seems to follow without issue, so Olson’s argument appears to be 
valid.  Unfortunately for Olson, all three of the premises OC1-3 are questionable.  Having 
granted OC1 for the time being for argument’s sake, I will take OC2 and OC3 in turn.  I do not 
believe either of these premises is true.  Olson’s arguments fail to support the controversial 
account of beliefs on which his conservationist position depends.  Therefore Olsonian 
conservationism is not a viable response to the ‘what now?’ problem.  As we will see, OC2 
faces a potentially fatal objection raised by Jussi Suikkanen.  And in my view OC3 fares little 
better, as I will explain. 
The main problem with premise OC2 is that Olson’s use of Pascal’s wager to show that it is 
possible to have beliefs irrespective of evidence is misleading.  One may have misgivings over 
whether the attitudes produced by the wager are really beliefs at all.63  But even if we grant 
that they are beliefs, Olson’s analogy only goes so far.  According to Olson’s reading, Pascal’s 
argument encourages us to ‘go the extra mile’ when we have insufficient evidence to reach a 
conclusion and voluntarily adopt beliefs despite the lack of evidence.  But remember that 
accepting the error theory entails that we take there to be sufficient evidence – in this case, 
in the form of detailed arguments – to conclude that all positive moral beliefs are false.  
Therefore what Olson seemingly asks is that we ignore the evidence and choose our 
conclusion in spite of it – that we have moral beliefs which we judge to be false.  This is a 
 
63 See Suikkanen 2013, footnote 17. 
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different matter than having beliefs predicated on insufficient evidence; it is a matter of 
having beliefs which are insensitive to evidence. 
In the context of WNP responses, Suikkanen persuasively argues (2013) that the best available 
accounts of belief support the view that beliefs must be sensitive to evidence.64  And as is the 
case with moral error theory and moral beliefs, where we accept that there is a systematic 
problem with a whole category of beliefs which we take to be sufficient evidence to 
conclusively contradict all positive beliefs of that type, we have no choice but to give up those 
beliefs, or else be irrational.65   
This is compounded in Olson’s case because his position as an error theorist is predicated on 
cognitivism – i.e. the view that one of the most fundamental functions of moral discourse is 
to express moral beliefs.66  Thus, if it is definitive of beliefs that they are sensitive to evidence 
– and the best available accounts of beliefs tell us that it is – and the attitudes which we have 
towards moral propositions are not sensitive to evidence, then they cannot be beliefs.  
Therefore cognitivism is wrong, since moral discourse does not serve to express moral beliefs 
(Suikkanen 2013 pp. 177-178).  As a consequence, Olson must provide a theory of beliefs 
which is more plausible than the most plausible accounts we currently have, and which can 
account for beliefs being insensitive to evidence.  If he cannot, then a) the argument is invalid 
since OC2 is false, and b) Olson’s whole error theory threatens to unravel. 67  
 
64 See also §2.1.2 of this thesis.  I describe Suikkanen’s argument as persuasive since even Jaquet & 
Naar, who can be read as supporting fictionalism, take Suikkanen’s arguments to be successful not only 
against conservationism, but also against their preferred fictionalism (2016 footnote 9). 
65 Holding ‘one-off’ evidence-insensitive beliefs need not necessarily render an agent irrational – for 
example otherwise respectably rational parents may believe that their child is the best child in the 
world, regardless of any evidence, and we would not usually think they had taken leave of their senses 
as a result.  But the kind of systematically evidence-insensitive beliefs Olson’s argument requires are a 
very different matter.  
66 Again, see also §2.1.2 of this thesis. 
67 An argument similar to Suikkanen’s is made by Matt Bedke (2014).  Very recently, Wouter Kalf has 
responded to Suikkanen’s argument (2019), and Olson to Bedke’s (2019).  It is debatable how successful 
these responses are - the dust has yet to settle, and both responses defend accounts of belief which 
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My own worries centre around OC3.  Bluntly, despite what Olson says, the phenomenon 
captured by OC3 simply is not the psychological commonplace that Olson’s argument needs 
it to be, and I do not believe that the lying politician example Olson gives actually supports 
OC3.  I say this for two main reasons.  First, setting aside for a moment the role played by 
dispositions, the example only covers one ‘cycle’ of changes in the occurrent beliefs.  At the 
beginning, the subject believes that not-p (in this case, that the politician is not telling the 
truth).  When exposed to convincing oratory, the subject shifts to believing that p (that the 
politician is speaking truthfully), and then on reflection reverts to believing that not-p.  In 
order to show how Olson’s theory could be stable in practise, the example needs to be 
extended to include re-entering the non-critical context and once again believing that p, 
followed by again re-entering a critical context and believing that not-p, and so on.  Without 
this extension, there is no reason not to simply conclude that the subject is gullible.  It is much 
more plausible that with repeated instances of being ‘taken in’, the subject will become 
increasingly resistant to manipulation, and eventually come to have a stable belief that not-p.  
That this is a widespread response is summed up by the common saying ‘fool me once, shame 
on you; fool me twice, shame on me’.  Having been taken in before, the real psychologically 
familiar reaction is to resolve not to be fooled again. 
In the moral case, we must recall what I wrote in §4.1 - remember that many people will find 
understanding and accepting a moral error theory difficult, and that the conclusion that there 
are no true moral judgements may be reached only very reluctantly.68  So in certain contexts 
 
are controversial, to say the least. That being the case, to avoid excessive digression I set the matter 
aside for now, but note that it may bear returning to in future work.  
68 A prominent example would be Smith, who in various texts has expressed gloom at the thought that 
something like an error theory might be true, including ‘I am […] worried, deep down…’ and ‘the 
conclusion I see looming is thus wholesale moral skepticism’ (1995b p. 278, emphasis added).  Possibly 
most emphatically, see the profoundly dejected tone he uses when describing how analysing evaluative 
beliefs may lead us to conclude that human life is absurd: ‘We dance and drink and have a ball in the 
sense of acting on the evaluative beliefs and desires that well up. In this way we move forward in the 
only way we can given that a rational response to our circumstances is impossible. It is rather unsettling 
to realise that our pursuit of value, if that is indeed what we are doing, is underwritten by such 
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to temporarily overturn or forget the belief that a moral error theory is true is surely nothing 
like being temporarily taken in by convincing politicians.  I suggest that there is a much more 
accurate psychological commonplace which captures what it would be like to try to force 
oneself to believe the opposite of so hard-won a belief as a belief in the truth of a moral error 
theory: it is summed up neatly by the phrase living a lie.  It is hard to see how choosing to 
enter such a psychologically unstable and potentially damaging state can be recommended 
on prudential grounds.  Thus Olson’s explanation fails to show that OC3 is true when it comes 
to moral beliefs in a post-error-theory context. 
Second, Olson’s example is perhaps better understood as demonstrating a more conventional 
model of belief than Olson suggests.  Olson uses two different phrases for what he has in 
mind, both of which feature in the quote above.  On one hand, he claims that throughout the 
example, the subject has two fully formed beliefs, but that one of them is ‘suppressed or not 
attended to’.  On the other hand, he describes a subject who currently believes that p as being 
disposed ‘to believe that not-p in certain contexts’.  It is not entirely clear to me what Olson 
means by being disposed to believe a proposition in certain contexts but not in others, and 
thus it is unclear whether it is quite the same thing as having a suppressed belief to which we 
attend in certain contexts but not in others.  Olson seems to be equivocating somewhat.  But 
I suggest that there is a highly credible reading of this which makes the ‘disposition model’ 
quite obviously correct, and which avoids Suikkanen’s objection discussed above.  That 
reading is that we are disposed to have beliefs which accord with the evidence of which we 
are aware.  This quite standard epistemological view is better supported by Olson’s example 
than the analysis he actually gives us.69 
 
unreasoned responses. But unfortunately, […] when it comes to the pursuit of value, that really does 
seem to be all that there is.’ (2006 pp. 105-106.) 
69 For a discussion of several authoritative accounts of belief which agree that beliefs are responsive to 
evidence, and so supports the claim that this is part of a standard view, see Humberstone 1992.   
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In the example, the subject begins with a belief that the politician is lying because they have 
evidence to support this belief (potentially, that the politician in question has been shown to 
be a liar in the past, that what the politician is saying is initially unconvincing, that all politicians 
are liars and so on).  The subject is then exposed to the politician’s oratory, and believes that 
what is being said is true.  There are two ways we might view this, both of which are more 
plausible than Olson’s interpretation.  One view is that the subject takes either the apparent 
authority of the politician or the politician’s persuasive way of speaking as evidence that what 
they are hearing is true.  People are taken in by appeals to authority or by ‘snake oil salesmen’ 
all the time.  In this case, the subject takes this new evidence to be more convincing than the 
evidence on which they based their former belief (albeit only until they later realise that they 
were being misled).  On this view, the subject quite straight forwardly has an evidence-
sensitive belief that p, followed by an evidence-sensitive belief that not-p.  Thus the 
disposition which is really at work, whatever Olson might claim, is a wholly uncontroversial 
disposition to form beliefs based on evidence, and to give up beliefs which are contradicted 
by (more convincing) evidence.  Given that acceptance of error theory counts as accepting 
conclusive evidence that all positive moral beliefs are false, this suggests that when they come 
to accept error theory, agents’ positive moral beliefs that p (for example that torture is morally 
wrong) should change to beliefs that not-p (e.g. that torture is not morally wrong).  In other 
words, Olson should be an abolitionist. 
The other view is that the subject never actually forms a belief that the politician is telling the 
truth, but rather experiences a suspension of disbelief akin to the familiar feeling of watching 
a film or reading a book.  In this phenomenon, we suppress those of our beliefs which are 
incompatible with what we are being told or shown (e.g. that no human can turn green and 
throw tanks around).  But crucially, we do not replace those suspended beliefs with new 
beliefs, we merely set them to one side for the duration of the story.  When the story has 
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concluded, we return to our original beliefs without any epistemological controversy. This 
view has the advantage for Olson of fitting neatly with his ‘suppression of belief’ explanation.  
But it has the considerable cost in everyday contexts of making moral judgements something 
which we ‘make-believe’ or ‘entertain’ rather than actually believe, and thus makes Olson a 
fictionalist, rather than a conservationist.70 
Either one of these views fits perfectly well with Olson’s example.  Further, on either of these 
views, any considerations of evidence-insensitive beliefs are explanatorily surplus – we do not 
need any of this controversial, non-standard kind of beliefs to explain the phenomena at hand.  
Therefore Olson’s politician example backfires.  Olson needs to provide us with an example 
which actually does support OC3, because OC3 is a central tenet of his argument, and it 
depends on doxastic voluntarism - a controversial model of evidence-insensitive beliefs which 
is not necessarily plausible.  But the example he chooses fails, and is actually better explained 
by standard accounts of belief. Therefore Olson’s argument for conservationism fails, and by 
his own lights he should either be an abolitionist or a fictionalist.  Taking this together with 
the argument which I discussed above that we should not grant OC2 either, I conclude that 
conservationism cannot currently be regarded as a successful WNP response. 
4.3.  Abolitionism 
Abolitionism, also referred to with varying degrees of appropriateness as eliminativism, moral 
nihilism, anethicism or amoralism is perhaps the most obvious, immediate response to the 
acceptance of error theory.71  Olson calls it a ‘natural reaction’ (2014 p. 179).  Once our moral 
thought and discourse have been found to be defective in some major way, abolitionists quite 
 
70 I will discuss the difference between conservationism and fictionalism, and exactly what being a 
fictionalist amounts to, in §4.4.  
71 See e.g. Nolan, Restall & West 2005, Hinckfuss 1987, Garner 2007, Pigden 2007. 
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simply claim that we should abandon them.  After all, we no longer discuss medicine in terms 
of the four humours, or maintain the Ptolemaic belief that the earth is at the centre of the 
universe.  History is littered with ways of thinking and talking about the world which were left 
behind once we realised that they were not accurate representations of the way things really 
are.  Therefore, if we have found our ways of thinking and talking about moral matters to be 
seriously defective, as acceptance of moral error theory necessarily implies, the same 
considerations would seem to count in favour of abandoning them as well. 
Abolitionism has been defended by, among others, Richard Garner (e.g. 2007, 2011, 2019), 
John Burgess (2007), and possibly most powerfully and influentially by Ian Hinckfuss (1987 & 
2019).72  And abolitionism is currently the focus of significant debate, following the recent 
publication of a book entitled The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously 
(Garner & Joyce 2019).  In the context of WNP responses, there are two main aspects to the 
abolitionist position.  The first main aspect is notable in that, particularly in the discussions by 
Garner and Hinckfuss, the opposition to moral thought and discourse can be read as separable 
from error theory.  The argument is that on balance, far from beneficially promoting accord 
or counteracting our limited sympathies, the moral dimension of our lives is in fact responsible 
for much avoidable harm.  Perhaps the clearest expression of this is in chapters three and four 
of Hinckfuss’ The Moral Society (1987).  In a style reminiscent of Marx, Hinckfuss accuses 
morality as a whole of, inter alia, fostering and cementing elitism (§3.2), of being authoritarian 
(§3.3), of thwarting altruism (§4.6), of hindering or making impossible the resolution of 
 
72 A note on Hinckfuss references.  Hinckfuss’ The Moral Society: Its Structure and Effects was published 
under that title in 1987.  This work is not easy to find in print today, hence the refence in my 
bibliography to an online version, and my occasional use of section numbers rather than page numbers.  
But a somewhat abridged series of excerpts from the book were published in Garner & Joyce 2019 
under the title ‘To Hell with Morality’ (which we are told in an editor’s note was Hinckfuss’ originally 
preferred title for his book).  Where more specific references are appropriate (for example quotations 
or references to the use of specific words), I will refer to this more recent volume, simply because it is 
more readily available and has easily identifiable page numbers. 
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disputes (§4.2), of allowing tyrants such as Hitler and Stalin to manipulate citizens (§ 3.6), and 
of paving the way to war (§4.3).73 
These accusations may initially sound extravagant to those of us accustomed virtually from 
birth to thinking and speaking in moral terms, but they are perhaps more plausible than at 
first they seem.  For example, in discussing how wars and major conflicts are justified and 
represented to the public, Hinckfuss writes,  
Think of any one of these conflicts and think of how the situation would have 
been if, by a miracle, moral thought could have been eradicated from the 
minds of all the agents involved. I, for one, find it difficult to conceive of how 
the conflicts would have proceeded. There would be no sense of duty, no 
sense of loyalty, no patriotism, no feeling morally obliged to fight for a cause, 
no sense that the people one is trying to kill or subjugate are less worthy of 
survival or freedom than oneself or anyone else. (2019 p. 36).74   
That is not to say that abolitionists believe that phenomena such as war would be impossible 
if we abolished moral thought and discourse.  Rather, Hinckfuss argues that morality makes 
war a significantly more likely prospect: ‘There could be war without morality.  But moral 
propaganda eases the task of those with control of the mass media to get almost all the nation 
determined to attack, plunder, slaughter and subjugate another group of people’ (2019 p. 36). 
 
73 See Wood 1993 for an analysis of Marx’s metaethical views which closely resembles parts of what 
Hinckfuss has to say. The phrase ‘morality as a whole’ here is intended in a broad sense which reaches 
beyond the analysis of morality typical among error theorists.  Hinckfuss specifically includes ‘the belief 
in moral obligations, vices, moral virtue, sins and morally good or bad acts or morally good or bad 
people’ (2019 p. 23). 
74 The conflicts Hinckfuss is referring to are ‘the situation in Ireland (unresolved after four hundred 
years of bloody conflict); the situation in the Lebanon (unresolved after about eight hundred years of 
conflict between Christian and Moslem); the Palestinian Arabs versus the Zionists; the Vietnamese 
versus the Khmer, the Chinese, the French and the Americans; all the wars of religion and all the blood-
letting of the two world wars.’ (2019 p. 35). 
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Alongside the extreme situation of war, another example might be abortion, an issue often 
conceived of in moral terms which allow scant leeway for compromise – the right to life, the 
right of women to decide what happens to their bodies and so on – and which is the subject 
of implacable disagreements which can appear insoluble.  In such cases abolitionists argue 
that if the notion were removed that there are relevant objective, immutable moral facts of 
the matter, it seems plausible that disputants would find it easier to reach an agreement of 
some kind based on more pragmatic considerations.  For example Garner argues that, while 
genuinely empathising with others’ predicaments rather than leaping to moral judgement is 
‘capable of unlocking a rich vein of compassion’, approaching matters from a moral 
perspective is much more likely to ‘harden our resistance and send us scurrying off in a search 
for counter-arguments and reasons not to care’ (2019 p. 87).75 
If abolitionists such as Hinckfuss and Garner are right, and assuming that we desire to avoid 
elitism, war and so on because they are harmful, it may well be that despite the limited benefit 
which morality may occasionally afford us, we have compelling prudential reasons to discard 
moral beliefs and discourse before we even consider moral error theory. Indeed, Olson takes 
this to potentially make any further discussion by abolitionists about whether an error theory 
is true redundant, asking ‘If moral thought and discourse really have the nasty consequences 
Hinckfuss insists on, why would it matter if there were after all non-natural moral properties 
and facts in reality? Would not a proponent of anti-elitism, anti-authoritarianism, peace, etc., 
recommend that we in such a scenario simply ignore the moral properties and facts?’ (2014 
p. 179, footnote 5).   
However, in posing this question, Olson misses an important point.  If moral facts were simply 
part of the fabric of the world then we may have no choice but to persist with the moral 
 
75 Garner is not arguing specifically about abortion here, but the point is clear. 
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practices we have.  Regardless of the consequences of doing so, we would have authoritative 
reasons for acting in certain ways – i.e. it would remain the case that we ought to follow moral 
rules even if it led to our ruin.  In moral error theory, however, we have a compelling set of 
arguments to the conclusion that moral values are not part of the fabric of the world.  
Whatever other ideas abolitionists may choose to discuss, therefore, moral error theory can 
be seen as a crucial tool to make the abolitionist’s case.76  In simple terms, when abolitionists 
claim that we would be better off without moral values, error theory allows them to add ‘and 
anyway, thankfully, there’s no such thing in the first place!’. 77 
The second aspect of the abolitionists’ response to the ‘what now?’ problem is that, even if 
we can maintain false beliefs (bearing in mind that this is controversial, as I discussed in §2.1.2 
& 4.2.1) they question whether we ought to defend having beliefs which we know not to be 
true. Quite obviously, the ‘ought’ here cannot be a moral ought, for this would violate the 
Normative Circularity Constraint.  Nonetheless there are numerous non-moral senses in which 
there may be something one ought to do.  At least two are relevant here.  First, absent the 
specific sort of case made by conservationists, it seems unlikely that we would benefit from a 
general policy of believing things which we know to be false (if that is even possible).  There 
is therefore a prudential ‘ought’ which one could apply here.  Second, it can be argued (albeit 
not without controversy) that one ought to have true beliefs as opposed to false beliefs 
because truth itself is normative – as I put it in §2.1.2, some philosophers would argue that 
 
76 Olson also comes close to selling short the abolitionist argument when he writes ‘One is tempted to 
say that this critique of what Hinckfuss calls ‘the moral society’ is moral in nature, but we can say more 
charitably that Hinckfuss claims to identify some consequences of moral thought and discourse that 
many people are opposed to, and that on this basis he recommends abolishing morality’ (2014 p. 179, 
emphasis original).  Hinckfuss in fact requires no such charity.  He explicitly frames his criticisms of 
moral thought and discourse in terms of what people desire, see e.g. the beginning of §4.1.  This is why 
I used the phrase ‘assuming that we desire...’ near the start of the preceding paragraph. 
77 See also Joel Marks, who despite the ‘undoubted utility’ of having moral beliefs finds that ‘the 
disutility looms larger’, leading to a situation wherein ‘the abolitionist sees error theory as presenting 
an opportunity – to make the world more to our liking – that abolitionism then seizes’ (2019 p. 101-
102). 
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beliefs ‘aim at truth’. 78  Garner is emphatic: ‘What serious philosopher can long recommend 
that we promote a policy of expressing and supporting, for an uncertain future advantage, 
beliefs, or even thoughts, that we understand to be totally, completely, and unquestionably 
false?’ (2007 p. 512).79   
As well as highlighting the potential harm of maintaining false beliefs, here Garner also 
anticipates a theme to which I shall return in detail shortly - that we cannot know in advance 
whether retaining known false beliefs (or as I will discuss in §4.4, make-beliefs or ‘thoughts’), 
will be of any benefit at all.  While plausibly likely outcomes may be a satisfactory basis for 
WNP responses in the absence of other complicating factors, when taken along with the above 
worries, this leads abolitionists to recommend against adopting any WNP response involving 
false beliefs or anything substantially like them. 
To sum abolitionism up, given that accepting the error theory opens up the possibility of 
discarding moral thought and discourse, difficult though that may be, abolitionists claim that 
we should do so.  They offer several reasons why this would be desirable or unavoidable.  
Moral beliefs are of questionable benefit to society, and may be pernicious.  Even if we could 
maintain moral beliefs at the same time as accepting a moral error theory, doing so when we 
know them to be false is tantamount to lying both to ourselves and to others.  Even if this kind 
of lying could somehow be justified in terms of how useful it is to society, in the moral case it 
is impossible to be sure that its consequences would be beneficial.  Garner sums things up 
well: ‘Moral memes have burrowed deep into our brains and our public rhetoric, but we can 
root them out by reminding ourselves that morality is a human invention based on biology, 
ignorance, credulity, fear, and a lust for control. If the belief in objective values is as mistaken 
 
78 For further discussion of this epistemic sense of ‘ought’, see e.g. Gibbard 2005 & Price 
1998. 
79 Cf. Joyce 2001, p. 214: ‘No policy that encourages the belief in falsehoods, or the promulgation of 
false belief in others, will be practically stable in the long run’. 
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as the error theorist argues, and as harmful as the moral abolitionist believes, then we would 
be well advised to find another star by which to sail.’ (Garner 2011). 
4.3.1.  Abolitionism in practise 
It may seem obvious how abolitionists suggest we might respond to the WNP, then: by 
completely abolishing morality and never making a moral judgement or a positive moral claim 
again.  But this is simplistic.  First, it may be objected that eliminating moral judgement may 
be impossible (Joyce refers to arguments to this effect by Peter Singer and Michael Ruse (2001 
p. 171), plus see footnote 47 about Strawson, above), or at least exceedingly, problematically 
difficult (e.g. Nolan et al. 2005 p. 314).  But even if we grant that somehow abolishing moral 
beliefs is feasible, there are several ways this might turn out in practise. 
At the weaker end of the spectrum, Russell Blackford advocates what he calls a ‘mild or partial’ 
(2019 p. 74) form of abolitionism whereby we continue to employ previously morally loaded 
terms such as good, bad, should, cruel, kind, and so on, and continue to approve of and abide 
by previously moral norms such as those relating to debts and promises.  According to 
Blackford, these pieces of ‘social technology’ (op. cit. p. 62) are too useful to abandon entirely, 
and may be repurposed and redeployed even after we have accepted the error theory.  We 
would simply be mindful as we do so that these terms and norms should henceforth be 
understood as devoid of objective (moral) authority, and should instead be understood as 
useful, non-objective conventions.  Essentially, on Blackford’s proposal, the furniture of 
traditional morality would remain in use, but any connotations of moral normativity would be 
replaced by hypothetical norms grounded in the instrumental benefits of practices such as 
keeping promises and so on. 
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Presenting a much stronger form of abolitionism, Joel Marks argues (2019) that although the 
error theory we accept is limited to morality and does not extend to all domains of 
normativity, we would be best served by treating even non-moral normative terms as posing 
a psychological threat to drag us back into having objectively prescriptive beliefs.  Marks 
therefore recommends that we refrain from using obviously morally evaluative terms such as 
moral uses of right, wrong, good and bad.  But he goes much further than this and advocates 
the elimination from our discourse, and eventually our psychology (2019 p. 106) of ‘the 
attitudes of not only morality but also of other value realms to the greatest degree practicable’ 
(2019 p. 102).  This includes even the appearance of any value objectification and ‘any hint of 
allusion to categoricity’ (p. 103 emphasis original).  Only then will we be able to truly leave 
morality behind and move forward as genuine abolitionists. 
By contrast, Hinckfuss is compellingly blunt: ‘if you want to minimise conflict and you do not 
want widespread denigration, guilt complexes, elitism, authoritarianism, economic inequality, 
insecurity and war, then throw morality away and think about how best you can resolve 
conflict without it.’ (2019 p. 38).  Hinckfuss’ main target is the doctrine of moral desert - i.e. 
the notion that people may be morally inferior or superior to others – and if we could rid 
ourselves of that, he suggests that morality in general would quickly disappear (1987 §3.5). 
4.3.2.  Problems with abolitionism 
I mentioned above the issues around the normative circularity constraint and the feasibility 
of abolitionism which could be thought problems for abolitionists.  But even granting that the 
former is not necessarily a problem for abolitionists who are moral error theorists, and 
granting for the sake of argument that being an abolitionist is not impossible, I believe 
abolitionism faces insurmountable problems as a response to the WNP.  Yet the upshot of 
these problems may be surprising, as I will shortly explain.  I will discuss three flaws of 
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abolitionism, ultimately concluding that while the abolitionist challenge must be taken 
seriously, we should not respond to the WNP by becoming abolitionists. 
The first problem with abolitionism is that we cannot plausibly do as Marks recommends, 
because his recommendation is too extreme.  As part of his crusade against moral or even 
moral-seeming thought and discourse, Marks recommends (2019 pp. 102-106) that alongside 
moral terms and attitudes, we eschew the use of ‘ought’ and related concepts, forms of 
argument which invoke practical justification, evaluations of aesthetics or humour, uses of 
terms such as ‘good’, ‘better’ and ‘right’ even in non-moral contexts such as hypothetical 
imperatives or in a functional sense, and judgements about whether what others say is true 
and whether others are rational.  Finally, Marks recommends that we alter our understanding 
of ‘thick’ conceptual terms, i.e. those with both descriptive and evaluative conceptual content 
such as ‘liar’, to purge them of evaluative content while nonetheless continuing to use the 
terms in a purely descriptive sense.80 
Marks recommends this laundry list of lexical, practical and conceptual changes despite 
admitting that ‘I myself can attest to the enduring power of my moralist reactions to various 
actions and traits and states of affairs even though I have striven to suppress them for several 
years now’ (p. 101).  Now recall that unless we are to keep the truth of error theory a strict 
secret known only among metaethicists (which would surely not be stable in the long run), 
then as I discussed in §4.1.3, WNP responses must be addressable to all moral agents.  Yet the 
degree of conceptual self-vigilance and discipline Marks’ proposal would require must surely 
be beyond all but the most insightful and ruthless handful of prospective abolitionists.  In 
comparison with conservationists’ ‘just carry on having moral beliefs’ or, as we shall see in 
 
80 One might also wonder whether Marks would recommend getting rid of predictions, too, since they 
can sometimes be or appear to be normative.  The same could also apply to probabilistic expectations, 
suppositions…  The list goes on. 
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subsequent sections, fictionalism’s ‘just act as if moral beliefs could be true, even though they 
can’t’, Marks’ advice, which amounts to ‘make myriad changes to a wide range of deeply 
ingrained patterns of thought and speech, some of which are very subtle, and which even I 
cannot reliably accomplish after years of trying’, is simply not a viable WNP response.81 
Turning to the second problem for abolitionism, if Marks’ proposed form of abolitionism is 
too extreme in its demands, then perhaps the comparatively less demanding Blackford model 
will fare better.  Blackford’s proposal is after all relatively modest – he recommends that we 
continue to use familiar moral terms, but that we just think of them as relying on hypothetical 
norms rather than categorical norms of the type which we are error theorists about.82   
The issue here is that Blackford’s model of abolitionism is confused and confusing on a 
metaethical level.  In recommending his general strategy of repurposing moral discourse, he 
glosses over important distinctions between fundamentally incompatible metaethical views.  
Yet when the different views are drawn out, they appear unsophisticated and unworkable.  
For example, concerning moral deliberation, Blackford makes the central question for any 
agent ‘what should I do?’ (2019 p. 68).  On Blackford’s proposal, in the WNP context this would 
be stripped of any moral sense of ‘should’, and replaced with a consideration of ’which path 
is most likely to meet the agent’s subjectively weighted ends, to the extent that she can 
identify them’ (ibid.).  There is nothing necessarily wrong with this on its own, of course, but 
a metaethical view couched in these terms inherits a classic problem for contractarianism – 
 
81 A similar objection could potentially be made to my own proposal, i.e. that it would be 
problematically complicated or difficult to implement.  I will discuss this in §7.5. 
82 It may be possible to set up a dilemma for abolitionists here.  Even if Marks’ proposal is too extreme 
to implement, arguably there may nonetheless be some truth to his claim that using previously morally 
normative terms at all threatens to turn error theorists back into moral realists (I do not think this 
myself, but clearly Marks would argue this).  If so, then Blackford’s more lax view would pose an 
existential threat to error theorists as such.  This could set up a dilemma: take the strong view and be 
unable to implement abolitionism, or take a weaker view but undermine error theory.  However I leave 
this to Marks and Blackford to sort out, should they wish to do so, and focus on the arguments in the 
main text myself. 
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the free rider problem (see e.g. Shafer-Landau 2010 pp. 190-194).  This problem arises 
because agents whose motivation is to satisfy their own subjective ends are often best served 
not by being moral themselves, but by getting everyone else to be moral, and taking 
advantage of them.  With no reason to think beyond their own ends, agents are free to act on 
principles such as ‘when you can get away with it, steal’ or ‘so long as there’s no legal or 
financial penalty, and you don’t care personally about them, exploit your employees 
mercilessly’.  This results in terms such as ‘good’ meaning such wildly different things to 
different people as to be useless in any coordinative sense, and so means that previously 
moral discourse cannot carry any useful authority or bring any significant portion of the 
putative benefits of its pre-error-theory ancestor. 
At other times, Blackford appears to propose that societies as a whole consider what would 
be good for the whole society, and that accordingly, members of a society would then use 
previously moral language such that e.g. ‘good’ would come to mean something like ‘allows 
society to function well’.  Thus the post-error-theory analogue of moral deliberation would be 
about what conduces to societal goods, and morality would be replaced by something quite 
similar to a legal system (2019 §7).  This might seem to get around the free rider problem 
because it moves the focus of practical deliberation away from the individual’s ends and 
towards cooperation among members of a society or group.  Yet this faces its own set of 
classic objections, this time inherited from cultural relativism (see e.g. Shafer-Landau 2010 pp. 
278-291).  Seen in this way, Blackford’s view is something like the relativist view I will propose, 
but less sophisticated because it offers none of the ways to cope with classic objections which 
I offer on behalf of my proposal.  So anyone tempted by this tendentious reading of Blackford’s 
somewhat confusing proposal would be better directed to the subsequent chapters of this 
thesis. 
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The third problem with abolitionism is more fundamental, and goes to the heart of 
abolitionists’ claims about traditional morality.  Abolitionists such as Hinckfuss and Garner 
claim that an amoral society would be less elitist and less authoritarian, and that in the 
absence of moral thought and discourse we would be better able to resolve conflicts and avoid 
wars.  And I suspect that they may well be right, at least to some extent. But the problem is 
that there is little theoretical heft to this claim.  What we have is primarily a series of empirical 
claims about the harms of morality, but it is not clear how they could be proven.  Therefore it 
remains perfectly possible to disagree, and simply make the contrary claim that moral thought 
and discourse are very useful to us, at least on balance - as Olson, Nolan et al., and Joyce do.83  
In other domains, in order to resolve such a disagreement, disputants would typically point to 
relevant data, usually in the form of real world examples, and explain how those data support 
their view rather than their opponents’ view.  But in this case I think it likely that the vast 
complexity of society makes it impossible to conclude in favour of either party without 
empirically determining exactly what an amoral society would be like. And such an experiment 
seems unlikely ever to be performed.84 
It could be argued that this is simply a failure of imagination on the part of non-abolitionists – 
perhaps the majority of us, even if we accept a moral error theory, are so wrapped up in a 
morally informed view of the world that we cannot see the benefits which would accrue to us 
if only we could step outside our moral conditioning and ‘throw morality away’.   Garner draws 
an interesting parallel between abolitionism and ‘new’ atheism (2011), and it may well be fair 
to extend that parallel and observe that at one time, many people would have found the idea 
of life without a religious dimension incomprehensible.  Yet today it seems self-evident to 
huge numbers of people that it is perfectly possible to live without believing in any gods.  
 
83 See e.g. Olson 2014, p. 180, Nolan et al. 2005, p. 307, Joyce 2001, pp. 184-185. 
84 As the reader may have noticed, this has significant implications for the burden of proof here, even 
beyond those I discuss in the text.  For the time being, I will set this matter aside and focus on 
abolitionism.  But I will return to this theme in significant detail in chapter 6. 
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Likewise, the abolitionist might suggest that in time, even committed moralists would be able 
to see that we would be better off  if we were to embrace abolitionism.   
But the parallel with atheism only holds so far. While it may be impossible to prove an 
ontological negative, we can certainly compare the lives and psychologies of theists and 
atheists to empirically test whether any gods are involved in beneficial ways, or whether 
secular explanations are sufficient to explain empirical phenomena relating to material and 
emotional wellbeing.  For example we might test a given religious claim – that prayer to the 
Christian god is the most beneficial form of prayer, say - by examining and comparing Christian 
people and cultures with others who adhere to other religions, and to none.  But an analogous 
moral test cannot be performed.  The abolitionist makes claims not about distinct moral 
theories, but about morality itself.  Thus despite abolitionists’ claim that we may be able to 
experience the benefits of abolitionism simply by experimenting in our own individual lives 
(for example, ‘[t]ry it – you might like it’ (Marks 2019 p. 106), or ‘give moral abolitionism […] 
a test drive’ (Garner 2011)), the only suitable comparator with our current moralised society 
would be an entire, entirely amoral society – and no such society exists. 
In conclusion, then, the abolitionists’ case rests too heavily on practically unprovable empirical 
claims and too little on provable theory to be convincing to anyone who does not share 
abolitionists’ controversial intuitions.  Seen as a challenge, as an attempt to pose questions 
which might shake us out of complacent assumptions about how wonderful moral beliefs are 
(or perhaps were), Hinckfuss’ critique of morality draws attention to previously unrecognised 
potential negative consequences of moral belief such as authoritarianism, the hindrance of 
conflict resolution, and even war.  On this level, abolitionism makes an invigorating 
contribution to metaethics, and I will have much more to say about this ‘challenge from 
abolitionism’ in later chapters.  Yet as a WNP response, absent an unfeasibly large-scale set of 
experiments, and against the backdrop of a near-ubiquitous intuition that moral thought and 
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discourse are beneficial or useful to society, the way is abundantly clear for abolitionists’ 
opponents to simply reject their claims out of hand.  As such, even if abolitionists may be right 
about some matters, abolitionism cannot be a convincing response to the WNP.  Taking this 
along with the other problems I discussed relating to sustainable implementation, I conclude 
that abolitionism should be ruled out as a viable WNP response. 
Thus far, then, I have ruled out conservationism and abolitionism as responses to the WNP.  I 
will turn now to the penultimate response I will discuss in detail, revolutionary fictionalism.  
This is probably the WNP response which has generated the most discussion and found the 
widest support to date.  Yet as I will explain, I believe it too faces insurmountable problems. 
4.4.  Revolutionary fictionalism 
There are various kinds of fictionalism about various domains of discourse.85  When it comes 
to metaethical fictionalism, there are two main alternatives: hermeneutic fictionalism and 
revolutionary fictionalism.  I will set aside hermeneutic fictionalism here, as it is a theory about 
how traditional moral thought and discourse should be understood.86  Our task here is to 
decide what we should do after we have accepted a moral error theory, and so arguments 
about what we should do rather than accept an error theory are moot.  Revolutionary 
fictionalism is proposed specifically as a response to the ‘what now?’ problem, and therefore 
it assumes the truth of error theory – this is why the term ‘revolutionary’ is appropriate.87  It 
 
85 For an overview of several non-moral domains of fictionalism, see Eklund 2015.  For a more detailed 
discussion of a specific non-moral example of fictionalism (in this case mathematics), see Balaguer 
2018. 
86 For a sophisticated view of hermeneutic fictionalism, see Kalderon 2005. 
87 Echoing footnote 59, since I have set other forms of fictionalism aside and will be concentrating solely 
on revolutionary fictionalism, hereafter I will frequently refer to revolutionary fictionalism as simply 
fictionalism without further qualification. 
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has been defended most prominently by Joyce (2001 ch.8, 2005, 2017, 2019) and Nolan et al. 
(2005). It has also been defended more recently by Jaquet & Naar (2016). 
Fictionalism shares with conservationism the basic assumption that the practice of engaging 
in moral thought and discourse is useful – that e.g. having moral beliefs delivers prudential 
goods unattainable via other means, and we are therefore better off having them than not 
having them.  As we have seen, the claim that traditional morality is beneficial is open to 
question, especially by abolitionists.  But for now I will grant this claim in order to focus on 
fictionalism itself (though I will return to it later on).  While it may be the case that only 
genuinely having moral beliefs can secure all relevant prudential goods, fictionalists argue that 
we can secure at least some significant proportion of them by speaking, acting and, 
importantly, thinking as if there were moral facts and properties. 
In the WNP context, fictionalists typically see abolitionism as their primary opposition.  Joyce, 
for example, simply dismisses conservationism out of hand (2001 p. 214), and while this might 
seem hasty, my own discussion of Olson’s conservationism shows that he is probably right to 
do so.88  And since its adherents claim that fictionalism can deliver at least some of the 
benefits of genuine moral beliefs, fictionalists argue that it is preferable to abolitionism, which 
delivers no such benefits and which ‘would force large-scale changes to the way we talk, think, 
and feel that would be extremely difficult to make’ (Nolan et al. 2005 p. 307).  Other WNP 
responses are largely quite recent, and have yet to provoke proper responses from 
fictionalists. 
Ultimately then, the primary fictionalist claim is that error theorists ought to become 
fictionalists on prudential grounds.  Over the next four sections I will examine whether they 
 
88 For an alternative discussion of conservationism which finds it similarly implausible (and that 
fictionalism is preferable), see Jaquet & Naar 2016. 
 88 
are correct to make this claim. I will begin by explaining what fictionalism is, and then outline 
how fictionalists claim that their proposal can be useful.  Following this, in sections 4.4.3 & 
4.4.4 I will explain why I believe fictionalism fails to be an adequate response to the ‘what 
now?’ problem. 
4.4.1.  What fictionalism is 
To be a fictionalist about a given domain of discourse involves using its terms in a very similar 
manner to realists, whilst treating the discourse in question as fictive. Typically, this involves 
either holding genuine beliefs about fictional subject matter (so-called content fictionalism), 
or having thoughts with similar content to genuine beliefs, but treating those thoughts as 
something other than genuine beliefs (so-called force fictionalism).  I will explain what these 
alternatives amount to further below.  In the moral case, fictionalists will use terms such as 
duty, obligation, right and wrong in everyday situations much as realists might.  They may 
even think in moral terms, seemingly arriving at moral judgements in accordance with moral 
rules, and so on.  But, crucially, and in contrast with how error theorists view traditional 
morality, in doing so they will not be using moral terms to make assertions about states of 
affairs in the actual world.  Accordingly, although in everyday contexts fictionalists will speak 
and even think as if error theory were not true, in more critical contexts (such as sophisticated 
metaethical discussions) they will remain disposed to affirm the truth of error theory, and the 
falseness of their day-to-day moral thoughts and statements. 
This is more familiar than it may initially sound.  To illustrate, consider that we often discuss 
fictional individuals and situations using ostensibly the same language we use to discuss real 
people and events.  For example, if I claim that Harry Potter has an unblemished forehead, 
you might reply that I am mistaken.  To an observer with no knowledge of the relevant fiction, 
this would appear to be a conversation about a real person.  Yet the Harry Potter we are 
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discussing does not exist - there may be individuals with that name of course, but none of 
them is a young wizard, has attended Hogwarts, was given a scar by an evil sorcerer, etc.   
There is a sense, however, in which my claim about Master Potter’s faultless complexion 
would nonetheless be wrong.  That is because according to the fiction (in this case, the books 
by J. K. Rowling), Harry Potter has a scarred forehead.  When we discuss the character, we 
know this, and we understand that we are talking in terms of the fiction, rather than the actual 
world.  We might even go a step further and take on the role of the actors in a Harry Potter 
film, speaking and acting consistently as if the fiction were true.  But all along we would not 
believe the fiction, we would merely make believe.  And when we were not acting, we would 
remain disposed to say that Harry Potter is a fictional character, and that no such real person 
exists. 
Fictionalists argue that we can use moral language in much the same way.  Recall from chapter 
2 that error theorists typically hold that moral discourse is assertoric, and commits us to the 
existence of moral facts or properties involving phenomena such as moral obligations.  Yet 
they do not believe that moral facts and properties exist, and accordingly they argue that it is 
never the case that we have moral obligations.  Thus, according to error theorists, moral 
discourse is systematically in error.  When we enter a fictional mode of discourse, however, 
we do not commit ourselves to the existence in the actual world of anything at all.  This can 
happen in two ways. 
First, our discourse may remain assertoric in structure but refer to facts and properties in a 
fictional world as opposed to the actual world.  This is what is often referred to as content (or 
preface) fictionalism.  It is analogous to the way in which we might disagree over Harry 
Potter’s scar.  In that case, the truth conditions which dictate which one of us is correct are 
nowhere to be found in the actual world.  But they do exist in a fictional world, one which we 
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understand ourselves to be referring to and which has fixed features, namely the world 
described in the Harry Potter novels.  This cognitive form of fictionalism is what I understand 
Nolan et al. to advocate (2005).  According to content fictionalists, moral claims can be read 
as elliptical, expressing beliefs of the form ‘(according to fiction F), x is y’.  I will have more to 
say about how we might define ‘fiction F’ shortly. But since the motivation for fictionalism is 
the claimed usefulness of moral thought and discourse, and since error theory rules out any 
moral grounds for preferring one fiction over another, we can suppose for the time being that 
it equates roughly to ‘whichever fiction is most useful’ or ‘whichever fiction brings about the 
greatest number of things we desire’.   
Second, we may speak without assertoric force in order to express our conative attitudes, or 
perhaps in order to achieve some perlocutionary effect such as persuading or inspiring others.  
Alternatively, we might do so in order to bolster our own motivation to act in certain ways.  
This is what is often referred to as force (or attitude) fictionalism, and is analogous to the 
acting case I mentioned above.  Force fictionalists understand moral judgements to have the 
same content as realists’ moral beliefs.  However, they consider the attitude we have to that 
content to be something other than belief.  Thus when we judge that ‘torture is wrong’, our 
judgement has the content that torture is wrong (as opposed to according to fiction F, torture 
is wrong), but rather than believing that content, we merely entertain it or quasi-believe it.  
Accordingly, on force fictionalism, when we utter ‘torture is wrong’, we do not assert that 
there is any fact of the matter about the moral status of torture, we merely quasi-assert it.89  
This non-cognitive fictionalism is what Joyce advocates (2001 chapter 8, and more explicitly, 
2017). 
 
89 This could be phrased in terms of pretending to believe and pretending to assert, but pretence is 
slightly too weak here.  A bad actor who never really engages with their role can pretend to assert or 
to believe something.  But Joyce requires something stronger than that, albeit stopping short of actual 
assertion.  A parallel with what quasi-assertion is meant to capture here might be a more immersive 
form of ‘method’ acting. 
 91 
The following table helps to show the differences between these various ways of analysing 
moral judgements by highlighting which mental states moral utterances express, according to 
each type of analysis.  In each case, we can see what kind of attitude a moral judgement is, 
and what the content of that attitude is.  I will use a judgement that torture is wrong as an 
example, and include cognitivist realism and a basic form of (hermeneutic) expressivism as a 
reminder of the more conventional ways of understanding the issue. 
A judgement that torture is wrong consists in: 
Realism (cognitivist):   Belief [torture is wrong] 
(Basic) expressivism:   Desire [do not torture] 
Content fictionalism:   Belief [according to fiction F, torture is wrong] 
Force fictionalism:   Entertain [torture is wrong] 
 
4.4.2. How fictionalism might secure the claimed benefits of conventional morality 
No matter what variety of fictionalism they defend, all fictionalists argue that by taking a 
fictionalist stance towards moral thought and discourse, we can secure (at least some of) the 
same prudential goods as those associated with genuine moral beliefs, without committing 
ourselves to the existence of moral properties and facts in the actual world.  The specific 
benefits of the moral discourse which fictionalists argue their approach can secure vary 
according to the theorist(s) concerned. Nolan et al. focus largely on social issues, and are 
concerned primarily with demonstrating that fictionalism is preferable to abolitionism.  
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Accordingly, they list four advantages which they claim abolitionism cannot provide but which 
fictionalism can (2005 p. 310ff.):90 
1.  Psychological convenience.  Moral thought and discourse are embedded into society in 
general and into individual psychology at a fundamental level.  Nolan et al. claim that it would 
be exceedingly difficult and require enormous effort to divest ourselves of them.  It may even 
be impossible.  Therefore, continuing to use moral discourse in a fictional mode is of 
significant practical benefit because it avoids this difficulty while remaining consistent with 
error theory. 
2.  Avoiding frequent digressions into complicated metaethics.  In everyday contexts, when 
other people (who may well not be error theorists) raise issues of applied ethics, Nolan et al. 
claim that fictionalists can consistently respond in a way which gets to the point of the 
discussion without having to explain at length why the issues are in fact illusory etc.  
Abolitionists, they claim, cannot.91 
3.  Expressive power.  Nolan et al. argue that it is possible to use moral language to say things 
about the non-moral world which would be cumbersome or even impossible to say using non-
moral language.  One example Nolan et al. give is ‘Suppose that we want to say that the duty 
to stop and attend to the victims of a car accident is more important than our duty to keep 
 
90 Nolan et al. do not necessarily take the four listed advantages of fictionalism to be the only possible 
advantages, citing for example potential uses of moral discourse in child rearing and avoiding 
inconsistency when error theorists are tempted to take moral claims to be true.  But the four 
advantages listed are their primary specific claims.  
91 Nolan et al. use the phrase ‘when speaking with the vulgar’ (p. 311), echoing Berkeley’s advice to 
‘think with the learned but speak with the vulgar’.  In a spirit of charity, I am content to read the use of 
‘vulgar’ as an evaluatively neutral reference to non-fictionalists as opposed to some kind of Freudian 
slip.  Though I will raise an objection to fictionalism concerning speaking to others who are not 
fictionalists – whether they are vulgar or otherwise! – below. 
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our commitment to meet our friend for lunch. Again, what non-moral features of the world 
are implied by talk of ‘duty’ here?’ (op. cit., p. 312). 
4.  Coordinating attitudes and regulating interpersonal conflict.  Nolan et al. claim that moral 
discourse sets out a set of shared values, and gives us a conceptual and semantic framework 
of rights, obligations and so on which they deem to be useful in conflict resolution. 
Joyce, on the other hand, focuses on the usefulness of the moral thought and discourse in 
avoiding temptation and weakness of will.  The idea here is that at least a majority of moral 
rules inveigh against practices which we have non-moral reasons to avoid, or promote actions 
and outcomes which most ‘ordinarily situated persons with normal human desires’ would 
want (2001 p. 222).  People generally desire not to be tortured, not to have their possessions 
stolen, not to have promises made to them broken, and so on.  Moreover, they normally also 
desire the stability of a society in which others refrain from those and similar actions.  By 
acting as a bulwark against weakness of will, Joyce argues that taking a fictive stance towards 
moral thought and discourse can help reduce the number of instances of these pernicious 
actions, even if people do not believe what they are saying and thinking. 
The key to seeing how this might be so is immersion.  Ordinarily, when we immerse ourselves 
in a fiction (by reading a book in a fully engaged manner, for example), we frequently feel 
emotions, often including very strong emotions.  These emotions can sometimes extend 
beyond the fiction, and form the motivational basis for actions in the real world.  For example, 
when reading The Color Purple, we may feel desperately sorry for Celie in the fictional world 
of the story.  But the emotions we experience while immersed in the fiction may also prompt 
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us e.g. to oppose racism in the real world.  Yet this will only happen if we engage fully with 
the fiction – if we allow ourselves to think and feel as if the fiction were true.92 
It is by this kind of mechanism that Joyce believes that ‘entertaining’ propositions which we 
know not to be literally true can nonetheless motivate us to act in certain ways.  Nolan et al. 
seem content to recommend fictionalism as a general policy, without discussing in detail what 
living a life as a fictionalist might be like.  But Joyce goes further (2001 pp. 218-221) and 
recommends that error theorists should immerse themselves in the moral fiction.  By this, he 
means that in most contexts, error theorists should cease to pay attention to the fact that 
they are error theorists at all.  They should think and act entirely as if they were moral realists 
in all contexts other than their most (metaethically) critical contexts (such as, for example, the 
philosophy seminar room).  For no matter what role their moral thoughts play in their 
deliberations, Joyce argues that fictionalists may remain consistent error theorists so long as 
they remain disposed to dissent from their apparent moral beliefs in a least one ultimately 
critical context.  This, says Joyce, is the defining difference between what he calls moral 
thoughts or images (which he considers compatible and consistent with error theory) and 
genuine moral beliefs (which he does not) – the former ‘may well seem to the subject as very 
much the same as beliefs.  The difference between a thought and a belief here is not a 
phenomenological one; it is a matter of a disposition to dissent’ (2001 p. 219). 
It is by developing the use of apparently moral thought and discourse into a ‘life strategy’ – 
i.e. far more than a simple habit - that Joyce believes error theorists can best protect 
themselves from akrasia.  Only by this level of commitment to the fictive discourse can we be 
sure that when confronted with temptation, the thought of giving in to it is unlikely to even 
enter our minds.  This is a process which Joyce believes begins long before we might become 
 
92 Joyce’s arguments here touch upon a much more complex set of debates in the philosophy of 
aesthetics.  For an overview and further reading, see Gendler 2013, especially section 5.3. 
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error theorists, since we are (at least most of us) raised in such a way that we genuinely hold 
moral beliefs.  But Joyce recommends that an agent who goes on to become an error theorist 
‘continues to use the language of morals, continues with her familiar patterns of thinking, but 
allows herself to express disbelief in it all when she is placed in highly critical contexts’ (2001 
pp. 229-230).93 
4.4.3.  Problems with fictionalism: i) Deception 
Having laid out what fictionalism consists in and how fictionalists argue it can deliver the 
benefits they claim, I will now examine whether or not they are correct.  Bluntly, I do not 
believe that they are.  In my view, fictionalism cannot deliver the benefits which its defenders 
claim it can, and brings with it serious problems which fictionalists cannot explain away.  
Ultimately, we will have to look elsewhere for a viable response to the ‘what now?’ problem. 
There are a number of issues with fictionalism, both in terms of the specific ways fictionalists 
make their case and with the overall fictionalist strategy itself.  Here, I will limit my discussion 
to two criticisms of the fictionalist strategy in general.  I do not consider the objections raised 
here to be exhaustive of the potential arguments against fictionalism.94  But taken together, I 
consider the objections I will raise sufficient to undermine fictionalism as a response to the 
‘what now?’ problem, and to thus necessitate the search for further responses. 
 
93 Joyce has recently expanded on his view by likening the non-assertoric use of previously moral terms 
to metaphors such as describing a person as a ‘spineless snake’ (2019 p. 154).  I will omit discussion of 
this here, since I believe it rests on a misunderstanding of metaphor.  When we use slurs which are not 
literally true – no human actually is a spineless snake – I would argue that we really are asserting 
something nonetheless, just not something which is literally true at a surface level.  That being the case, 
Joyce’s recent talk of metaphors threatens to undermine the non-assertoric form of fictionalism he 
defends elsewhere prior to 2019.  Joyce would doubtless have something to say in response to this, but 
rather than get bogged down in a tangential debate about metaphor, I therefore choose to focus on 
Joyce’s more direct earlier presentations here. 
94 For further criticisms of fictionalism as a post-error theory option, see e.g. Garner 2007, Lenman 
2013, Svoboda 2015, Olson 2014 p. 181ff. 
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The first problem with fictionalism is that it necessarily involves deception.  To see why this is 
so, let us begin with a definition:  
To lie is ‘to make a believed-false statement to another person with the 
intention that the other person believe that statement to be true’ (Mahon 
2016).95   
Keeping this definition in mind, consider a conversation between Gregor, who is a 
revolutionary fictionalist, and his sister Grete, who is a moral realist and unaware of the error 
theory.  In what follows, I will proceed as if Gregor is a Joyceian non-assertive fictionalist, but 
the points will apply to Nolan-style content fictionalists as well. 
During the conversation, Gregor says to Grete, ‘killing insects is immoral’.  As a fictionalist, 
Gregor is quasi-asserting something which he believes is literally false, and which he is merely 
‘entertaining’.  This fulfils the first half of the definition of lying I just gave, but it is of course 
to be expected of a fictionalist.  But in order for my charge of lying to stick, Gregor must also 
intend that Grete believe his statement to be true.  The problem for fictionalists is that Gregor 
cannot avoid having this intention.  To explain, I will begin with linguistic conventions.  One of 
the background conventions which English speakers share is that sentences with an assertoric 
surface structure are to be understood as assertions.  Joyce himself observes that,  
...speech acts occur only against a background of conventions shared by a 
speaker and her audience; a person cannot unilaterally decide that she isn’t 
 
95 This definition is not necessarily entirely platitudinous, and Mahon discusses several objections and 
possible revisions.  But none of the issues raised affect the argument I will make here (not even ‘the 
assertion condition’ (see Mahon 2016 §1.5.2), as I will explain below).  Thus the definition as given here 
is respectable for present non-specialist purposes. 
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asserting the sentence S if she fails to signal this to her audience, all of whom 
take her to be asserting S. (2017 p. 82) 
Conventionally in English, the intended mode of speech is typically inferred from the context 
and subject matter.  So, when we discuss the features of the Death Star with others whom we 
know to be familiar with Star Wars, all parties understand any apparent assertions as 
expressions of make-beliefs, rather than of genuine beliefs about states of affairs in the real 
world.  Conversely, when we utter a sentence such as ‘granite is a type of igneous rock’, it is 
implausible that our audience would typically take us to be to be withholding assertoric force 
or expect us go on to claim that rocks do not exist when we are in a relevantly more critical 
context.  in the moral case, remember that the vast majority of people are not currently 
revolutionary fictionalists.  Indeed, Joyce’s argument for an error theory rests on claims that 
people are typically moral realists and interpret moral discourse assertorically (see chapter 2 
of this thesis). 
Returning to Gregor and Grete, this means that as a non-error theorist, under typical 
circumstances Grete will understand Gregor’s apparent assertion that killing insects is 
immoral as a genuine assertion intended to get her to believe the relevant proposition.96  And 
as a competent speaker of English (and a metaethically sophisticated one at that), Gregor 
knows this.  Therefore, if he utters the sentence ‘killing beetles is immoral’ to Grete without 
further preamble or explanation, he must intend that she believe him.  This fulfils the 
remainder of the definition of lying given above, and thus Gregor would be lying. 
Perhaps Gregor could avoid lying by somehow signalling that his use of moral terms is non-
assertoric, or pointing out that he is only quasi-asserting, etc.  But this would come at the cost 
 
96 It is near-platitudinous that assertions are typically intended to produce a belief in an audience.  See 
e.g. Grice 1957 pp. 383-384.  (Grice speaks of a speaker ‘meaning’ something, but for present purposes 
this is synonymous with their asserting something). 
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of the all-important immersion which Gregor must maintain if he is to remain a fictionalist 
(see §4.4.2).  For one cannot consistently think and feel as if one is a moral realist while also 
prefacing one’s apparent moral assertions with a metaethical disclaimer about quasi-
assertion, entertaining thoughts and so on.  Hence if he is to remain a fictionalist, Gregor 
cannot avoid lying whenever he discusses moral matters with anyone who is not a fictionalist 
(i.e. currently almost everyone, by Joyce’s lights).97 
Even aside from the idea that truth might have intrinsic value (or, for obvious reasons, the 
suggestion that lying is morally wrong), this is problematic for two reasons. First of all, most 
arguments for fictionalism seem to embrace the idea that the fiction which we are to adopt 
should be essentially a fictional counterpart of the conventional morality.  Therefore, lying is 
likely to be wrong according to the rules of the relevant fiction and thus the fictionalist 
position threatens to become incoherent.  This is because fictionalists recommend that we 
act and think as if the moral fiction were true, and yet if I am right they simultaneously 
recommend what amounts to lying – which would be breaking the rules of the moral fiction 
which they tell us to adopt.  And, secondly, it seems likely that most people would agree that 
there are sound pragmatic reasons for following a general policy of refraining from lying.  As 
Joyce says, ‘No policy that encourages belief in falsehoods, or the promulgation of false belief 
in others, will be practically stable in the long run’ (2001 p. 214).  Not only is there the 
likelihood of being found out and facing censure as a result, there is the fact that truth itself 
is often thought to be instrumentally valuable (see e.g. Lynch 2004 p. 16).98 
Yet perhaps fictionalists can avoid the deception problem.  Although he has not thus far 
responded to the kind of objection I have raised here, Joyce is sensitive to the possibility of a 
 
97 Although I am framing the discussion in terms of Joyceian non-assertive fictionalism here, this would 
also destroy Nolan et al.’s advertised benefit of avoiding metaethical digressions (see §4.4.2). 
98 This latter view is admittedly not without controversy – for an opposing view, see Wrenn 2010. 
 99 
mismatch in background assumptions between speaker and audience, as the quote I gave 
above shows.  And this may point the way to defusing my objection.  Joyce observes that 
recommending fictionalism on an individual basis is rather ‘like advising someone to become 
a rugby team’ (2017 p. 82-83), because the fictionalist recommendation to use moral 
sentences without asserting them requires both speaker and audience to be known 
fictionalists in order to be intelligible.  The proposal is not the kind of thing that makes sense 
when considered on a per-agent basis.  We should therefore interpret Joyce as recommending 
fictionalism to groups of people, rather than to individuals.   
This can be read as forestalling my deception objection because, in recommending 
fictionalism to groups of people who share an appropriate background of linguistic 
conventions, Joyce places speakers who speak in the fictionalist mode in the company of 
others who will understand them to be doing so.  Even if what one says would typically be 
interpreted in a realist sense by the general public, if one is speaking to a group of fictionalists, 
and all concerned know that they are fictionalists, this misinterpretation would be very 
unlikely.  Thus the deception problem, it could be argued, evaporates. 
However, this doesn’t actually solve the problem.  Rather it simply pushes the problem back 
one step.  For whatever group Joyce expects to take his advice, that group will always come 
up against outsiders.  Given that the community of revolutionary fictionalists is unlikely to be 
very large, at least initially, the problem which faced the lone fictionalist will quickly return to 
face the group.  When the fictionalist group eventually descends from the metaphorical 
metaethical mountain, they will immediately be surrounded by, and forced into conversation 
with, people who typically use moral discourse in a realist fashion.  This is, after all, the basis 
for the moral error theory which gave rise to the WNP in the first place.99 
 
99 See chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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One way I can see around this is for Joyce to stipulate that the group he intends to make his 
recommendation to is very large – at least a majority of the population of an entire society.  
This is clearly not feasible, since it would require an unprecedented and implausibly 
widespread revolution among huge numbers of people, many of whom may be incapable of 
understanding fictionalism in the first place, or at least unwilling to make the effort to do so.100  
Thus fictionalism remains either dishonest or unintelligible in the way I have described.  
Alternatively, Joyce could recommend fictionalism only to small groups, for use exclusively 
within those groups.  Yet unless those groups secrete themselves in monastery-like 
conditions, which is unlikely to be appealing to many people, the problem will return as soon 
as they encounter anyone who is not a member of the group.   
Moreover, returning to Nolan et al., if they were tempted to try to avoid the deception 
objection I raised above by adopting a similar ‘group orientation’, they would in so doing 
undermine another of their claimed benefits, psychological convenience.  For it can hardly be 
convenient, psychologically or otherwise, to demand that everyone with whom one converses 
should have a sufficiently sophisticated grasp of metaethics that they are a specific variety of 
post-error theory fictionalist.  And if fictionalists converse knowingly with other fictionalists, 
the claimed advantage of avoiding metaethical digressions is also undermined – it is not an 
advantage to avoid explanatory digressions where no digression is needed in the first place. 
I conclude that fictionalism necessarily involves deception.  This renders the proposal that we 
respond to the truth of error theory by becoming fictionalists problematic in several ways, 
and I do not believe that error theorists will be willing to embrace a response to the ‘what 
now?’ problem which forces them to become liars.  This may be enough by itself to convince 
 
100 I will respond to a similar challenge to my own proposal in §7.4. 
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us that we should look to other WNP responses as the way forward.  But just to be sure, I will 
now discuss a further problem which further undermines fictionalism as a WNP response. 
4.4.4.  Problems with fictionalism: ii) Which Morals? 
The second problem with fictionalism I will discuss is one I mentioned earlier (§4.4.1), namely 
the issue of deciding which moral quasi-beliefs we should have (hereafter I will refer to this as 
the ‘which morals?’ question).  This is a problem for Joyce more than for Nolan et al., and he 
acknowledges that it something he needs to address, writing,  
There are different ways of understanding the claim that X is useful to a 
group, even before we get to more specific questions raised by replacing “X” 
with “morality.” Let us suppose that we settle on one such way. If a group is 
motivated to adopt morality as a fiction because doing so is useful (in the 
manner settled upon), then when faced with the choice of which moral 
fiction to adopt (from an infinite range of possibilities), the answer is simply 
“The most useful one.”  It is important to remember that the fiction is being 
maintained for practical purposes; it is entirely possible that a group might 
adopt the wrong moral fiction. (2017 p. 83) 
There are a number of problems here.  First, there seems no clear way to distinguish moral 
fictions from any other fictions which may be deemed useful.  This is important, because 
fictionalism demands that we treat moral quasi-beliefs very seriously, immersing ourselves 
almost entirely in the thought that they are true and incorporating them into our practical 
deliberations.  But which fictions do we adopt this involved, dedicated attitude towards, and 
which do we treat as mundane fictions which require no deeper immersion on our part, like 
the rules of a fictional game in a novel? Perhaps it might be suggested that the only issues 
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which would feature in our moral quasi-beliefs would be those about which we formerly (i.e. 
before we came to accept error theory) had moral beliefs.  So we could sort through our prior 
moral beliefs, and retain in fictional form those which would be most useful.   
But that seems as though it would be too restrictive.  Society is continually changing, yet if 
fictionalism was restricted to some subset of whatever moral beliefs we had before we 
became error theorists, there would be no way for the fictive morality to evolve or to reflect 
novel moral questions.  For example, just as two hundred years ago there could have been no 
concept of the moral issues around, say, online communication, as ‘fossilised’ fictionalists we 
would have a hard time accounting for new situations which obviously had a moral dimension.  
Yet without some way of picking out what makes a fiction a moral fiction, how could we sort 
out moral fictions from other fictional rules which were merely useful?   
It seems potentially useful to institute a fictional rule whereby every individual in a group who 
can afford to do so must buy a tool – a hammer or a screwdriver or somesuch – for another 
randomly chosen member of the group.  Tools are very useful things, so having a group-wide, 
tool-based secret Santa scheme should be useful, too.  Thus the relevant rule would be very 
like a fictionalist ‘thought’.  We may act as if it were binding upon us, it might nudge us into 
action when otherwise we might have been insufficiently motivated, and we might react 
poorly to those who fail to act according to the rule.  We could do all of this while knowing, 
when we were thinking critically about it, that the rule was a fiction - it was not really a rule 
which was binding upon us in any objective sense.  But would we really think of such a fictional 
rule as a moral rule?  Surely it would be going too far to claim that we would.  Joyce owes us 
an account of what counts as a moral fiction, with the attendant requirement that we take it 
seriously and act at almost all times as if it were true, as opposed to any other kind of fiction. 
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A reasonable response from fictionalists here might be to say that we should consider ‘moral’ 
whichever fictional rules play a particular ‘moral’ role in our deliberations, in whichever way 
that role might be specified – for example in terms of reactive attitudes such as blame, guilt, 
censure and so on.101  But I would reply that we would still need an account of this (or 
whatever alternative fictionalists might suggest).  For example, if lots of people have an 
intense ‘moral-style’ reaction to something which is not useful, where does that leave us?  
There are numerous instances of ‘moral panics’ in which some phenomenon triggers 
widespread, apparently moral reactions which frequently seem highly unlikely to be useful in 
any obvious way to society or to the individuals involved.102 
The second problem, and I believe a far more significant problem, is that Joyce gives the 
impression that an answer to the ‘which morals?’ question can be found.  Yet I believe there 
may be no satisfactory answer.  I find Joyce’s formulation in the quote above a little unclear, 
since it seems to conflate usefulness for accomplishing a goal with the question of which 
goal(s) it would be useful to accomplish.  The reader may have no such issue with Joyce’s 
formulation, but in an attempt to be a little clearer (even if only for my own benefit), I suggest 
that we can break the ‘which morals?’ question down into the following two sub-questions 
without changing what Joyce is driving at: 
A) What do we want to get out of adopting morality as a fiction? 
B) Which moral fiction would be the best means to that end, if we adopted it? 
The reason I am not optimistic that there can be a satisfactory answer to the ‘which morals?’ 
question is that I see no satisfactory way of answering A) or B).  Let us consider A) first.  In 
§4.4.2 I noted that Joyce focuses on overcoming weakness of will as the primary thing we will 
 
101 I will return to the theme of reactive attitudes in §5.4.3 when describing my own proposal. 
102 The classic text on moral panics is often thought to be Cohen 1972.  For an insight into more recent 
views on moral panics, see e.g. Cree 2016. 
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get out of adopting fictionalism, but this is a model – the above quote from 2017 clearly shows 
that this is not the only way in which adopting fictionalism is supposed to be useful to the 
group of fictionalists.  A much fuller answer to A) is required here.  It initially seems that a 
satisfying answer to A) might involve such things as a more harmonious society, a reduction 
in how frequently people do things which harm others, and other things along similar lines.  
But why should we want those things?   
To illustrate, imagine someone (let’s call her Caroline) who is of a certain Nietzschean bent 
and believes that humanity in general would be best served by denouncing pity and revelling 
in conflict, in order to move towards a stronger, more glorious future. Caroline’s answer to A) 
reflects these sentiments, and so what she wants out of adopting morality as a fiction is more 
strife, more adversity, and more consequent opportunities for triumph.  On what grounds can 
we tell Caroline that her answer to A) is wrong?  Certainly error theorists can offer no moral 
grounds for criticising Caroline’s position (as most people who have conventional moral 
beliefs might).  And on a pragmatic level, there seem to be few grounds on which to say that 
Caroline is conclusively wrong either.  It seems to me that whatever answer we come up with 
for A), there will be a corresponding character we can come up with to play Caroline’s role 
and undermine it.103  
Recall from §3.3.7 that Joyce is committed to the claim that there is no single desire which is 
shared by all people.  Given our disparate desiderative starting points, there is nothing which 
we all want to achieve.  This means that there can be no particularly specific answer to A).  
And Caroline’s example shows us that even broad answers to A) will be unsatisfactory to 
someone.  Joyce considers something like this problem, and replies  
 
103 My point here is that no list of ‘Carolines’ would be exhaustive.  But to flesh the suggestion out a 
little, further examples might include some kinds of communist who would want to abolish private 
property, and some neo-Luddites who would place environmental concerns above all others. 
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Perhaps taking a fictional stance toward morality will recoup costs for one 
person but not for another.  Even the best advice is unlikely to be good for 
anyone in any circumstances.  In light of this, the revolutionary fictionalist 
should be permitted a degree of modesty and a dose of vagueness: The 
position is reasonable if it’s good advice generally for most people. (2017 p. 
82) 
This philosophical shrugging of the shoulders is inadequate.  The implication is that whatever 
a majority of people think is good should be pursued, regardless of whether a minority of 
people consider it harmful.  Clearly Joyce’s ‘advice’ is premised on a form of consequentialism 
– good advice is good insofar as it promotes a net improvement in outcomes for a majority of 
people.  But why should we grant Joyce's claim that adopting revolutionary fictionalism is 
good advice if it's good for most people, most of the time? The claim seems to run contrary 
to one of the plausible benefits of morality - that it defends those who would otherwise be 
subject to the tyranny of the majority.  In fact, Joyce's recommendation seems to be premised 
on a form of consequentialism, and it is precisely an ethical consequentialist who made one 
of the most famous moral arguments against the tyranny of the majority – J.S. Mill in On 
Liberty.  This is not the place for a discussion of consequentialism in ethics, but note that it is 
a significant disadvantage of Joyce’s view that it strongly threatens to inherit some or all of 
the issues around consequentialism, many of which remain very controversial.104 
One way Joyce could respond to this is to argue that a group of fictionalists could stipulate 
that one of the fictions to which they will commit is that minorities should not be harmed by 
the tyranny of the majority.  But this just further complicates the search for an answer to A).  
Are we to seek answers to A) which are optimally useful to a majority within a group, as Joyce 
 
104 For an overview of consequentialism in ethics and the problems it raises, see Sinnott-Armstrong 
2019. 
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explicitly says, or not?  If so, is optimal usefulness to such a majority the same as not harming 
minorities?  It certainly seems unlikely that it is, and it seems equally unlikely that this rather 
ad hoc response will lead to a satisfactory answer to A). 
Turning to B), there seem to be important empirical questions with no clear answers.  Even if 
we were to be able to overcome the above problems with A) and settle on an answer to it, 
how are we to know which moral fiction will contribute best to bringing it about?  Again, there 
are some initially plausible answers to B) which, on closer inspection, turn out to be 
problematic.  For example, consider an answer to A) along the lines that, as far as possible, 
people should not be harmed by the actions of others.  This seems to have some quite obvious 
implications for our answer to B), such as implying that it should include a rule against, say, 
stealing.  But does such a rule really contribute to minimising harm to others?  This is an 
empirical question, and although we will be inclined to answer in the affirmative, there seems 
to be no way of knowing for sure that it does not in fact merely promote wealth inequality, 
which breeds conflict and disadvantages the poor.  It seems likely that an analogous example 
can be found for virtually any proposed moral rule.  As I discussed in §4.3, this is the 
foundation of the arguments put forward by abolitionists.  While it may be a disadvantage of 
abolitionism that it ultimately rests on an empirical claim which may not be provable, we can 
now see that fictionalism rests on just such a claim as well. 
Underlying all of this is a sense in which I believe Joyce falls foul of status quo bias.  Despite 
his insistence that the moral beliefs we should take a fictive stance towards should be 
whichever are most useful, Joyce often speaks of the fictionalist habit in terms of continuing 
our pre-error theory moral practice or of adopting ‘morality’ (as opposed to ‘parts of morality’ 
or ‘certain moral beliefs’) as a fiction without reference to any further discrimination (see e.g. 
2001 chapter 8 passim).  Yet it seems impossible that the most useful moral beliefs are the 
ones we had before error theory came along.  Even if there were a credible evolutionary basis 
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for some traditional moral beliefs, we do not have to exert very much effort to come up with 
widely held yet mutually exclusive moral beliefs, hence for example the intractability of 
conflicts around abortion.  And any attempt to sort out the evolutionarily justifiable moral 
beliefs from the rest inevitably leads straight back to the issues with the search for an answer 
to A).   
Moreover, entirely apart from whether they could be mustered into anything approaching a 
coherent set with no contradictions, abolitionists have shown us that the moral beliefs the 
majority of people have may well be responsible for disastrous events.  Not only would it be 
question begging against abolitionists to dismiss the possibility that traditional morality is 
actively pernicious, doing so cannot be supported by evidence.  While fictionalists may be 
correct if they were to argue as I have done that abolitionists cannot empirically prove their 
case, neither can opponents of abolitionism empirically prove abolitionists wrong. 
Surely part of the point of error theory is that morally speaking, all bets are off.  One might 
suspect that mere usefulness is not the only criterion by which we should judge responses to 
the ‘what now?’ problem.105  But even ignoring that question, for now, if we follow the 
fictionalists in their insistence that usefulness is enough, then that leads inexorably to 
questions of what is and is not useful which cannot be answered. 
Taking §4.4.3 and §4.4.4 together, I conclude that fictionalism fails because as a general 
strategy it cannot plausibly be described in satisfactory detail or implemented.  Once again, 
we will have to look elsewhere for a convincing WNP response.  In the next section, I will 
 
105 For example, perhaps it might be argued that experiencing things we find beautiful is psychologically 
important to us, and therefore something we have prudential reasons (which are compatible with the 
truth of a moral error theory) to want.  Yet usefulness and beauty are not obviously the same thing, 
and nor is it obviously useful to us to contemplate beauty, even if it is psychologically important. 
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discuss a handful of further responses to the ‘what now?’ problem, including one which has 
emerged as a noteworthy candidate for answering the WNP only comparatively recently. 
4.5.  Revolutionary expressivism 
This is the last of my sections discussing why error theorists should reject the WNP responses 
which have appeared to date.  Other than conservationism, abolitionism and fictionalism, few 
responses to the ‘what now?’ problem have emerged as yet.  Despite its appearance in some 
literature (e.g. Joyce 2001 p. 214, Cuneo & Christy 2011 pp. 93-94, Husi 2014), I will set one 
possible response aside immediately.  So-called propagandism, according to which a 
metaethically learned elite would keep the truth of error theory a secret, and let the moral 
‘proletariat’ carry on unaware of their profound errors, is unviable for a couple of reasons.106  
One, despite several philosophers mentioning propagandism, none has yet made a serious 
attempt to defend it.  Until someone does so, it would be unfair and too much of a distraction 
from the task at hand to concoct a straw man form of the view and put it into the mouth of 
an as-yet fictional opponent.  Two, the ‘secret’ of moral error theory is already out, and has 
been since at least 1977.  Moral error theory may not (yet) be the talk of taverns across the 
land, but the attention it has already attracted makes it impossible to keep it secret from 
anyone interested in the topic. 107 
 
106 An analogy may be drawn between propagandism and ‘Government House Utilitarianism’ in the 
works of Sidgwick and Hare (see e.g. Williams 1985 pp. 108-109 for explanation and criticisms).  Joyce 
mentions this in passing (2001 p. 214) and Blackford suggests that Mackie may have had something like 
G. H. U. in mind (2019 p. 62), though declines to elaborate. 
107 Variations of a further view have been suggested by Matt Lutz (2014), who calls it substitutionism, 
and Stan Husi (2014), who calls it revisionism.  The idea is that we might respond to the WNP by 
reforming our moral thought and discourse to remove the erroneous features while retaining the rest. 
I omit further discussion here because Lutz and Husi describe variations on a strategy according to 
which completely different WNP responses as disparate as my own revolutionary relativism and 
revisionary expressivism (see below) would both count as substitutionist/revisionist.  I therefore 
consider ‘substitutionist’ and ‘revisionist’ labels for certain kinds of WNP response rather than fully 
fledged responses in their own right, in a similar way to how ‘realist’ can be used to describe very 
different and mutually exclusive forms of e.g. naturalism and non-naturalism.  As such, I will set Lutz 
and Husi aside and concentrate on more contentful views. 
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Of the notable WNP responses to date, this leaves just one to discuss in detail here.  I will 
examine a recent paper, the author of which suggests that if we accept error theory, we 
should become expressivists.108  In my view, the attempt to recommend expressivism is either 
 
108 A similar proposal was also made by Köhler and Ridge (2013).  Despite their insistence to the 
contrary, I believe it is self-undermining, and Svoboda’s discussion is therefore more useful here.  
Despite lacking the space for a proper discussion, I will attempt to give an exceedingly brief 
reconstruction of Köhler and Ridge’s (complex) argument, and show why I either see no reason for 
moral error theorists to adopt it, or see it as potentially self-defeating.  Their argument, which is about 
a general error theory about all normativity, rather than just morality, runs roughly thus: 
 
If a Normative Error Theory (NET) is true, we should become revolutionary expressivists.  This 
suggestion could be seen as self-defeating (p. 429).  This is because it contains a ‘should’ clause which 
appears to rely on a practical form of normativity ruled out by the NET.  The authors argue that this 
pitfall can be avoided via the following analysis of the situation: 
1.  Practical normative thought and discourse serve important functions. 
2.  Either 
2a. We have no choice but to care about preserving those functions. 
Or 
2b. It is in our interests to preserve those functions (p. 435). 
3.  Of the available theoretical options, revolutionary expressivism preserves those functions best. 
4.  Therefore, of the available options, we should adopt revolutionary expressivism and reform our 
definitions of normative terms accordingly. 
5.  This ‘should’ must be read in a functional sense, similar to ‘x is required in order to allow y to perform 
its function’.  This is roughly analogous to the way in which one might say that blunt knives should be 
sharpened in order to allow them to perform their definitive function of cutting (p. 434).  This avoids 
reliance on the perhaps more intuitive practical sense of ‘should’ in ‘...should become expressivists’, 
and so avoids self-defeat. 
 
My problems with this strategy concern 2a, 2b and 5.  If 2a is true, then surely the best way to preserve 
the functions in question is, where possible, to leave practical normative thought and discourse as they 
already are.  This is not an option for error theorists about practical normativity in general, which is 
how the authors characterise their NET.  But it is an option for moral error theorists who have no issues 
with accommodating non-moral ‘oughts’ which are predicated on our desires or interests and which 
can perform the desired functions.  If 2b is true, and adopting revolutionary expressivism is something 
we would need to do (which surely it must be), then 2b constitutes a claim about a practical sense of 
normativity ruled out by Köhler and Ridge’s NET.  The argument is therefore self-defeating.   
This flows into the issue I have with 5, which is that reforming the definitions of normative terms, just 
like knife sharpening, does not happen in a vacuum or by itself.  Even if something is required in a 
functional sense, some agent is still required to bring it about.  This is clear if we continue with the knife 
analogy.  Given that we as agents have no definitive function (i.e. there is nothing that we are for doing 
in the way that knives are for cutting), there is nothing we should – in a functional sense – do.  
Therefore, even if there is a functional sense in which knives should be sharpened, there is no functional 
sense in which we ought to sharpen them.  I find it plausible to suggest that, consistent with the 
arguments for error theory discussed in previous sections, moral error theorists would agree that we 
have an authoritative reason to sharpen a blunt knife only insofar as e.g. we desire to cut something, 
and believe that a sharp knife will help us do so, while a blunt knife will not.  This is clearly an instance 
of practical normativity, and by analogy, once again Köhler and Ridge’s argument turns out to be self-
defeating. 
I do not take the above to necessarily demolish Köhler and Ridge’s view.  But it should suffice to 
illustrate that their view is not without controversy, and that given the space constraints on this project, 
a less contentious revolutionary expressivist view is a better subject for discussion here. 
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inappropriate, given the commitments of contemporary error theorists, or inadequate as a 
response to the problem at hand.  That being the case, I argue that we should not adopt 
revolutionary expressivism.  In the next chapter, I will begin to outline my own proposal, 
revolutionary relativism, and then move on to show why error theorists should adopt it in the 
light of the criticisms of the foregoing theses. 
In ‘Why moral error theorists should become revisionary moral expressivists’ (2015), Toby 
Svoboda argues on prudential grounds for a non-cognitivist, expressivist response to the 
WNP.109  That is, he proposes that if we accept the error theory, we should nonetheless 
continue to use moral discourse because it is useful.  But we should revise our understanding 
of moral judgements and discourse and view them not as beliefs and expressions thereof, but 
as desires or desire-like attitudes (such as approval or expectation) and expressions thereof 
instead. This, he claims, will allow us to gain the benefits of moral thought and discourse while 
avoiding error. 
Svoboda argues that revolutionary expressivism is superior to abolitionism, conservationism 
and fictionalism ‘in three different contexts: how these positions fare in avoiding moral error, 
how they fare in securing intrapersonal benefits of morality, and how they fare in securing 
interpersonal benefits of morality’ (2015 p. 8).  If he is right, he takes this to show that moral 
error theorists should adopt revolutionary expressivism on the grounds that it will better 
deliver the stated benefits (which are things that most people desire) than competing 
theories.   
 
109 I will refer to Svoboda’s view as revolutionary as opposed to his preferred term, revisionary. This is 
because 1) it is more consistent with the foregoing sections of this project and thus avoids introducing 
a new term for little gain, and 2) because revolutionary better captures the idea that this is a post-error 
theory proposal as opposed to a form of expressivism about conventional morality.  Nothing turns on 
the distinction here, and anyone more sympathetic with Svoboda’s phrasing can just replace 
revolutionary with revisionary where appropriate. 
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I take the arguments I gave in previous sections to count decisively against Svoboda’s chosen 
opponents, and will therefore forego discussion of his comparisons between the various 
theses.  Rather, I will appraise whether revolutionary expressivism can deliver the benefits 
Svoboda claims.  Setting aside the criterion of avoiding moral error (since avoiding moral error 
would seem to be a requirement of all post-error theory recommendations), I will discuss the 
purported intrapersonal and interpersonal benefits of revolutionary expressivism.110  I will 
show that Svoboda’s proposal fails in both areas.  I believe that Svoboda’s lack of success in 
those contexts means his response to the ‘what now?’ problem fails on its own terms, making 
it unnecessary to consider any further contexts which might be thought appropriate.  Before 
getting into the arguments though, I would like to pause briefly to correct an inaccuracy in 
Svoboda’s terminology.   
4.5.1.  A note on terminology 
When he claims that moral error theorists should become ‘revisionary moral expressivists’, 
the latter instance of the word ‘moral’ is inappropriate.  Recall from chapter 2 that moral error 
theorists typically assume the truth of cognitivism, i.e. the view that moral judgements are 
beliefs, as a description of pre-error theory moral practice.  Expressivism, being a non-
cognitivist view, entails that moral judgements are not beliefs.  Therefore, according to the 
typical commitments of error theorists, the phrase ‘moral expressivism’ is oxymoronic, since 
‘moral’ precludes expressivism.111 
 
110 With the possible exception of conservationism.  But recall that one of the problems with 
conservationism is precisely that it implausibly relies on the viability of continuing to have erroneous 
moral beliefs (see §4.2.1). 
111 It might be suggested that this raises the interesting question of whether cognitivism could be seen 
as another non-negotiable commitment of moral discourse, alongside objective 
prescriptivity/categoricity.  But beyond my observations in the above text, I leave it to others to 
consider that question. 
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Svoboda acknowledges that this accusation could be levelled against him (op. cit. p. 18), but 
claims that being a revolutionary moral expressivist ‘is consistent with supposing that moral 
error theory is descriptively true, for that truth may simply reflect contingent features of our 
current morality rather than necessary ones’ (p. 19).  This is a misunderstanding of the 
situation.  It is true that in metaethics in general, cognitivists must begin by accepting that 
moral judgements may not be beliefs, in order to avoid begging the question against non-
cognitivists.  Thus ‘being beliefs’ cannot be said to be a necessary feature of moral judgements 
at the start of debates between cognitivists and non-cognitivists.   
But moral error theory is not a position in any such debate.  Rather, the best developed forms 
of moral error theory currently available proceed from an assumption that the debate 
between cognitivists and non-cognitivists has already been settled in favour of cognitivism.  
Indeed, one might think that moral error theory as defended to date depends on cognitivism 
for its coherence – if moral judgements were anything other than truth-apt beliefs, how could 
they be systematically erroneous?  Therefore unless someone comes along with a radically 
novel moral error theory which is compatible with the truth of non-cognitivism, one cannot 
consistently be both a moral error theorist and a moral expressivist. 
This does not necessarily derail Svoboda’s thesis, however.  It remains open to him to simply 
drop the latter ‘moral’ from his title and/or substitute some other appropriately defined term 
(e.g. ‘schmoral’ or moral*).  Revolutionary expressivists could then recommend that we 
replace e.g. moral discourse with schmoral discourse, which is to be understood in expressivist 
terms, and which delivers the same purported benefits as moral discourse.  Thus even if, 
properly speaking, Svoboda’s recommendation is a form of abolitionism (in that it 
recommends replacing moral discourse with something which is not moral discourse, given 
the commitments of typical error theorists), an expressivist understanding of putatively moral 
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vocabulary may still deliver the benefits he claims for revolutionary expressivism.  Therefore 
I will move on to consider what he says despite the terminological issue. 
4.5.2.  Problems with revolutionary expressivism: i) Intrapersonal 
In the intrapersonal (i.e. motivational) context, Svoboda holds that conventional morality is 
beneficial because ‘it bolsters one’s commitment to act for certain ends, increases one’s self-
control, and helps overcome weakness of will’ (p. 20).  Revolutionary expressivism, he claims, 
can deliver these benefits because, like expressivism in general, it allows us to  
understand moral judgements as desire-like attitudes that have inherent 
motivational force.  For example, if the moral judgement that lying is wrong 
is understood as a desire-like attitude with respect to lying (e.g., disapproval 
of it), it is easy to see why the person making the judgement would be 
motivated to some degree not to lie. (ibid.) 
We might say that in expressivist terms, an agent who has judged that lying is morally wrong 
has thereby made a sincere, considered judgement about lying, to the effect that they 
disapprove of it.  Their judgement just is this sentiment.  Giving in to weakness of will 
represents doing something which runs contrary to that sincere, considered judgement, 
usually for short term gain (and often despite, or without considering, the long term costs).  
An expressivist account of moral judgements can help to show how we overcome such 
instances of weakness of will, because on expressivism, moral judgements – being desire-like 
attitudes – automatically include or bring with them motivations to act in accordance with the 
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judgement made.112  Simply put, if you don’t like the idea of anyone lying, you won’t want to 
lie yourself.  This, I take it, is the essence of Svoboda’s argument here. 
My response is that yes, we can do as revolutionary expressivists urge and resolve henceforth 
to interpret ‘moral’ judgements as desire-like attitudes (hereafter DLAs).  While expressivism 
may be incompatible with error theory as typically defended for the reasons I noted above, in 
the context of responses to the truth of error theory, all previous bets are off.  This is because 
in the latter context, metaethical theories do not necessarily have to account for the features 
of conventional moral thought and discourse, but can instead concentrate on how moral 
thought and discourse might be reshaped in the light of error theory.  However, it is highly 
controversial whether non-cognitivists of any stripe can help themselves to the notion that 
DLAs have inherent motivational force.113 
But let us be charitable and grant Svoboda that when we make a moral judgement we are 
automatically relevantly motivated at least to some degree.  Let us also grant that moral 
judgements are considered judgements which we make after proper deliberation, whereas 
temptation simply ‘crops up’.114  I still maintain that Svoboda’s proposal fails to secure the 
benefits he claims. 
In the case of weakness of will, if the sentence ‘stealing is wrong’ is understood as expressing 
a DLA such as a desire that people do not steal, consider what happens when one is tempted 
to steal.  It seems to me that being tempted to steal is most clearly understood as a desire to 
 
112 See e.g. Blackburn 1998a (especially chapter 3), Gibbard 1990.  For further discussion & analysis, see 
Toppinen 2015. 
113 See for example Smith 1998.  Among other things, Smith points out that it is possible to judge that 
one ought to do something, but at the same time to feel no motivation to do it, for example when one 
is depressed (p. 161). 
114 I do not necessarily consider this latter concession plausible, not least since it seems to me that 
moral judgements are often made in the heat of the moment.  But it strengthens Svoboda’s argument 
against a possible line of criticism according to which moral judgement seems to require something 
more significant than a snap decision about how we feel (cf. Miller 2013 §3.6). 
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steal.  It may not be a desire to steal which is regularly felt, and it may not be the product of 
the kind of thorough deliberative process whereby sincere, considered moral judgements 
might be reached.  It may not be a rational desire.  It may not be a desire which we desire to 
have.  But temptation in a situation like this is nonetheless most clearly understood as a desire 
of some sort. 
If that is correct, then being tempted to steal when one has previously judged (according to 
the expressivist account) that stealing is wrong represents at best having two DLAs which 
contradict one another.115  This results in a motivational conflict.  We have two DLAs pulling 
us in opposite directions, each with an attendant motivational force.  While there may be 
interesting reasons to divide DLAs into various categories (moral versus non-moral is one 
which springs to mind), in this case of weakness of will, it is only the motivational force of a 
DLA which matters.   
Remember that by Svoboda’s own lights, moral judgements are supposed to help with 
weakness of will because they include motivations to act in what we judge to be morally 
appropriate ways, rather than give in to temptation.  Yet this will only happen if the motivation 
involved in a judgement that stealing is wrong is somehow stronger than the motivation 
involved in being tempted to steal.  If that is the case, then the moral judgement will mean 
that we do not give in to temptation, because our strongest relevant motivation is against 
stealing.  But if the motivation involved in the temptation to steal is stronger than the 
motivation involved in judging that stealing is wrong, then that judgement will not prevent us 
stealing. 
 
115 I say ‘at best’ because at worst, temptations threaten to partially or even entirely reverse our 
previously held DLAs and thus our moral judgements, especially in cases where we eventually give in 
to temptation.  I leave this as a footnote because the scenario I go on to describe in the main text is 
slightly more charitable yet still, I argue, undermines Svoboda’s proposal. 
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Perhaps if there were some way to rank the motivational force of different types of DLAs, 
Svoboda might be able to show that moral judgements somehow come out on top in 
motivational terms, while the desire represented by an instance of weakness of will always 
loses out.  But I am skeptical whether any such ranking system would be plausible. I suspect 
that the only criterion by which we can judge the motivational power of a DLA is the strength 
of the DLA in question, at least in cases without complicating factors such as depression.  
Rather, the motivational efficacy of a DLA and the strength with which it is held seem to be 
intertwined, or even to be the same phenomenon. 
Revolutionary expressivists could reply to this by clarifying their proposal: just as hermeneutic 
expressivists may claim that our moral DLAs can be very strong (Blackburn’s 1998 book is, 
after all, entitled ‘Ruling Passions’), revolutionary expressivists could argue that in the WNP 
context, we should come to have very strong DLAs about traditionally moral matters.  This will 
not help, however.  We cannot simply choose to strongly desire anything.  For example, most 
people would likely agree that it would be prudentially highly beneficial to have an overriding 
desire to eat healthily.  But we cannot just start having such a desire, that simply is not how 
desire works. 
Thus revolutionary expressivists face a dilemma.  Either our post-WNP moral judgements are 
to be DLAs of arbitrary motivational efficacy, and thus potentially be of little or no help in 
resisting weakness of will, or our moral DLAs are to be very strong, in which case we cannot 
decide to have them (and thus very possibly cannot choose to become revolutionary 
expressivists at all). 
Svoboda might object that I am framing the discussion as if revolutionary expressivism has to 
make submitting to weakness of will impossible, when all it needs to do to be worth 
recommending is give us an analysis of ‘moral’ judgements such that they count against giving 
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in to temptation.  This, he might claim, is sufficient for post-error theory ‘moral’ discourse to 
serve the same regulatory purpose as conventional morality.  Or perhaps all that is needed to 
recommend revolutionary expressivism is that it serves the relevant purpose to some extent, 
albeit less well than conventional morality did. 
I do not accept this potential objection.  What I am arguing is that sufficiently strong 
temptations will always win out over moral judgements.  This falls a long way short of 
substantiating Svoboda’s claim that revolutionary expressivism can deliver the intrapersonal 
benefits of conventional morality.116  But worse than that, Svoboda’s view threatens to ensure 
that agents’ moral judgements coincide with what they most desire (and are therefore 
motivated) to do.  One of the issues with expressivism as a descriptive thesis about our current 
moral practice is that it must account for the fact that moral judgements seem to be somehow 
more significant than merely expressions of our preferences.117  But this may or may not be 
the case in a post-error theory context - perhaps ‘moral’ judgements in this context need to 
be more significant than expressions of our preferences, perhaps they do not.  It is incumbent 
upon Svoboda to provide reasons for deciding the matter one way or another.  But Svoboda 
does not address this issue.  In the absence of an account of why ‘moral’ judgements should 
be anything more than preferences, revolutionary expressivism threatens to reduce ‘moral’ 
judgements to the kind of arbitrary judgements which would be the opposite of a bulwark 
 
116 While I do not wish to make a full-blooded argument here, one might point to Blackburn 1998a, p. 
191, where Blackburn argues that acting contrary to a prior (expressivist) moral judgement can make 
us realise what our motivations actually were, contrary to what we thought they were, when we made 
the judgement.  Thus an argument could be made that on expressivism, succumbing to temptation may 
actually tell us retrospectively that we should have judged it right to do as we were tempted.  It seems 
possible that many people would find this unsatisfying in comparison with the ‘bulwark effect’ provided 
by traditional morality.  It would be an excessive digression to investigate here whether an argument 
along these lines could succeed, however, and I believe the points made in the main text above will 
suffice for present purposes. 
117 See e.g. Miller’s discussion of what he calls the ‘moral attitude problem’, Miller 2013, p. 39ff, 
especially footnote 11. 
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against weakness of will.  Rather, it is in danger of becoming a justificatory framework for 
giving in to temptation. 
4.5.3.  Problems with revolutionary expressivism: ii) Interpersonal 
In the interpersonal context, Svoboda cites the ability to track normative disagreement as 
conventional morality’s main benefit (p. 21).118  He claims that it is an advantage of 
revolutionary expressivism that it ‘preserves the useful feature of accounting for normative 
and evaluative disagreement, because it can track these as attitudinal divergences’ (p. 22).  I 
question whether the ability to track normative disagreement is a benefit in the sense 
required here.119  It is a theoretic benefit if a given moral theory can account for moral 
disagreement.  For any theory which offers no way of understanding what is going on when 
people disagree about first-order moral matters (which they certainly seem to do) will be at a 
serious disadvantage in comparison with competing theories.  Otherwise, there will be an 
obvious phenomenon which the theory is at a loss to explain.  There will therefore be a natural 
motivation for expressivists in general to show how expressivism can give an account of moral 
 
118 Svoboda also cites morality’s ability to allow for moral reasoning.  I omit this facet of his argument 
for three reasons.  First, because he concedes that his opponents can also account for moral reasoning, 
and that conservationism probably fares better in this regard.  It is therefore not so much a benefit of 
his theory, as a cost his theory avoids incurring.  Second, I have doubts that the ability of revolutionary 
expressivism to facilitate moral reasoning is of genuine benefit on similar grounds to my doubts about 
the tracking of normative disagreement (see below), and my argument about that can readily be 
applied to the moral reasoning case.  And third, Svoboda’s argument concerning moral reasoning rests 
on there being a satisfactory solution to the infamous Frege-Geach problem.  While it would be 
question-begging to assume that there is no such solution, Svoboda still arguably owes us a proper 
demonstration that a solution which supports his moral reasoning argument has been found.  Without 
such a demonstration, certain aspects of the arguments for revolutionary expressivism must be 
somewhat provisional, pending a satisfactory solution to the Frege-Geach problem.  Given that he does 
not provide a demonstration (which would surely be impossible within the scope of his paper, given 
the complexity of the issue) other than pointing to Blackburn’s (still highly controversial) view, I find 
Svoboda’s moral reasoning argument to be a theoretical possibility, rather than a compelling argument 
in its own right. 
119 It is also controversial whether expressivists can make sense of moral disagreement in the way 
Svoboda suggests.  For examples, see Merli 2008 or Ridge 2013.  Both papers criticise previously 
influential expressivist accounts of disagreement.  Ridge offers a new analysis of disagreement which 
is compatible with expressivism, but we should be wary of considering him to have thereby ‘solved the 
disagreement problem’. 
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disagreement.  But that does not mean that an expressivist account of moral disagreement is 
necessarily of instrumental use or benefit in a post-error theory context. 
In the WNP context, the usefulness or otherwise of apparently moral thought and discourse 
must be understood in terms of what contribution they make to our wellbeing and to securing 
goods which we desire or are in our interests.  Yet seen from this angle, all revolutionary 
expressivism allows is that two people who obviously appear to disagree can be said to 
disagree in an intelligible way.  Svoboda owes us an account of why such a feature is useful – 
why it is conducive to our wellbeing or serves our ends.   
It might be suggested that what Svoboda has in mind is the idea that once we have made the 
substance of our moral disagreements explicit – once we can get a clear picture of what 
disagreements are about - we will be better equipped to find solutions to them.  Conversely, 
if we have no intelligible account of ‘moral’ disagreement, we are unlikely to make progress 
in solving disagreements because we will lack a clear picture of what we are even disagreeing 
about, yet alone how we might resolve our differences.  If true, this would indeed seem to be 
beneficial, since resolving moral disagreements seems to serve our interests by facilitating 
better coordination between members of society.  If we can resolve our disagreements rather 
than talk past one another, we can get on with more productive tasks.  So it seems that being 
able to account for moral disagreement is a useful feature of any response to the ‘what now?’ 
problem in the required instrumental sense. 
The problem with this is that an expressivist understanding of moral disagreement, while 
possibly beneficial in comparison to having no analysis at all, falls short of delivering the same 
extent of benefit that a (cognitivist) realist understanding does.  The key here is to understand 
that there is more than one account of disagreement at work.  If two people disagree about 
whether e.g. torture is morally wrong, then according to a realist analysis of the disagreement, 
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there is a fact of the matter about the moral status of torture, and only one party can be 
correct about it.  That being the case, the dispute will be resolved when both parties come to 
agreement in what they believe the fact of the matter to be.   
On an expressivist account of the same disagreement, the disagreement is not about having 
mutually contradictory beliefs.  Rather, the disagreement is in attitudes – one (e.g.) approves 
of torture, while the other disapproves.  It is up for debate whether this counts as 
disagreement at all.  But to claim that it does not count as disagreement here, without 
considerable digression, would be to beg the question against expressivists.120  So I will grant 
that both disagreements about facts and disagreements about attitudes are forms of genuine 
disagreement.   
Nonetheless, this shows that when Svoboda claims that revolutionary expressivism ‘preserves 
the useful feature of accounting for normative and evaluative disagreement’ (2015 p. 22), this 
is slightly misleading.  The phenomenon of moral disagreement which occurs on a cognitivist 
account (i.e. the account of conventional morality assumed by error theorists) is factual 
disagreement.  This factual sense of disagreement is not preserved by a revolutionary 
expressivist account, rather it is replaced by an attitudinal sense of disagreement which, 
presumably, Svoboda takes to be equivalent to factual disagreement in terms of how useful 
it is as an analysis of moral disagreement. 
But just because both factual and attitudinal disagreements are forms of genuine 
disagreement, it does not follow that both analyses of moral disagreement are on a par when 
it comes to how useful they are – i.e. what degree of instrumental benefit they would yield in 
a post-error theory context.  Moral realism is useful in this sense because when moral 
 
120 See Jackson 2008 for a discussion of the differences between factual and attitudinal types of 
disagreement, and an explanation of why some non-cognitivists are committed to defending the idea 
that attitudinal disagreements really are disagreements. 
 121 
disagreements are understood as differences in beliefs about matters of fact, there is the 
possibility that the process of disagreement might help parties agree on what the facts are, 
and so resolve their disagreement.  This result is plausibly beneficial because after resolving 
their disagreement, it seems likely that the parties will be more willing to cooperate, or at 
least cease to hinder one another. 
On the other hand, if we view ‘moral’ disagreements as parties having differing DLAs, this 
implies that there is no fact of the matter for them to discover.  True, it may be that 
appreciating the sentimental nature of the disagreement might pave the way for the parties 
coming to sympathise with one another, and so resolving the disagreement.  But it is not 
plausible that this offers the same degree of benefit as factual disagreement.  Factual 
disagreement offers no guarantees – some people still claim that the world is flat.  But it seems 
reasonable to think that someone offering you what you take to be convincing epistemic 
reasons to hold a certain belief will be more able to get you to change your mind than 
someone trying to convince you to feel a DLA you are not otherwise inclined or disposed to 
feel. 
The upshot of this is that revolutionary expressivism fails to preserve the sense of moral 
disagreement which conventional morality allows for.  Rather, revolutionary expressivism 
involves replacing the conventional model of moral disagreement with a different model, 
which it is less certain can yield the instrumental benefit of disagreement resolution which 
Svoboda claims (or at least implies) it can.  I do not therefore conclude that revolutionary 
expressivism yields no relevant kind of benefit, but that it is plausibly of significantly less 
benefit than Svoboda advertises.  I will return to this later in §6.5.1 and §7.1, and so for the 
time being will leave the matter at that. 
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Given the above, and along with the necessarily provisional nature of the position, I reject 
Svoboda’s proposal that error theorists should become revolutionary (moral) expressivists. 121  
And since the issues with Svoboda’s proposal I have discussed stem from the expressivist 
nature of the proposal rather than from small details which could easily be tweaked, I doubt 
that any other expressivist recommendations will fare much better as responses to the ‘what 
now?’ problem. 
4.6.  Conclusions, and the lessons to be learned so far 
I began this chapter by arguing that accepting a moral error theory means that we face a 
problem about what to do next.  Quite how pressing a problem this is for error theorists has 
been somewhat overlooked, but in section 4.1 I outlined the problem in more detail than has 
appeared in most of the relevant literature, and underlined how important it is that we find a 
satisfactory solution to the WNP.  The past few sections have concentrated on analysing the 
existing responses to the WNP, and in each case I have argued against the position in question.  
Many of these arguments were, I believe, original.  One reason for this is that at this point in 
my project, we are running up against the limits of the debates around this issue to date – 
broadly speaking, whatever else needs to be said on the matter has yet to be written.  In this 
section I will consider where all this leaves us.  If my arguments in sections 4.2-4.5 were right, 
then in the WNP we still face an important problem and yet we lack an adequate response to 
it.  Furthermore, the problems I identified with previous WNP responses were often 
systematic – i.e. an improved version of any of those responses is still unlikely to be 
convincing, because the problems in each case are ‘built in’ to the fabric of the response.  This 
means that in order to overcome the WNP, we will need something radically different.  
 
121 As I touched upon in footnote 118, if they are to avoid at least some facets of their arguments being 
rather provisional, revolutionary expressivists also need to find DLAs with the required logical features 
to avoid the Frege-Geach problem, which is a very difficult thing to do – see e.g. Schroeder 2008 for 
discussion of such issues. 
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Accordingly, in the next and subsequent chapters I will present and defend a new variety of 
response which I believe can succeed where previous responses have failed.  But before 
embarking on that task, we can learn a lot about what a more satisfactory answer to the WNP 
will need to look like by taking on board the lessons to be learned from the failure of the 
previous  responses.  Therefore in this concluding section I will try to draw out some of those 
lessons, in order that we can bear them in mind as we move forward to consider a new WNP 
response. 
Three related points should be noted as preliminaries to this section.  First, the lessons I draw 
from the failures of previous WNP responses do not constitute an exhaustive list of the 
required features of any future WNP responses, including my own.  For example, it seems 
largely uncontentious that, being metaethical theories, responses to the WNP must include 
some account of the relationship between certain putatively moral judgements and reasons 
for action (even if that account is one according to which those judgements do not give us 
reasons to act).  Yet nothing in this section shows that this must be a feature of future WNP 
responses – the reasons why WNP responses must include such features are independent of 
the lessons I draw here.  Second, the lessons drawn are not an exhaustive list of the features 
a WNP response may include.  For example, I will go on to present a response to the WNP 
which involves having beliefs.  But nothing in this section should be read as arguing that WNP 
responses must involve having beliefs.  It is up to anyone presenting any kind of WNP response 
to argue for the specific features of their response.  There are numerous other features which 
WNP responses may also have than those discussed here, provided they are supported by 
appropriate arguments.  And third, this section may not constitute an exhaustive list of all of 
the lessons we might draw from the foregoing sections.  I will simply highlight those points I 
feel are most salient. 
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In section 4.2 I discussed conservationism.  I rejected it principally because it is not plausible 
that we can knowingly have and maintain false moral beliefs in the stable way 
conservationism requires.  Conservationism is therefore not something which we could 
plausibly implement.  At first blush, then, the lesson to be drawn here seems quite clear – 
error theory rules out the possibility of having true (affirmative, atomic) moral beliefs, and 
conservationism failed precisely because of the known falsity of the beliefs involved.  It could 
therefore be suggested that any successful future WNP response must avoid reliance on us 
having beliefs at all.   
I do not think, however, that this is necessarily the case.  Rather I believe a more subtle lesson 
must be drawn from conservationism’s example: my response to the WNP must be such that, 
if we are to have anything substantially similar to moral beliefs, they must be (potentially) 
true.  As we will see in chapters 5 and 6, I believe it is possible to construct a successful WNP 
response which relies on agents having something quite similar to moral beliefs.  But bearing 
in mind the nature of the arguments for error theory and the reasons for the failure of 
conservationism as a WNP response, I will describe a view which supports having true beliefs 
which can play a role very close to that played by traditional moral beliefs, but which are 
consistent with error theorists’ commitments. 
Following conservationism, in section 4.3 I examined abolitionism.  I argued that abolitionism 
fails as a WNP response principally because it rests on an unprovable claim that conventional 
morality is inherently pernicious.  Absent an unfeasible empirical experiment, it remains too 
easy for opponents of abolitionism to simply reject that central claim of abolitionism and to 
insist instead that conventional morality is a force for good in the world.  What I want to 
highlight here, however, is that rejecting abolitionism out of hand in this manner is a mistake.  
It is a mistake because there is a big difference between rejecting a claim and showing why a 
claim is false.  In this case, while it is unlikely that it would ever be possible to perform the 
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empirical experiment required to substantiate the abolitionist claim that conventional 
morality is pernicious, it is just as unlikely that the required experiment could ever be 
performed which might prove that it is not.  That being the case, and unless opponents of 
abolitionism come forward with something more concrete, there seem to be no grounds for 
deciding the matter one way or another, other than whether we share an intuition with either 
abolitionists or their opponents.  This is hardly the gold standard of philosophical argument.   
While this lack of provability undermines abolitionism as a WNP response, however, I believe 
it draws vital attention to some risks.  Even if we cannot be certain whether traditional 
morality has on balance been harmful, abolitionists have described the potential harms we 
must be careful not to risk inflicting via our chosen WNP response.  In developing my own 
proposal, I will therefore argue that we must demand of WNP responses that, rather than 
dismissing it, they are able to cope with the possibility that abolitionists are right that 
traditional morality is harmful.  To put it bluntly, despite the recent emergence of a volume 
subtitled ‘taking abolitionism seriously’ (Garner & Joyce 2019), I worry that in not making this 
demand, even some abolitionists fail to take abolitionism seriously enough. 
I will seek to avoid this error by treating abolitionism as presenting a challenge which must be 
answered.  Of any WNP response, we can ask whether and how it can cope with changes in 
how sure we are that any moral or moral-like norms we adopt are really for the best.  Since I 
will be advocating the adoption of a form of moral relativism, which will indeed involve 
retaining something like moral beliefs, then I must be open to the charge that those beliefs 
are not as beneficial as we might have assumed.  That being the case, there must be some 
thought given to how we might reassess our new judgements as we learn more about their 
real, rather than expected or hoped-for, effects and the consequences of adopting my 
proposal.  This in turn seems likely to raise issues around the authority of our relevant 
judgements – if they are open to reappraisal, how can they have the authority required to 
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play anything like the role played by traditional moral judgements?  I will discuss these 
worries, and show how my view can cope with them, in chapters 5 and 6. 
Added to this, since my own proposal will be based on a form of relativism, I will need to be 
doubly careful - one of the traditional criticisms of moral relativism is that it cannot provide 
sufficiently authoritative moral reasons.  For example, it is often objected that moral relativists 
lack grounds on which to claim that the agents who were involved had any authoritative 
reasons not to commit the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis, and that this undermines 
relativism (see e.g. Baghramian & Carter 2018 §4.5).  I will not digress here into the debates 
around this topic, but the lesson that I will need to pay close attention to the matter of 
normative authority is clear. 
I would also like to highlight two instructive features of the discussion of revolutionary 
expressivism in section 4.5.122  First, I argued that expressivism cannot give a satisfactory 
account of the tension between ‘moral’ judgements and temptation in the WNP context.  It 
seems to me that temptation, understood as some kind of desire to act contrary to a prior 
‘moral’ judgement, will always be able to override ‘moral’ judgements in motivational power 
because according to expressivists, those judgements are themselves simply desires or desire-
like attitudes.  It remains open to expressivists to polish their proposal and to introduce a way 
to distinguish specifically ‘moral’ judgements from other desire-like attitudes in such a way 
that ‘moral’ judgements are somehow reliably more motivationally efficacious.  They have not 
yet done so, but the lesson which I can take away from the failure of expressivism is that my 
WNP response must include a way of showing that the relevant judgements can effectively 
counteract temptation. 
 
122 As in section 4.5, unless noted otherwise, all references to expressivism here should be read as 
referring to revolutionary expressivism, i.e. expressivism as a response to the WNP, rather than to more 
standard hermeneutic forms of expressivism. 
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Second, I noted towards the end of section 4.5.2 that on closer examination it was not clear 
that expressivism delivers the benefits claimed, specifically for its account of moral 
disagreement.  This reflects the general requirement outlined in section 4.1 that there must 
be a clear and explicit link between adopting a given strategy and securing the benefits 
claimed for doing so.  The example of the failure of expressivism in this regard serves to 
highlight that requirement. 
A final lesson is that we must bear in mind the implementation costs of any given WNP 
response.  For any WNP response, we can ask whether it would be necessary for the general 
public to understand all of the metaethical intricacies involved in order for the response in 
question to deliver its benefits.  If it would, it seems exceedingly unlikely that the proposal 
could ever be implemented – some problems in metaethics are simply too complicated for 
many people to understand, and it seems unlikely that many people would ever be willing to 
devote the time required to do so even if they were capable of understanding them.  That is 
not to say that all WNP responses must be simple enough for every member of the general 
public to quickly and easily understand their every detail, but it does mean that responses 
requiring everyone to suddenly become metaethical geniuses should be regarded with a 
measure of suspicion. 
Given the failure of previous attempts to propose a satisfactory response to the WNP, and 
armed with the lessons drawn here, in the next chapter I will begin to propose my own, new 
response, which I call revolutionary relativism.  In subsequent chapters I will argue that 
revolutionary relativism is superior to the other WNP responses to date, and then defend the 
proposal against a number of objections.  Ultimately, I will argue that having accepted a moral 
error theory, we should eschew the WNP responses defended to date, and become 
revolutionary relativists.  
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Chapter 5.  Revolutionary Relativism 
In this chapter, I will introduce and explain my own proposal for how we should respond to 
the ‘what now?’ problem.  I call this proposal revolutionary relativism.  I use the term 
relativism because, as we will see, I propose that we adopt a practice of making apparently 
moral judgements and statements which include what Boghossian has called (2006) a 
‘relativising parameter’.  And I use the term revolutionary for two reasons.  Firstly (and 
obviously in the current context) because the proposal comes into play only after we have 
come to accept a moral error theory, which is surely a revolutionary metaethical event.  And 
secondly because, as will become clear, the model of relativism which I propose is one which, 
in line with the demands of the WNP context, is considerably different from hermeneutic 
forms of moral relativism.  In comparison with the existing literature at the time of writing, 
my proposal is unique among responses to the WNP in suggesting that we should adopt any 
form of relativism. 
I will begin in §5.1 with a short summary of where we are in the overall structure of this thesis.  
I will then lay out some preliminary issues, including some constraints on good WNP responses 
in §5.2.  And then in §5.3 I will give the details of my proposal, showing how the various parts 
of my proposal are each required and fit together, and showing how my proposal respects the 
constraints discussed in §5.2.  Finally, I will summarise where this chapter has taken us, and 
how it feeds into the subsequent chapters. 
Looking ahead, this chapter will form the first of two broad parts of the positive section of my 
thesis.  Here, I will lay out my own positive proposal.  Then the second of these broad parts 
comes in the following two chapters where I will go on to defend the proposal I offer here.  I 
will do this in two distinct ways.  In chapter 6, I will argue that revolutionary relativism is a 
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better response to the WNP than those offered by others to date.  This chapter will be one of 
the most important sections of this project, and hence will be in considerable detail.  
Alongside the explicit aim of showing that my proposal is the best response to the WNP, this 
will allow me to draw out some important facets of how revolutionary relativism would work 
in practise.  And then in chapter 7 I will defend revolutionary relativism against a number of 
criticisms which confront relativist metaethical theories in general, revolutionary or 
otherwise, in order to show that my proposal can stand on its own two feet, philosophically 
speaking.  I will also defend revolutionary relativism against certain objections which crop up 
specifically in the post-error-theory context. 
5.1. Summary thus far & preliminary considerations 
In this section I will give a brief reminder of where we are in the overall structure of this thesis.  
I will then discuss part of Crispin Wright’s objection to error theory (1996).  Despite its failure 
to convince error theorists that they are wrong, I will suggest that Wright’s argument 
highlights two important considerations which will inform my proposed response to the WNP. 
If we become convinced by the arguments for error theory which I discussed in chapters 2 and 
3, then as I argued in §4.1, we will inevitably and immediately face a new metaethical problem.  
I call this the ‘what now?’ problem, or WNP.  There are various reasons why this problem 
arises – we might worry that something must fill the void in our normative lives left behind by 
traditional morality in order to avert catastrophe, for example.  But one of the most 
compelling (and often overlooked) reasons why we face the WNP arises out of a 
fundamentally practical matter of philosophy itself.  Regardless of our feelings about error 
theory, if we accept it, we will do something next.  If we respond to error theory by 
abandoning moral discourse, as some commentators have suggested we might most naturally 
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do, this represents just one response among several possible responses.123  The same is true 
if we seek to retain our moral beliefs, or anything substantially similar to them.  And so long 
as there are multiple possible responses, the adoption of each of which may have different 
results from a variety of theoretical and practical viewpoints, then surely we fail as 
philosophers if we do not carefully consider the options. 
Accordingly, a number of philosophers have sought, whether they would see it in the terms I 
am using here or not, to respond to the ‘what now?’ problem.  In sections 4.2-4.5 I grouped 
these responses into four categories: conservationism, revolutionary fictionalism, 
abolitionism and revolutionary expressivism.124  In each case I argued that the responses 
offered to date face serious problems.  The extent and severity of these problems force us, I 
argued, to look for new responses to the WNP, and just such a new response is what I aim to 
provide here. 
When considering how to respond to the WNP, we effectively have a moral tabula rasa.  If we 
assume the truth of a moral error theory, and assume the commitments typical of error 
theorists along with that truth, then the way we have understood morality until now is not 
merely somewhat mistaken.  It is entirely insufficient to think that, say, some of our moral 
judgements might be unreliable or incorrect.  Rather, we are forced to accept the profound 
conclusion that morality is systematically in error – it is radically mistaken, root and branch.  
There is not, nor can there ever be, anything which any agent is ever morally required, 
 
123 See e.g. Wright 1996, p. 2: ‘Whatever we may once have thought, as soon as philosophy has taught 
us that the world is unsuited to confer truth on any of our claims about what is right, or wrong, or 
obligatory, etc., the reasonable response ought surely to be to forgo making any such claims’. 
124 In what follows, I will often omit the revolutionary tag and refer only to fictionalism or expressivism 
simpliciter.  This is because, as I have iterated above, at this point in this project we are now in a post-
error-theory context.  It therefore becomes appropriate to assume the revolutionary nature of the 
fictionalism and expressivism under discussion, and draw a distinction instead by using the label 
hermeneutic when non-revolutionary forms of these views are discussed.  For reasons of readability or 
emphasis I will still use the revolutionary tag from time to time.  But where fictionalism or expressivism 
are mentioned without further qualification, the revolutionary form of each should be understood to 
be the intended target. 
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permitted or forbidden to do.  All bets, morally speaking, are off.  And so we plot our course 
forwards by beginning with what appears to be a blank slate. 
But there are things which might point us to certain kinds of response to the WNP over others.  
And in formulating my own response, I am to some extent guided – perhaps ironically – by 
one of Wright’s arguments against error theory.  In ‘Truth in Ethics’ (1996), Wright’s concern 
is that, if an error theory is true, then it would have ‘calamitous’ (p. 2) consequences, for ‘how 
are we supposed to take ourselves seriously in thinking the way we do about any issue which 
we regard as of major moral importance?’ (ibid.).  Wright then goes on to make an argument 
that error theorists are mistaken about their commitments as regards what counts as truth 
for moral judgements.  This argument has not proved convincing to error theorists, but it can 
inform WNP responses nonetheless, as I will explain. 
Briefly, writing before Joyce’s The Myth of Morality had been published, Wright argues against 
a Mackieian error theory (see chapter 3 of this thesis).  His argument is that error theorists 
understand truth for moral discourse in terms of correspondence with moral facts which, on 
reflection, do not exist – hence the systematic error in moral thought and discourse.  However, 
Wright suggests that it may be possible to locate some other element of moral thought and 
discourse in virtue of which we might say that moral judgements or sentences could be true 
or false.  For example, we might determine which moral judgements were useful or 
prudentially beneficial, and take those judgements to be true.  If we were to do so, Wright 
argues, we would make available a new success theory of morality which can withstand error 
theorists’ arguments concerning traditional morality, and therefore avoid a metaethical error 
theory.  Wright then argues that error theorists will not be able to respond effectively to this 
strategy, writing, ‘[t]he error-theorist may be able to argue that the superstition that he finds 
in ordinary moral thought goes too deep to permit any construction of moral truth which 
avoids [construing moral truth in terms of the satisfaction of some weaker standard than 
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correspondence with metaphysically outlandish moral facts] to be acceptable as an account 
of moral truth.  But I do not know of promising argument in that direction’ (1996 p. 3). 
Unfortunately for Wright c.1996, as we saw in chapter 3, this was just the kind of argument 
Joyce made a few years later.  To put it in compatible terms, we might paraphrase Joyce’s 
principal ‘non-negotiable commitment’ (Joyce 2001 passim, beginning p. 17) as the claim that 
no judgement can be moral unless it ascribes a non-institutional categorical obligation.  Put in 
terms of truth, Joyce’s argument for an error theory becomes roughly that no sense can be 
made of such obligations, and so no moral statement can be true. 
Wright’s argument may fail to convince today’s error theorists, but we can still draw out some 
useful considerations regarding how we might respond to the WNP.  First, Wright’s worry 
about whether we will be able to take seriously the things which we considered hugely morally 
important before we accepted error theory highlights the fact that error theory itself will be 
much more palatable to skeptics if we can respond to the WNP in a way which preserves the 
profound seriousness with which we previously regarded matters such as torture, murder and 
suchlike.  Indeed, a WNP response which can accomplish this may have an advantage over 
competing responses in virtue of its being psychologically easier to accept than, say, 
abolitionism.125  Alongside this, it is plausible that seriousness is important in an instrumental 
sense – judgements which we take seriously seem much more likely to be able to affect our 
behaviour than those we do not.  Such is the sense of importance with which we regard many 
of our moral judgements that we may consider good WNP responses to be under a Seriousness 
Constraint – i.e. any good WNP response must be able to preserve the seriousness with which 
we regard moral judgements about murder and similarly weighty matters.  While it may be 
possible to construct a WNP response which fails to respect this Seriousness Constraint, a 
 
125 This point is similar to one raised against abolitionism by Nolan et al. (2005 p. 310-311). 
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response which does respect it will be a more satisfying response and will head off possible 
objections along the lines of Wright’s worry here.  As we go on, some further constraints on 
good WNP responses will also become clear. 
Second, Wright’s argument highlights the possibility of responding to the WNP in such a way 
that apparently moral judgements may be thought true or false in respect of some other 
standard than correspondence with a kind of moral fact which, having accepted a moral error 
theory, we do not believe exist.  In keeping with Joyce’s ‘non-negotiable commitment’, we 
would not be able to call these judgements moral in the proper sense.  But where Wright sees 
a reason to change our definition of the term moral and otherwise keep moral thought and 
discourse largely as they are – and therefore abandon the error theory - I suggest that we can 
consistently remain error theorists, yet avoid any ‘calamitous’ consequences of error theory 
by keeping as much as possible of moral thought and discourse intact, and simply dropping 
the full-blooded use of the term moral.  In order to draw the appropriate distinction while 
emphasising that my proposal retains much of what error theorists would claim constitutes 
traditional morality, I will use the term moral*.126 
 
126 A note on the use of the terms moral and moral*.  It may seem somewhat cumbersome to 
continually use the term moral* in the remainder of this thesis.  But, as I pointed out in my discussion 
of revolutionary expressivism in the previous chapter, to label the obligations, reasons, judgements etc. 
under discussion here moral would be incorrect by error theorists’ lights (see §4.5.1).  The 
commitments of typical error theorists will include the commitment that moral obligations, reasons, 
judgements etc. involve some non-institutional categorical element without which those obligations 
etc. cannot properly be called moral.  And since the obligations etc. revolutionary relativism deals with 
do not have this categorical element, revolutionary relativists cannot therefore consistently call them 
moral, even if the phenomena in question are in other respects very similar to their properly moral 
equivalents a lot of the time. 
It may seem appropriate to insert a general disclaimer explaining that this remains the case, but that I 
will henceforth gloss over the matter and use the term moral regardless for the sake of fluency or 
readability.  But this risks confusing the reader (and alarming any error theorists who might have 
skipped past the disclaimer).  On a slightly more sophisticated level, in principle I see no reason why 
revolutionary relativists could not defend a localised form of fictionalism about the term moral. Even 
though the reasons, obligations etc. revolutionary relativism involves are not categorical and therefore 
are not actually moral by error theorists’ lights, the argument could be made that revolutionary 
relativists are free to speak and even deliberate as if the term moral could properly be applied to these 
phenomena.  At least, they could do so in all but unusually metaethically critical contexts.  Again, 
however, in the present context I fear this might confuse less careful readers and generally muddy the 
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If this suggestion is right, then we have a prudential reason to formulate a WNP response 
which preserves important elements of traditional moral practice, yet does so in a way which 
respects the commitments of error theory.  This is, of course, part of the reasoning behind 
conservationism as I discussed in chapter 4.  But I believe we can respond to the WNP in a way 
which preserves key features of moral thought and discourse such as interpreting judgements 
as beliefs, yet which avoids the problems which overwhelm Olson’s proposal. 
5.2.  Groundwork for the metaethics of revolutionary relativism 
I will begin to outline my proposal with a couple of preliminary notes which necessarily 
underpin the proposal, and may underpin other proposals as well.  The first two of these are 
‘ground rules’ which can be read as constraints upon good WNP responses, which go 
alongside the Seriousness Constraint mentioned in §5.1.  After explaining these constraints, I 
will move on to a discussion of prudential reasons which will flesh out the ‘should’ in my 
proposal that error theorists should become revolutionary relativists.  In §5.3 I will then 
present my proposal, and explain how it works and how the various aspects of the proposal 
relate to and follow from one another. 
5.2.1.  Constraints upon good WNP responses: i) The ROBET Constraint 
The first thing to establish is that my proposal that error theorists should become 
revolutionary relativists must not, and does not, rely on anything which is incompatible with 
the truth of error theory.  For example, to suggest that error theorists have a moral obligation 
to respond to the WNP in one way versus another is a non-starter.  The should in ‘should 
become revolutionary relativists’ must not be read in a moral sense, or any other sense which 
 
metaethical waters.  Therefore I will continue to use moral to refer only to what might also be called 
‘traditional’ morality, and to use moral* as a distinct term despite its slight unwieldiness. 
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relies on any non-institutional categorical notion of normativity – otherwise my proposal 
would itself be ruled out by error theory, and the whole aim of this project would unravel.  For 
ease of reference, we can call this the ‘Ruled-Out-By-Error-Theory’ (hereafter ROBET) 
Constraint. 
5.2.2.  Constraints upon good WNP responses: ii) The RC Constraint 
Second, my proposal must, and does, respect the commitments incurred by error theorists en 
route to their error theories.  Imagine, for example, that there was a theory, ‘red-theory’, to 
the effect that humans can only see shades of red.  In the course of their supporting 
arguments, ‘red-theorists’ make the claim that colour cannot be understood other than as a 
visual phenomenon.  It would be inconsistent for someone to then include in their attempt to 
respond to ‘red-theory’ the claim that humans can perceive the colour green by smell.  Such 
a claim would undermine the previous claim about visual phenomena, and so undermine ‘red-
theory’.  Naturally this is an absurd example, but the structural issue of consistency is clear – 
the commitments borne by the arguments for a given conclusion must be respected by 
theories about how we might build on that conclusion.  For ease of reference we can call this 
the ‘Respect Commitments’ (hereafter RC) Constraint. 127 
The RC Constraint applies generally across the supporting arguments for error theory.  In this 
section, the particular commitment typically borne by error theorists in virtue of their 
arguments for the error theory which I wish to draw attention to is aptly captured by Joyce’s 
theory of practical reasons.  Joyce’s arguments in this area are influential, and arguments 
made by others to date have often either recommended or gone along with them (see e.g. 
 
127 The ROBET and RC constraints are a broadened and clarified version of the Normative Circularity 
Constraint I discussed in §4.1.3.  There, it was sufficient to use a more hastily expressed constraint.  But 
here I have expanded on the NCC to bring out relevant details as is more appropriate for this more 
sophisticated stage in the thesis, and to include e.g. proscribing the attribution of true moral (as 
opposed to moral*) beliefs alongside the issues discussed in the earlier section. 
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Robertson 2008, Nolan et al. 2005) or offered similar arguments themselves (see e.g. Olson 
2014 chapter 6).  Therefore, it seems fair to consider Joyce’s theory as typical among error 
theorists.  As we saw in chapter 3, Joyce argues persuasively, and as a key part of his argument 
for an error theory, that it is practically rational for an agent to act only on those reasons 
which she believes conduce to the satisfaction of some desire or end she has.128   
Accordingly, it would seem to fail to respect both the RC and ROBET constraints if I proposed 
that agents who come to accept the truth of a moral error theory should do anything which 
would fail to satisfy any of their desires (or which promotes an outcome which is not among 
the agent’s ends).129  It seems that there would, by Joyce’s lights, be no authoritative reason 
why agents should do anything which would not conduce to their current desires or ends, and 
thus agents may even be practically irrational to adopt my proposal unless they antecedently 
had appropriate desires or ends.  This may seem to dictate that the form of my proposal must 
be something like this: 
1. Adopting my proposal and becoming revolutionary relativists will result in error 
theorists’ lives going better than they would otherwise.   
2. This means that error theorists have prudential reasons to adopt my proposal. 
 
 
128 Or, possibly, reasons which and agent may have in virtue of some institution in which they are 
participating – because of the rules of a game they are playing, say, or because they are playing a certain 
role (see also Olson 2014 §6.1).  I set these ‘institutional’ reasons aside here because I am discussing 
reasons for adopting one WNP response rather than another, and there are no roles or games which 
require the adoption of specific WNP responses. 
129 There is a degree of overlap between the constraints here.  Suggesting that agents should do 
something which does not relate to their desires/ends violates the commitment, specifically part of 
Joyce’s theory of practical reasons, that an agent’s authoritative practical reasons must relate to their 
desires or ends.  The same manoeuvre also implies that there can be authoritative forms of obligation 
which do not relate to agents’ desires/ends, which is ruled out by the error theory. 
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The idea here is that error theorists’ lives will go better if they adopt my proposal, and 
therefore to the extent that they want their lives to go better (which surely most error 
theorists do, if not all), error theorists should, prudentially speaking, adopt my proposal.  This 
avoids reliance on any kinds of categorical practical reasons, and thus respects the RC and 
ROBET Constraints. 
This falls somewhat short of what I need here, however, as a number of questions may remain.  
For example, what does it mean for an agent’s life to go better?  Or what if an agent has come 
to accept error theory, but for some reason has only frivolous or even harmful desires at the 
moment (because they are drunk, say), which would not be served by adopting my proposal?  
Or what if error theorists antecedently desire to retain some of the coordinative benefits of 
traditional morality (which I am claiming that adopting my proposal can deliver), but hold false 
beliefs about the course of action most likely to bring this about?  Do they still have 
authoritative reasons to adopt my proposal?  And if so, what does this imply about practical 
reasons, regardless of what I have said above – are the RC and/or ROBET Constraints under 
threat?   
What is needed here is a more concrete understanding of the sense of prudential reasons I 
have in mind.  Therefore, in the next subsection I will offer an account of prudential reasons 
and why agents have them, and thus show more precisely what I mean when I claim that error 
theorists should, prudentially speaking, adopt my proposal. 
5.2.3.  Prudential reasons 
Without a sufficiently nuanced and sophisticated view of prudential reasons, vexing questions 
about the detail of my proposal remain, and the proposal may seem to risk violating one or 
more of the constraints which I have only just introduced.  Just such a view is famously 
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defended by Bernard Williams.130  Williams’ paper discussing the issue, ‘Internal and External 
Reasons’ (1981), is both important and nuanced, and the view he describes is not necessarily 
one about prudential reasons, being rather a view about normativity in general and internal 
versus external reasons in particular.131  But I believe that sufficient detail concerning 
prudential reasons can be extracted from Williams’ wider view to be useful in the context of 
this thesis.  Joyce also discusses Williams’ view at some length (2001, especially chapter 5), 
but I differ in emphasis here by focusing specifically on the implications for prudential reasons.  
The classic example of the view is this: 
The agent believes that this stuff is gin, when it is in fact petrol.  He wants a 
gin and tonic.  Has he reason, or a reason, to mix this stuff with tonic and 
drink it?  […]  On the one hand, it is just very odd to say that he has a reason 
to drink this stuff, and natural to say that he has no reason to drink it, 
although he thinks that he has.  On the other hand, if he does drink it, we not 
only have an explanation of his doing so (a reason why he did it), but we have 
such an explanation which is of the reason-for-action form. (Williams 1981 
p. 102) 
One way of interpreting Williams here is as offering a definition of prudential reasons. For 
simplicity, I will set aside the tonic, and focus on the gin.  We can see that in his current state 
of ignorance about the petrol in the glass, it would be practically irrational by Joyce’s lights for 
Williams’ agent to avoid drinking what he believed to be gin, given that his current 
desiderative set includes the desire to drink gin (and not to drink petrol - or so we are clearly 
 
130 A not dissimilar view is discussed in another well-known paper by Peter Railton, ‘Moral Realism’ 
(1986).  Discussions and refinements of this kind of view can be found in Smith, Lewis & Johnston 1989 
and Smith 1995a. 
131 To give a sense of how important and nuanced, a google scholar search at the time of writing showed 
over 1500 citations of Williams’ paper.  For an overview of the relevant issues, including at least two 
different readings of Williams’ overall argument, see Finlay & Schroeder 2017, especially §2.1.1 & 2.1.2. 
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to infer from the example).  Yet, if the agent had all the relevant information, and no false 
information, it seems that given his desiderative set he would refrain from drinking.   
So here we have a suggested kind of reason which depends only partially on an agent’s current 
desiderative set, and partly on a counterfactual idealisation, i.e. what the same agent would 
desire if they had better relevant information.  To make this picture of prudential reasons 
more precise, we may also add to the counterfactual idealisation that alongside having all the 
relevant information and no relevant false beliefs, and that the agent deliberates clearly (i.e. 
is not irrational).  Finally, we should also add that the agent’s desires are made into an 
appropriately coherent set.  For example, the ‘petrol-ignorant’ agent may have a de re desire 
to consume the contents of the specific glass in front of him. Given the rest of the agent’s 
desiderative set, this desire would not survive clear deliberation in light of the relevant facts 
and in the absence of relevant false beliefs, and so making the agent’s desires more coherent 
would involve his ceasing to have this de re desire.  Alternatively, and recalling Joyce’s story 
about Molly (see §3.3.4-5), an agent may have an occurrent desire which runs contrary to 
another more deeply considered and subjectively more highly valued desire or end.  Were the 
agent to deliberate carefully on the matter, they may come to see that these desires were 
incompatible, and so come to have a more coherent set of desires by ceasing to be motivated 
to act on the occurrent desire.  Note that this process involves only such changes to the 
agent’s desires as are needed in order to make the agent’s desiderative set more coherent in 
light of the relevant facts, and no wider changes are suggested.132 
 
132 One thing I am specifically not suggesting is that there would be any necessary convergence among 
the desires of multiple idealised agents, as Smith argues (e.g. Smith 2015).  I mention this explicitly both 
because Joyce discusses and rejects Smith’s argument (2001 §3.8), and because allowing this 
convergence claim would risk violating the RC Constraint, since Smith builds from the convergence 
claim towards a refutation of error theory (e.g. 1995b §5, 2010).  In the current context, we have 
accepted error theory, so that battle is over, but the RC Constraint must be respected. 
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On this definition, then, a prudential reason is a reason for an agent to act which that agent 
would be practically rational to act upon, given their current set of desires, if they were aware 
of the relevant information, had no relevant false beliefs, were not irrational, and had 
appropriately coherent desires.133  This is the kind of reason I mean to imply when I say that 
error theorists should become revolutionary relativists.  And when I claim that error theorists’ 
lives will go better if they adopt my proposal, what I mean for an agent’s life to go better is 
for more of the desires of their counterfactually idealised selves to be fulfilled.  Roughly 
speaking, an agent’s life will generally go better for them if their prudential reasons are acted 
upon.  Accordingly, a prudential benefit is a situation or outcome which satisfies or conduces 
to the satisfaction of the desires for current agents of those agents’ counterfactually idealised 
counterparts. 
Now, error theorists could currently be in a position analogous to Williams’ petrol-ignorant 
agent – for example they may believe that adopting a given competing proposal will bring 
about a desirable situation, when in fact the consequences of adopting that proposal would 
be catastrophic.134 If that were so, respecting the RC constraint in the flat-footed manner 
described in §5.2.2 would imply that the only thing I or anyone else could claim that those 
error theorists should do would have disastrous consequences. 
 
133 This may be a controversial use of the term prudential reason.  For example it could be suggested 
that what I am describing should more properly be called a subset of internal reasons, and/or that 
prudential reasons have different features to the features I claim here (see e.g. Hubin 1980 for a 
different definition of prudence and prudential reasons).  I will not engage with these suggestions here.  
My use of the term is clearly defined above, does not contradict an intuitive sense of the meanings of 
the words involved, and most importantly does not violate the ROBET constraint by, for example, 
positing authoritative reasons which do not relate to agents’ desires or ends.  I leave it to other work 
to consider whether this is the proper, or only, relevant definition of prudential reasons. 
134 Note that I am simply describing a logical possibility here - I am not claiming here that adopting any 
of the specific competing WNP responses defended to date actually would result in catastrophe.  I gave 
what I take to be compelling reasons to reject other WNP responses in the previous chapter, and I will 
discuss comparisons between the other WNP responses and my own in the next chapter.  Note also 
that although I will not make an argument to this effect in this project, it may well be that other WNP 
respondents should bear the reasoning given here more closely in mind when formulating their own 
proposals. 
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However bearing in mind the more sophisticated view of prudential reasons I just described, 
we can see that the intention in this project is to give such error theorists the best available 
information, demonstrate that some of their current beliefs may be false and may therefore 
be discarded, and show that the clearest deliberative route supports my proposal.  Essentially, 
this thesis is aimed at turning current error theorists into their counterfactually idealised 
counterparts.   
Given this structure of argument, prefacing my proposal that as error theorists we should 
become revolutionary relativists with ‘if we want our lives to go better…’ is redundant.  The 
definition of prudential reasons I am using here means that to claim that an agent has a 
prudential reason to f just is to claim that that agent already has relevant desires, even if they 
don’t realise it.   
It could be objected that this assumes too much about some error theorists and their current 
desires.  Perhaps there are those who do not want to retain any of the apparent benefits of 
traditional morality, and who would not want to do so no matter how much extra information 
they had or no matter how much their deliberative process were improved.  Such a stance 
might be taken by abolitionists, who urge us to reject moral thought and discourse because 
they cause us harm, at least on balance.  To them I respond by begging their indulgence until 
the next chapter, where I will show that it is possible to retain traditional morality’s benefits 
while avoiding the harms which abolitionists diagnose.  A similar stance might be taken by 
error theorists who believe we (or they) would be better off in a world without cooperation, 
coordination and so on.  I will return to this issue in chapter seven.  For the time being it will 
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suffice to respond by claiming that it is highly plausible that most error theorists have desires 
such that – if my arguments in this thesis are right - they should adopt my proposal.135 
With the above established and borne in mind, I am now in a position to introduce my 
proposal.  The next section will contain my proposal along with some arguments supporting 
the inclusion of its various stages.  I will then break down and explain the proposal in more 
detail in the subsequent sections.  Since my reasoning here is specific to my proposal and 
therefore distinct from the equivalent stages of other WNP responses, I will begin by building 
up from some quite basic considerations. 
5.3.  Formulating revolutionary relativism 
This section will really be the heart of my thesis, because I will explain in detail how exactly I 
propose we should respond to the ‘what now?’ problem.136  I will begin in §5.3.1 by fixing the 
scope of my proposal – something I raised as a criticism of Joyce’s proposal in the last chapter.  
In §5.3.2-5.3.4 I will then lay out in detail the attitudes and commitments of the judgements I 
propose we should make in the post-error-theory world, and why they can help deliver the 
prudential benefits we desire. 
 
135 The view of prudential reasons described may raise another potential problem in the WNP context, 
even if that problem does not arise for Williams, Smith et al.  For even if prudential reasons as described 
here exist, we might wonder how we could come to know what they are.  After all, we cannot be sure 
that we know what our idealised counterparts would desire for our current selves, because by 
definition they may have access to information which we do not, and which we cannot know that we 
currently lack.  This is not a particularly serious problem for my proposal, however.  I am not proposing 
that we must know with utter certainty what our prudential reasons are sub specie aeternitatis.  Rather, 
I believe that we will have a clearer, albeit potentially imperfect, idea of what our reasons are if we 
carefully think things through along the lines I have described, and make committed efforts to get the 
best handle we can on what the desires of our idealised counterparts would plausibly be. In Joyce’s 
terms we can thus bring our subjective reasons into a closer alignment with that subset of our objective 
reasons which I am calling our prudential reasons than we could if we failed to make the effort. 
136 In case it needs repeating, remember that I am assuming the truth of error theory here – in the 
current context, we are all error theorists. 
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5.3.1.  The scope of the proposal 
The most basic aspect of my proposal is its scope – to whom is my proposal addressed?  In 
§4.4.3 I criticised Joyce’s competing WNP response partly because of questions about its 
intended scope - a proposal which applies to just one person, or even to groups, can run into 
difficulties.  Therefore let me be clear about my own WNP response:  I propose that all capable 
agents become revolutionary relativists.137 
The reason for this universal scope is simple.  If error theorists are right, as we are assuming 
here, then all agents who wish to avoid systematic errors in their beliefs should accept error 
theory.  This means that everyone, everywhere faces the ‘what now?’ problem.  This whole 
thesis is my attempt to show that the best way of responding to the WNP is to adopt 
revolutionary relativism.  In the broadest possible terms, this is because, out of the available 
ways of responding to the WNP, revolutionary relativism most plausibly delivers the greatest 
level of prudential benefits.  If I am right about that, especially about the comparisons 
between my proposal and competing ways of responding to the WNP, then we – that is, all 
capable agents - should become revolutionary relativists.138  This is one of the senses in which 
my proposal is revolutionary – whatever may happen in practise, from a theoretical point of 
view, we are talking about changing the way everyone, everywhere understands morality. 
 
137 I use the word capable here simply because there may be individuals who count as agents, but who 
cannot become revolutionary relativists in any meaningful sense.  For example children may fall into 
this category because they cannot understand virtually any metaethical view.  I do not see this as a 
problem, since ‘everyone who can do so should f ’ is an acceptably universal scope in the current 
context.  But it is better to include capability here since if I left it out, it could leave open an objection 
to my proposal on these spurious, albeit technically correct, grounds.  In what follows I will sometimes 
simplify this formulation to ‘everyone, everywhere’ or ‘everyone’. 
138 This is a subtly different issue to the question of whether or not every individual agent’s all-things-
considered strongest relevant practical reason is to adopt my proposal.  At this stage however, this 




There are two further related reasons for the wide scope of my proposal.  First, one of the 
putative benefits of traditional morality is that it facilitates coordination among agents, for 
example by furnishing agents with moral reasons to keep promises, stick to agreements, and 
so on.  As I will argue, we can preserve this benefit, even though in the WNP context we no 
longer believe that moral reasons exist, by adopting my proposal.  That being the case, the 
more people who adopt revolutionary relativism (or at least the more people to whom the 
advice to do so can be addressed), the more coordination among agents there will be.   
Second, there can be a tendency to dismiss niche views, regardless of how well-founded those 
views are.  This means that if my proposal were addressed to only a small group of people, 
even if the proposal were totally successful and convinced every member of its target 
audience, it would still run the risk of failing to respect the Seriousness Constraint I discussed 
in §5.1.  Naturally, having a wide scope does not guarantee wide adoption, but a wide scope 
does mean that this potential problem is not built into my proposal from the start. 
The final issue with the scope of my proposal is what counts as adopting my proposal or 
becoming a revolutionary relativist.  One could interpret this as a demand that agents should 
be very metaethically sensitive and reflective indeed.  Or it could be that simply acting roughly 
in accordance with my proposal is sufficient, even if agents do not actively engage with all of 
the metaethical details.  What I am proposing is somewhere between these two 
interpretations – I am suggesting that it is in everyone’s interests to act in accordance with 
my proposal, and this would count as ‘adopting’ the proposal.  But beyond this, it seems likely 
that a more conscious and deeper understanding of why they are doing what they are doing 
will be helpful for people who do act in accordance with my proposal.  Thus I am not 
suggesting that in order to adopt my proposal, everyone must do a PhD in philosophy.  Simply 
acting in accordance with the proposal will be sufficient to count as adopting it and being a 
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revolutionary relativist.  But being sensitive to and reflective upon the metaethical details as 
well surely won’t hurt! 
5.3.2.  Core belief & truth conditions 
Having established to whom my proposal is addressed, the question now turns to what exactly 
it is that I am proposing all capable agents should do.  Remember that we are seeking 
something which can amend or replace traditional morality, and which will have a number of 
desiderata.  As far as possible, adopting the proposal will preserve features of traditional 
morality which are widely held to be prudentially beneficial.  For example it will facilitate 
coordination among agents, and will provide a framework for understanding and resolving 
disagreements.139  Given Wright’s worries, we also need to ensure that the WNP response we 
adopt can accommodate and offer the means to articulate certain judgements and actions 
which are very important to us, by giving us an appropriately serious way of thinking about 
and discussing some of the most difficult topics we can think of like rape, murder, torture and 
so on.  And bearing in mind Mackie’s point about different ways of life, i.e. systems of first-
order moral beliefs being optimal for people in different ‘concrete circumstances’ (1977 p. 
37), the proposal should admit of locally distinct variations.  For example, if there were a 
prudentially desirable outcome in terms of resource distribution – that everyone has enough 
water, say – then there could be local variations in the prudentially optimal norms which 
regulate people’s behaviour around water, dependent on the local variations in the 
availability of water in arid vs. verdant parts of the world. 
 
139 This may seem to beg the question against abolitionists who would claim that morality, and anything 
substantially similar to morality which we might adopt in response to the WNP, necessarily hinders 
conflict resolution.  But it does not.  In the next chapter I will be at pains to engage with abolitionism 
far more thoroughly than other WNP respondents typically do. 
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I submit that the best way of achieving these desiderata is to retain as far as possible the 
language and patterns of thinking which go along with morality, albeit changed in order to 
remain consistent with error theory and the commitments of the arguments for error theory. 
Therefore, I propose that we respond to accepting the truth of error theory, and to the 
resulting ‘what now?’ problem thus: on the same occasions when we would previously have 
made moral judgements, we make moral* judgements instead.  The same would apply, 
mutatis mutandis, to moral vs moral* thought and discourse in general.  These moral* 
judgements, exemplified here by the token judgement that ‘it is morally* wrong to f’, are 
defined as follows: 
For an agent, S, to judge that it is morally* wrong to f, is for it to be the case that: 
BELIEF: S believes that fing is in contravention of one or more practical norm(s), 
acceptance of which is a condition of participation in the moral* community in which 
S is a participant.140 
This will require some unpacking (for example I will need to explain precisely what I mean by 
acceptance of a norm, and how moral* judgements differ from moral judgements), and I will 
lay out what it amounts to in more detail shortly.  Initially, however, note that for the purposes 
of assigning truth conditions to S’s belief, this is all that I propose.  Thus S’s belief that it is 
morally* wrong to f is true if and only if fing is in contravention of one or more practical 
norm(s), acceptance of which is a condition of participation in the moral* community in which 
S is a participant.   
 
140 I use ‘wrong’ here simply because it follows the terminology I have used in previous sections.  The 
same proposal would generalise, mutatis mutandis, to obligatory, permissible and so on, just as is the 
case with the traditional moral terms wrong, obligatory etc. 
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Note also that facts about the norms a community accepts are descriptive, non-normative 
facts about the moral* community in question.  Therefore revolutionary relativism does not 
posit the existence of any objectively prescriptive facts or properties, and neither does it 
invoke any non-institutional categorical forms of normativity.  Thus, revolutionary relativism 
respects the RC and ROBET constraints.  On a terminological level, and recalling §4.5.1, this 
means that my proposal cannot involve e.g. having moral beliefs, since in the WNP context, 
the term moral necessarily implies categoricity.  Yet since the beliefs I am describing here are 
so closely related to moral beliefs, I find the term moral* appropriate (along with related 
terms such as morally*, morality* etc.). 
The final point to note at this early stage is that having a mental state with the structure of 
BELIEF is not by itself the full extent of making a moral* judgement according to my proposal.  
In order for revolutionary relativism to be a comprehensive proposal which works as intended 
in the WNP context, BELIEF will need to be supplemented somewhat.  Therefore in order for 
S’s belief to count as a moral* belief in the required sense, I propose that S must have certain 
further commitments.  By the term commitment, what I have in mind is similar to Valerie 
Tiberius’ notion of commitment, which she describes thus: ‘I use the term “commitment” to 
indicate the attitude or set of attitudes we have toward the things we take to have (at least 
some) normative significance. Commitments are, at least in part, constituted by passions and 
sentiments that motivate us to act' (2002 p. 166).  A commitment in this sense, then, involves 
a set of attitudes.  Thus my proposal is that for S to have a moral* belief that it is morally* 
wrong to f, is for S to hold BELIEF plus certain further attitudes, which I will specify as we go 
on. 
This heads off a potential objection.  It could be argued that we commonly have non-moral 
beliefs similar to BELIEF (for example in matters of etiquette or style), and so proposing only 
that we cease to have moral beliefs and instead have beliefs similar to BELIEF amounts to a 
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form of abolitionism.  However, my proposal is not that simple – the moral* judgements I am 
proposing we make comprise not only BELIEF but also the further attitudes I will describe as 
we go on.  Therefore, my proposal is not that we jettison the moral category of judgements 
and ‘make do’ with our other pre-existing categories of judgement (which would make me an 
abolitionist).  Rather, I propose that we adopt a new kind of judgement (which makes my 
proposal non-abolitionist) which also includes the further attitudes I will shortly describe.141  
This raises a matter which must be cleared up before moving on, however – given what I just 
said about the truth conditions of moral* beliefs, how are we to determine what counts as a 
moral* vs a non-moral* belief, and how do the further commitments of moral* beliefs bear 
on the truth or falseness of moral* beliefs?  
5.3.3.  Moral* vs non-moral* and the truth conditions of moral* beliefs 
I am proposing that if S judges that it is wrong to f, yet lacks the further attitudes I am about 
to describe, then S’s belief is not a moral* belief.  In hermeneutic theories, it is a controversial 
matter whether moral beliefs necessarily imply motivation or desires which go along with the 
propositional content of the moral belief in question.  In the present context, however, there 
are no pre-existing phenomena of moral thought and discourse which require explanation.  
These phenomena have been explained, and found to be subject to an error theory.  It is 
therefore an advantage of the WNP context that it is up to me to specify the nature of my 
proposal, and I am specifying that in order for a belief to count as a moral* belief, further 
attitudes are required alongside BELIEF.  Accordingly, an agent who has a belief with the 
 
141 This means that technically, although I am using the name revolutionary relativism, since the view I 
am proposing we adopt includes more than just one (kind of) mental state, its full name would be 
Revolutionary Hybrid Cognitivist Cultural Relativism.  Revolutionary relativism is a much snappier title, 
though! 
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content BELIEF but who lacks the further attitudes I will describe does not have a moral* 
belief, but instead an anthropological or some other non-moral* type of belief.  
This means that according to my proposal, there could be two beliefs with identical content 
of the form of BELIEF which could both be true, one of which is a moral* belief because the 
agent who holds the belief also holds other attitudes as specified here, and the other of which 
is not a moral* belief because the agent who has that belief lacks those further 
commitments.142  This may seem a little confusing at first, but we already think and speak in 
this manner often and without difficulty or confusion.  One example of a commonplace 
phenomenon with similar features is conventional implicature, where a proposition can be 
said to conventionally implicate further commitments beyond its truth conditions.143  
Compare the following propositions: 
i) Peter is rich and kind. 
ii) Peter is rich but kind. 
Both i) and ii) share the same truth conditions – both are true if and only if Peter has two 
properties simultaneously – richness and kindness.  This is straightforwardly conveyed by i), 
and an agent who has a belief with the content that i) need not accept that they are thereby 
committed to any further attitudes regarding Peter, richness or kindness.  Yet the word but in 
ii) conventionally implicates something more.  This means that holding a belief that ii) requires 
believing that Peter has certain properties, but it also requires that the agent who holds the 
belief feels there is some kind of contrast between richness and kindness; that rich people are 
 
142 I draw here on Hare’s discussion of the various ways in which the term ‘good’ may be used, especially 
1952, p. 124-126. 
143 I will present only a very brief sketch of conventional implicature here, as I am merely using it as a 
model rather than trying to defend or attack it.  For more on conventional (and other kinds of)  
implicature, and how the term has been used and developed over time, see e.g. Grice 1989, Copp 2001 
& 2009 & Finlay 2017. 
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seldom kind.  Holding a belief that ii) means the agent has a further commitment that such a 
contrast exists, and if an agent is not committed to the existence of that contrast, the agent 
does not hold a belief that ii).  This is very similar to how I intend the term moral* to be 
understood – if an agent has a belief with the form of BELIEF, they must also have certain 
further attitudes in order for that belief to be a moral* belief.  Those further attitudes do not 
alter the truth conditions of the belief in question, but the belief cannot be a moral* belief 
unless the further commitments are present among the agent’s mental states.  Having 
established this, I can now lay out what the further commitments I have in mind are. 
5.3.4.  Further commitments of moral* judgements 
The first of the commitments which go along with BELIEF in moral* judgement is 
ACCEPTANCE, as referred to in the definition of BELIEF in §5.3.2.  I will give a definition of 
ACCEPTANCE, and then begin to unpack it by picking out three features of moral* judgements 
which are promoted by ACCEPTANCE, and which I will argue help to maximise the prudential 
utility of morality* in the post-error-theory world. 
Alongside having a belief with the content BELIEF, for an agent, S, to judge that it is morally* 
wrong to f is for S to be committed as follows: 
ACCEPTANCE: S i) is disposed to be motivated or plans to refrain from fing, ii) feels 
appropriate reactive attitudes (e.g. blame) towards agents who f, and iii) endorses a 
general (i.e. community-wide) policy of acting in accordance with a norm against fing 
because she believes that so acting is prudentially beneficial. 
Each of the three elements of ACCEPTANCE plays a key role in helping to make it the case that 
adopting a practice of making moral* judgements would be plausibly beneficial.  I will explain 
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each of these features in turn.  The first element’s role is to make it clear that, absent 
complicating factors such as depression (hence including ‘is disposed’), moral* judgements 
should imply a motivation to act in accordance with the judgement.   
It is easy to see why this feature of revolutionary relativism would be beneficial - what we are 
aiming for is a theory which actually does conduce to prudentially beneficial outcomes, rather 
than a theory which merely involves S believing that prudentially beneficial outcomes will 
likely be produced.  ACCEPTANCE facilitates this by establishing a direct link between what it 
is to make a moral* judgement and being motivated to act in accordance with moral* 
judgements.   
It is a matter of some controversy in hermeneutic metaethics whether moral judgements 
entail motivations, but on my proposal the matter is settled – in order for a judgement for be 
a moral* judgement, I stipulate that under typical circumstances, the judging agent is thereby 
committed to a motivation or plan to act in accordance with the norm around which the 
moral* judgement is based.  This feature of moral* judgement cannot rule out akrasia or 
weakness of will, since agents may have other, stronger motivations, or they may be subject 
to depression, etc.  But this feature nonetheless counts against giving into temptation by 
ensuring that judging agents have at least some motivation to act accordingly. 
The second element ensures that moral* judgements should involve reactive attitudes such 
as praise and blame.  That is, a moral* judgement that e.g. it is wrong to f should retain the 
feature of the equivalent moral judgement that agents who f thereby lay themselves open to 
blame and possible censure by others in respect of their having fed.144  This is a very basic 
part of the meaning of traditional moral terms, and many metaethical theories assume 
 
144 I use the formulation ‘in respect of their having fed’ simply to relate the censure to the act of fing 
such that a person who e.g. tortures others is not as a result censured for some other thing, say, not 
having washed up (though they may be further censured for the latter). 
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something like this, even if they do not spell it out.  For example, if torture is morally wrong, 
and someone tortures others, moral realists will virtually universally agree that other things 
being equal, that person thereby becomes a fit object of blame.  Depending on the species of 
moral realism in question, blame may also be accompanied by other deserts such as outrage, 
correction, restraint or imprisonment.145 
This feature of moral judgement plausibly aids coordination among agents by offering a 
mechanism for guiding agents towards certain kinds of behaviour and away from others, and 
is thus prudentially beneficial.  A further benefit of this feature of moral judgement is that it 
also counts towards making agents motivated to perform acts evaluated as good, and to 
refrain from performing acts evaluated as bad or wrong.  Put simply, the reactive element of 
moral judgement doesn’t just tell agents who to blame or what they might be blamed for, it 
also makes agents want to act appropriately in order to avoid blame and censure, and (albeit 
possibly less strongly) to seek approval.  This is not indefeasible – agents may say ‘to hell with 
what others think’, but it seems undeniable that the reactive element of moral judgement 
counts at least to some extent in favour of agents being motivated to act in accordance with 
moral judgements.  By including reactive attitudes among the commitments of moral* 
judgements as a component of ACCEPTANCE, revolutionary relativism can retain these 
features of traditional morality and the benefits it brings. 
A potential worry here is whether revolutionary relativists can choose, based on theoretical 
considerations, to feel appropriate reactive attitudes towards agents who act in certain 
ways.146  For example, what if I believe it is in everyone’s interests that people do not steal, 
but I do not blame those who do so?  This is not a significant issue, however – whatever the 
 
145 The locus classicus here is Strawson 1962.  For further discussion, see Eshleman 2016, especially §2. 
146 This parallels a worry I expressed about revolutionary expressivism in §4.5.3.  There, it was 
problematic.  Here, it is not, as I explain in the text. 
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status of what might be called ‘desire-voluntarism’, we are talking here about actions which 
likely promote or threaten other agents’ wellbeing.  Such actions uncontroversially arouse 
reactive attitudes – we standardly allot praise or blame to agents who act in ways which we 
feel promote or threaten our wellbeing.  If you cut us, not only do we bleed, we also typically 
hold you responsible for cutting us!  I would therefore argue that consistent with the 
definition of prudential reasons I gave in §5.2.3, proper reflection on the stealing-but-who-
cares example would reveal that one of two unproblematic things is actually the case.  Either 
the details of the theft in question mean that I do not actually judge that it was wrong, all 
things considered (for example, perhaps it was to feed starving children, and thus actually 
produced an aggregate prudential benefit), or I actually do feel some reactive attitudes about 
it after all (e.g. I may not have initially realised that the theft was harmful, but come to realise 
this and so feel aggrieved when I think more carefully about it). 
The role of the third element of ACCEPTANCE is to support the motivational feature 
mentioned above by including endorsement.  Endorsement here is intended to imply a sense 
in which the judgement in question is something the agent would ‘stand behind’ on a lasting 
basis.  Naturally this does not mean that agents cannot change their minds about moral* 
judgements, or cannot make moral* judgements in the heat of the moment, but it carries an 
assumption that moral* judgements will be durable and appropriately serious judgements 
rather than snapshots of whatever the agent feels like at any given time.  Thus iii) adds a 
degree of stability which the motivation element discussed above may lack. 
Alongside this, the generalised aspect of iii) makes moral* judgements community-focused.  
Without element iii), all of the attitudes involved in moral* judgement so far could apply to 
purely personal matters which have no effect on other agents at all.  Including the ‘general 
policy’ part of ACCEPTANCE allows moral* judgements to keep other agents firmly in view, 
and so emphasises the coordinative benefits revolutionary relativism can help to deliver. 
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There are at least two ways in which this community focus can be beneficial.  One, extending 
the focus to other people beyond the individual agent can help emphasise that members of a 
moral* community may and prudentially should educate younger generations about the 
moral* code the community accepts.  This aids the stability aspect I mentioned a moment 
ago, and also facilitates coordination among agents.  And two, the community focus helps 
make the moral* norms accepted by a moral* community public.  This need not mean that 
the norms are strictly codified and published, but it seems likely to increase general awareness 
of the relevant norms in comparison with a community in which behavioural norms were 
considered a private matter.  Again, this is plausibly beneficial because it aids coordination 
among agents. 
All of the above gives rise to a problem, however.  Imagine that there is a moral* community 
which shares the moral* belief that it is wrong to squanch.147  This means that agents in the 
community will typically have the BELIEF and ACCEPTANCE attitudes as regards squanching, 
and thus believe that it is prudentially beneficial to refrain from doing so.  But suppose that in 
fact, given the local circumstances, they are mistaken - it is actually prudentially harmful to 
refrain from squanching, and everyone would be much better off if squanching were 
widespread. 
In such a situation, the moral* attitudes I have recommended thus far could threaten to trap 
the community in their mistake.  After all, so long as agents believe that their moral* practices 
are prudentially beneficial, neither BELIEF nor ACCEPTANCE suggests that agents must check 
to make sure the relevant policies actually are beneficial.  Worse, features such as element ii) 
of acceptance may seem to count against agents changing their minds about which moral* 
 
147 I use a nonsense verb here so that the discussion is not coloured by attitudes we may have, but 
which the community in question may not. 
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beliefs might be prudentially beneficial, and nothing I have said so far concerns what might 
happen if agents are indeed mistaken about what to do for the best. 
This is why my proposal includes one more commitment of moral* judgement.  I propose that 
alongside having a belief with the content BELIEF, and being further committed to 
ACCEPTANCE, for an agent, S, to judge that it is morally* wrong to f is for S to be committed 
that: 
GOOD CITIZEN: Should it become known that a policy of adhering to the practical 
norms accepted by her moral* community is prudentially suboptimal, and that a 
policy of adhering to different practical norms would be more beneficial, S will 
attempt to engage with her community in order to facilitate the acceptance of the 
new, prudentially optimal norms. 
One of the purposes of GOOD CITIZEN is to highlight that acceptance of practical norms by 
members of moral communities is not a permanent phenomenon.  While some features of 
moral* judgement lend themselves to doxastic stability – the community acceptance and 
reactive attitudes elements in particular – that stability must always be in the service of 
delivering prudential benefits.  If a community comes to accept a moral* norm which is 
actually prudentially harmful, there needs to be some mechanism within revolutionary 
relativism which can change that situation.  In concert with the conditionality aspect of 
ACCEPTANCE, GOOD CITIZEN means that revolutionary relativism provides for, and can indeed 
encourage, breaking down and replacing widely held first-order moral* beliefs which are 
found to be prudentially suboptimal. 
In the current context, my desire to highlight this grows out of the need to avoid begging the 
question against abolitionists such as Hinckfuss.  But the same concern has roots at least a 
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century older.  I am sensitive to the concerns of those who sympathise with – or at least 
suspect there might be some merit in - Nietzsche’s view that widely held traditional first-order 
moral beliefs may be very far from the optimal beliefs for encouraging human flourishing (e.g. 
Nietzsche 2007 p. 20). I believe we would be wise to share Nietzsche’s suspicion of promoting 
a first-order moral (or in this case moral*) status-quo even as we become second-order moral 
error theorists.  Rather, we must be wary of allowing ourselves to be merely, as he put it, ‘wily 
spokesmen for [our] prejudices’ (1998 p. 8).  That is, we should be careful not to fall into the 
trap of insufficiently critically agreeing with those who make what Nietzsche and Hinckfuss 
would both see as a cosy and erroneous assumption: that traditional moral beliefs are, for all 
that they may be in error, still somewhere close to prudentially optimal. 
I do not seek to accuse any of the philosophers under discussion here of anything specific or 
malicious,148 but these thoughts ground the way in which I want, and feel well philosophically 
justified in doing so, to treat Hinckfuss’ and wider abolitionist arguments more seriously than 
other WNP respondents frequently seem to.  This is something I will elaborate on in the next 
chapter.  For the time being, my explanation of revolutionary relativism is now complete.  I 
will close out this chapter by offering some concluding remarks, and looking towards what will 
follow in the next two chapters. 
5.4.  Conclusion 
To recap what happened in this chapter, in §5.1 I gave a summary of the overall picture so far, 
including highlighting the ‘what now?’ problem I had introduced in the previous chapter.  I 
then discussed some preliminary considerations about how we might formulate a good 
 
148 Nietzsche may well accuse me of being too timid in this (see e.g. Nietzsche 1998 §1, inter alia), but 
I am expressing sympathy with a particular idea in his work here, not confessing agreement with the 
tone and content of everything he said! 
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response to the ‘what now?’ problem.  In §5.2 I laid some groundwork for my response to the 
WNP by introducing two constraints on good WNP responses, and by defining in some detail 
what prudential reasons are and why we have them.  Then in §5.3 I gave the formulation of 
my proposed response to the WNP, revolutionary relativism, and explained how adopting it 
could secure prudential benefits in a post-error-theory world.  This involved fixing the scope 
of my proposal in §5.3.1, and then in §5.3.2-5.3.4 spelling out my proposal in detail – the 
difference between moral and moral* beliefs and the bearing this has upon truth conditions, 
the commitments involved in moral* judgement, and the role played by each of those 
commitments in delivering prudential benefits if my proposal were to be adopted.  This 
completes my explanation of revolutionary relativism. 
A slightly more detailed note on the use of the term ‘revolutionary’ than I gave at the very 
start of the chapter is appropriate at this point.149  On one level, my proposal is revolutionary 
in that it applies only as a response to the WNP, which in turn arises as a result of accepting 
error theory.  I am not proposing a hermeneutic view intended to explain traditional moral 
thought and discourse, but rather something which comes into play only after moral thought 
and discourse have been found to be systematically in error for something like the reasons I 
discussed in chapter 3.  Such a finding is surely a revolutionary event, and using the term 
revolutionary to signal the context in which my proposal operates and to differentiate my 
view from hermeneutic forms of relativism seems entirely appropriate.   
However, there are two further senses in which my proposal is revolutionary.  One of these 
senses I mentioned above – that I am proposing that all agents everywhere alter their 
understanding and use of moral thought and discourse.  Any change with such broad scope 
 
149 I am mindful here of Miller’s admonishment that Joyce’s revolutionary fictionalism is much less 
radical than claimed (2013 p. 121).  I add these extra remarks here because I want to leave no doubt 
that my relativism is indeed revolutionary. 
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must merit the term revolutionary, even if it were subtle – and in theoretical terms, error 
theory and the possible responses to accepting it are far from subtle.   
The other reason why my proposal is revolutionary is because I am not proposing the adoption 
of an ‘off the peg’ form of relativism.  Rather I am proposing a novel form of relativism which 
has not been defended to date.  This is because the revolutionary (i.e. post-error-theory) 
context of my proposal makes it possible and indeed appropriate for me to stack the deck in 
my favour, so to speak.  That is to say, there are certain problems which traditional, 
hermeneutic forms of relativism are often thought to face which I can hope to avoid because 
the task here is not one of explanation of how things are, but rather suggestion of how things 
might be.  As such, I have provided an entirely new – i.e. revolutionary – form of relativism. 
Hoping to avoid objections is not the same as actually avoiding them, though, and I will still 
have to defend my proposal against the ‘inherited’ principal objections to hermeneutic forms 
of relativism.  One of the best known examples is disagreement – if moral judgements are 
relative to an individual or a community, how can they be of any use in situations involving 
members of other communities?  This objection confronts revolutionary relativism just as 
much as it does hermeneutic varieties of relativism.  I will offer a defence against this objection 
and other ‘inherited’ objections on behalf of my proposal in chapter 7.  There are also certain 
issues which arise for my proposal which may not arise for hermeneutic forms of relativism, 
either because of the post-error-theory context or because of the way I have constructed the 
view.  Again, I will offer a defence against these context-specific objections in chapter 7. 
None of that will matter, though, if I cannot make a strong case for why error theorists should 
adopt my view rather than one of the competing WNP responses – after all, who cares if there 
are interesting defences of my proposal if it is not one we have any reason to adopt?  
Therefore, before getting into the potential objections to my proposal, in chapter 6 I will offer 
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extensive arguments that revolutionary relativism is a better response to the WNP than the 




Chapter 6.  Why Revolutionary Relativism Is the Best WNP 
Response 
In this chapter and the next I will show why my proposal is a better response to the ‘what 
now?’ problem than the responses offered by others to date.  I will begin by fleshing out the 
claim I made in §4.6 that WNP respondents to date have failed to give sufficient weight to the 
challenge from abolitionists.  Thus §6.1 will contain my argument for taking abolitionism more 
seriously.  Briefly, I believe that all WNP responses must be compared under two scenarios: 
one in which abolitionists are wrong, and morality is prudentially beneficial (at least on 
balance), and another in which abolitionists are right, and traditional morality is harmful (at 
least on balance).  It was not necessary to discuss this in chapter 4, as my focus there was on 
arguing that we should reject previous WNP responses on their own merits.  All non-
abolitionist WNP responses assume that the abolitionists are wrong about traditional 
morality, at least on balance, and so it was appropriate in chapter 4 to go along with this.  But, 
for reasons I will explain in §6.1, to give a full account of why my proposal is superior to others, 
I will argue here that a twin-track case must be made, explicitly including the possibility that 
abolitionists are right and traditional morality is indeed harmful.   
I will then turn in sections 6.2-6.5 to showing why revolutionary relativism is a better response 
to the ‘what now?’ problem than the available alternatives in both of the scenarios laid out in 
§6.1.  I will argue that revolutionary relativism is superior to competing proposals because it 
can either avoid or cope better with my own objections to other proposals (which I presented 
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in chapter 4) and also with the key objections others have raised in the literature. My strategy 
here will be to offer a version of a dominance argument.150  
Each of the sections 6.2-6.5 will tackle one of the WNP responses I rejected in chapter seven.  
In each section, I will give a reminder of the proposal itself.  I will then provide a brief precis 
of each reason I gave for rejecting the proposal in question, and an argument that 
revolutionary relativism either avoids the criticism, or copes better with it than the proposal 
in question can.  I will also discuss the implications of the distinction drawn in §6.1 for the 
proposal in question.  Thus in each section we will see that revolutionary relativism is a better 
response to the WNP than the competing response under discussion.  And when taking the 
chapter as a whole, even if there may seem to remain a glimmer of hope for the other 
proposals after my arguments in chapter 4, we will see that regardless of whether traditional 
morality is harmful, and whichever existing WNP response we might consider adopting, we 
will always be better off if we adopt revolutionary relativism.  As a result, I will conclude that 
revolutionary relativism is the best response to the WNP overall. 
In the overall structure of my project, this chapter will constitute the first stage of my defence 
of revolutionary relativism.  In the next chapter, I will present the second stage of my defence, 
and show how my proposal can also cope with the most significant problems which confront 
traditional relativist theories, and can therefore stand on its own two feet, philosophically 
speaking.  I will also discuss some problems which arise for revolutionary relativism specifically 
 
150 Dominance arguments are familiar in game theory, but for examples of variations on dominance 
arguments being used in philosophy, see e.g. Sayre-McCord (2013) or, famously, Pascal’s Wager.  Very 
briefly, dominance arguments can apply when an agent makes a choice between possible courses of 
action without knowing which of two or more situations they are in (or will imminently be in).  Where 
one course is preferable to the other(s) regardless of which situation obtains, then that choice is said 
to superdominate the other(s).  For example in Pascal’s Wager, the unknown situation is that either 1) 
God exists or 2) God does not exist.  Pascal argues that regardless of God’s existence, we are always 
better off believing that God does exist (and acting accordingly).  Thus Pascal’s conclusion can be 
expressed as the claim that belief in God superdominates atheism. 
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in the WNP context, and show that they cannot derail my proposal.  This will complete my 
case for revolutionary relativism, and will be followed by the concluding chapter of the thesis. 
6.1.  The challenge from abolitionism and ‘moralbad’  
Recall from section 4.3.2 that one of the main problems I raised with abolitionism is that it 
rests on a claim which cannot plausibly be proven: that traditional morality is, on balance at 
least, harmful to our wellbeing.  If we are not persuaded by this claim, it seems we can simply 
set abolitionism aside.  If the motivation for abolitionism is the harmfulness of traditional 
morality, and traditional morality is in fact not harmful, then the motivation for abolitionism 
is wholly undermined. 
This is what most philosophers who have responded to the WNP have argued.151  Olson’s short 
dismissal of abolitionism centres largely around one sentence: ‘My suspicion, though, is that 
moral discourse is at least potentially more beneficial than detrimental to human and non-
human well-being’ (2014 p. 180).  Joyce spends a little more time discussing abolitionism, but 
ultimately comes to a similar conclusion – moral beliefs may have occasionally resulted in 
tragedy, but they are nonetheless useful (2001 p. 184-5).  Nolan et al. go so far as to doubt 
that jettisoning moral thought and discourse is something we could easily do, if at all (2005 p. 
307).152 
 
151 An anomaly among WNP respondents here is Svoboda, who characterises abolitionism as being 
motivated primarily by epistemological worries about error theorists having false beliefs, rather than 
by the worry that traditional morality is prudentially harmful (2015 p. 9).  Abolitionists do of course 
discuss this dimension of abolitionism (e.g. Garner 2007 p. 508), but it is hardly the only point they 
raise.  Thus rather than presenting a view of the issues involved which competes with the one I have 
offered in the text (and which I would therefore need to argue against), Svoboda’s characterisation 
seems to me to rather miss the point, or at least one of the salient points, of abolitionists’ arguments.  
After all, other responses offer freedom from error plus other benefits, so why be an abolitionist unless 
all the alternatives are untenable, including Svoboda’s own proposal?  That being so, I merely mention 
the matter and move on, rather than digressing further. 
152 Some philosophers claim that it may actually be impossible to abolish moral thought & discourse, 
see e.g. Streumer 2013a & Strawson 1962, particularly §4. 
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Far from being a cynical whitewash on the part of non-abolitionist WNP respondents, the 
above is quite credible.  For example, imagine a survey where participants were asked 
whether it was more likely that traditional morality a) beneficially helps us combat weakness 
of will (cf. Joyce 2001 p,184) or b) inexorably leads to harmful elitism, authoritarianism and 
war (cf. Hinckfuss 1987 especially chapter 3).  It is entirely believable that a majority would 
answer a). 
In light of this, the fact that I have proposed a response to the WNP which includes retaining 
(anything substantially similar to) elements of traditional morality, such as making apparently 
moral judgements, might make it appear that I intend to make a similar case for the 
superiority of my proposal over abolitionism.  First, I could reject the claim that traditional 
morality is harmful, at least on aggregate.  And I could then argue that by definition, 
abolitionism cannot retain any of the benefits of traditional morality, because eliminating 
moral practice must obviously entail eliminating the beneficial effects of moral practice.  Thus 
I might argue that my proposal is superior to abolitionism to the extent that it can deliver (any 
of) the benefits of traditional morality.  This line of argument is just as convincing when 
deployed in support of revolutionary relativism as it is when others use it (cf. Olson 2014 p. 
181).   
But I will go further, and I believe that other non-abolitionist WNP respondents should 
similarly respond to abolitionism more thoroughly than they frequently do.  This is because 
the unprovability problem with abolitionism cuts both ways – it is implausible that we could 
prove whether traditional morality leads to harm or not, since we have no comparison world 
in which no agent ever makes a moral judgement or engages in moral discourse. We can 
assume, since our history includes morality and the current world is still here and we are still 
in it, that any harmful effects of morality have not proven catastrophic on a global scale.  
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However we cannot be certain whether we would be significantly better off now, had humans 
never made a moral judgement or expressed a moral belief.   
And this issue persists into the WNP context.  Hinckfuss’ central point in his 1987 was surely 
that many of the moral beliefs which we previously thought were beneficial turned out after 
critical reflection to have harmful effects (again, see Hinckfuss 1987 chapters 2 & 3).  This is 
not an a priori matter or an outcome which could easily have been foreseen.  The harmful 
effects of traditional morality need to be pointed out to us after the fact, otherwise there 
would be no need for Hinckfuss’ book. 
Therefore let us put aside for a moment the intuition that traditional morality is beneficial (at 
least on balance), and consider what would follow if the claim that traditional morality is 
harmful were true. For ease of exposition, I will label this situation ‘moralbad’, defined more 
precisely as the epistemic possibility that our conventional moral beliefs and discourse could 
be such that our lives would go better without them.  The converse situation in which 
traditional moral beliefs are beneficial (i.e. as is presupposed by the other WNP responses) I 
will label ‘moralgood’.  I would argue that WNP respondents must do one of two things.  Either 
i) they must provide a convincing argument that it is implausible that we currently are, or ever 
could be, in moralbad, or ii) they must provide an account of how their view would fare in 
moralbad, should it be the case.  Simply disagreeing that traditional morality is harmful is 
inadequate.  Despite the cursory examinations of abolitionism mentioned above, none of the 
proposals under discussion adequately include either of these two elements. 
What follows from this is that non-abolitionist responses to date have failed to answer the 
challenge from abolitionism adequately.  In order to give proper weight to this context, I will 
need to consider the superiority of revolutionary relativism in moralbad as well as the more 
usual moralgood situation. 
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What I want to highlight is that abolitionism is only one response among several to the 
possibility that we are currently in moralbad.  The key to seeing this is to note that abolitionists 
such as Garner do not advocate eliminating all normative reasons.  Rather, abolitionists 
recommend that we abolish traditional morality for prudential reasons.  They argue that we 
would be better off if we didn’t have the moral beliefs we have, and being better off is 
something most people want (see e.g. Garner 2007 & my footnote 76, above).  Thus it is at 
least possible that we might do away with the kinds of moral beliefs which both a) are false 
according to error theorists, and b) lead to the negative outcomes abolitionists suggest, and 
yet still retain practical rules by which we regulate our behaviour.  Any view which can 
accomplish both a) and b) can respond to both the WNP and moralbad. 
As I said at the beginning of this chapter, I intend to offer a dominance argument.  I believe 
that regardless of whether moralgood or moralbad obtains, when compared with any 
competing WNP response, revolutionary relativism is always the better choice.  To defend this 
claim, I will discuss the available alternatives, conservationism, revolutionary fictionalism, 
abolitionism and revolutionary expressivism in sections 6.2-6.5 respectively.  In each case I 
will explain why revolutionary relativism is a better response to the WNP both in moralbad 
and the more usual moralgood situation. 
6.2.  Revolutionary relativism versus conservationism 
In section 4.2, I discussed and rejected conservationism, principally defended by Jonas Olson, 
as a response to the WNP.  To recap, Olson argued that we can and should respond to the 
truth of a moral error theory by choosing to retain our moral beliefs, even though we now 
know them to be systematically false.  We should do so, Olson claimed, for prudential reasons, 
i.e. because we are likely to be better off in a society in which people have genuine moral 
beliefs, and act in accordance with them, than we would be in a society in which no one had 
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such beliefs.153  Olson argued that, despite certain intuitions we might have to the contrary, 
we can consistently have genuine moral beliefs and remain moral error theorists.  This is 
because, Olson argued, we can compartmentalise our beliefs – we can genuinely hold certain 
beliefs at certain times whilst remaining disposed to dissent from those beliefs at other times. 
In section 6.2.1 I will assume that moralgood obtains, and show why revolutionary relativism 
avoids the objections to conservationism I discussed previously, and is therefore preferable 
to conservationism in moralgood.  In section 6.2.2 I will explain why revolutionary relativism 
is also preferable to conservationism if moralbad obtains.   
6.2.1.  Revolutionary relativism vs. conservationism in moralgood 
I discussed two main objections to Olson’s proposal.  The first, drawing on Suikkanen 2013, 
was that the best accounts of belief available to us from the philosophical debates concerning 
the nature of propositional attitudes suggest that beliefs must by definition be sensitive to 
evidence.154  But remember that we are considering how we as error theorists should respond 
to the WNP.  Error theorists as such will take themselves to have conclusive evidence that our 
traditional moral beliefs are systematically false.  This puts Olson in a very awkward position.  
Either he must offer a highly unconventional theory of propositional attitudes which can 
accommodate evidence-insensitive beliefs, and which is more plausible than the best theories 
of beliefs we currently have, or he must abandon the claim that we can consistently and 
rationally retain genuine moral beliefs after we have become convinced that a moral error 
 
153 In the terminology I am employing here, and given remarks such as ‘…moral discourse is at least 
potentially more beneficial than detrimental to human and non-human well-being’ (Olson 2014 p. 
180)), we can infer that conservationism assumes that moralgood currently obtains.  See also §6.2.2 
below. 
154 Throughout this subsection, it will be helpful to recall the discussion of the nature of beliefs versus 
other propositional attitudes I gave in §2.1.2, and the development of these issues in §4.2.1.  For quick 
references on the evidence-sensitivity of beliefs, see e.g. Smith 1994, especially §4.6, pp. 111-116 & 
Schwitzgebel 2019, especially §1.4. 
 168 
theory is true.  Since Olson does not offer a satisfactory theory of what beliefs are which is 
compatible with his proposal, it seems that he must abandon conservationism.155 
Revolutionary relativism is not vulnerable to Suikkanen’s line of criticism, because my 
proposal requires only a standard account of beliefs.156  To see why, consider the differences 
between our moral beliefs before we accept an error theory and the beliefs Olson and I 
propose we should have after we accept an error theory.  We may assume that typical error 
theorists would agree that before we become error theorists, our moral beliefs conform to 
the standard account of beliefs.  I say this because in arguing for an error theory, when error 
theorists describe our traditional moral beliefs, they typically use terms such as ‘beliefs’ 
without presenting arguments that they intend a non-standard reading of the term.  There is 
also evidence for the claim that traditional moral beliefs are indeed evidence-sensitive.  For 
example, we sometimes change our moral beliefs in response to convincing arguments or 
other evidence.  Thus before we accept an error theory our moral beliefs have a mind-to-
world direction of fit, and so are sensitive to evidence. 
In summary, then, error theorists typically hold that before we accepted error theory, moral 
judgement consisted in having an attitude of belief towards propositions which ascribed 
mysterious non-existent properties to certain actions.  And according to the best accounts of 
 
155 As I noted in §4.2.1, Olson has recently responded to this kind of criticism (2019).  Olson claims that 
we can suppress beliefs by ‘advertently not attending to evidence supporting moral error theory’ (p. 
310).  Yet even if we can do so, I suspect this fundamentally threatens the stability of error theory itself 
(for reasons very like those I gave in §4.2.1).  Olson also claims (p. 309) that that there can be degrees 
of belief, and so we can believe in error theory partially, but also have partial moral beliefs.  I find it 
plausibly more accurate to say that we can have varying degrees of certainty that a belief is correct.  If 
so, what Olson describes is merely a matter of not being sure what to believe.  A familiar predicament, 
sure enough, but this fails to be a picture of how we can rationally maintain genuine moral beliefs at 
the same time as genuinely accepting a moral error theory.  As such, I do not believe Olson’s arguments 
work.  But in the present context it would not be especially helpful to digress into a full discussion here, 
only to end up no further forward.  So I set Olson’s recent response aside for the time being, though I 
note that the issue may bear revisiting, especially if he is able to expand on the matter further in future. 
156 For a further overview and discussion of beliefs, which includes discussion of various authorities in 
the field (hence the claim above that it is a standard view), see Humberstone 1992. 
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propositional attitudes we have, if an attitude we have towards some proposition is a belief, 
then insofar as we are rational we tend to give up that belief if we encounter convincing 
evidence that the belief is false.  Now, in the ‘post-revolution’ WNP context, I am proposing 
that we make moral* judgements which consist in having an attitude of belief towards 
propositions about norms which our moral* communities accept (and so on, as described in 
detail in §5.3).  This depends on an entirely standard account of belief-attitudes – most 
saliently, I am proposing having attitudes which are sensitive to evidence, and which we give 
up if we encounter convincing evidence that they are false.  One could even say that the 
beliefs I propose we have are roughly the same as some beliefs we already have, given that 
there is evidence that some of our traditional moral beliefs are relativistic.157  So the tension 
between the evidence-sensitivity of pre- and post-error-theory models of belief which 
Suikkanen objects to in Olson’s case simply does not exist on revolutionary relativism. 
The second objection to conservationism I discussed in chapter 4 was my own objection that 
Olson failed to make a successful case for the strand of his argument which I summed up thus: 
OC3.  For a proposition, p, we can have an occurrent belief that p in one context, while 
simultaneously being disposed to believe that not-p in other contexts. 
My concern was that, for beliefs of the kind under discussion, this is simply not plausible (see 
§4.2).  There is a sense in which something like OC3 is true.  We are indeed sometimes 
disposed to change the beliefs we have in context A upon entering context B if context B 
exposes us to evidence that the belief we had in context A was false.  The evidence need not 
be particularly good evidence – we may be persuaded by convincing oratory or by strong 
 
157 I refer here to Goodwin and Darley (2008), whose experiments show that some ‘lay people’ have 
relativistic as well as objectivist intuitions about morality.  I will return to this in more detail in §6.3.1 
and §7.4.  Note that this is entirely consistent with error theorists’ typical understanding of traditional 
morality – the ‘lay’ people could simply be wrong. 
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emotions to believe things which we cease to believe upon the most cursory reflection later 
on.  But we do nonetheless sometimes find ourselves temporarily believing things which we 
do not believe most of the rest of the time.  Thus it could be said that although we may believe 
that p while we are in context A, we are simultaneously disposed to believe that not-p in 
context B in this way.  This, I argued, is what is going on in the examples Olson gives to 
demonstrate the plausibility of his view.   
But Olson needs more than this, for two reasons.  One, Olson needs us to be able to change 
from believing that p to believing that not-p not because of a change in evidence between 
different contexts, but because we choose to feel more reflective in one context than 
another.158  And two, when Olson talks of a disposition to believe different things in different 
contexts, he does not mean having distinct beliefs at different times in the manner I just 
described.  He means something much closer to having two contradictory beliefs at once, but 
only paying attention to one of them at a time: ‘In such cases, the more reflective beliefs are 
suppressed or not attended to’ (2014 p. 192).  This is an entirely different phenomenon that 
that captured by OC3.159  I argued that neither of these further steps is plausible, nor are they 
supported by the examples Olson provides. 
By contrast, I do not need anything like OC3 in order for my proposal to work.  Revolutionary 
relativism requires only that agents’ beliefs track what agents take to be the best evidence 
available to them.  Having begun as moral realists, we were exposed to the arguments for 
error theory, and thus to what we took to be convincing evidence that our moral beliefs were 
 
158 I take it that the volitional aspect is clear here.  Granted, we may be guided by external influences 
to become more reflective in some contexts (such as the philosophy seminar room).  But if we can move 
from believing that p to believing that not-p as a result of entering ‘more reflective and detached 
contexts’ (2014 p. 192), then surely we can also unilaterally shift our context in the relevant way by 
simply choosing to think carefully about the matter. 
159 Lest it be thought that I have mischaracterised Olson’s view in OC3 in order to make it easier to 
object to, I offer the following quote: ‘In general, it does not seem impossible simultaneously to have 
an occurrent belief that p and a disposition to believe not-p in certain contexts’ (2014 p. 192). 
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false.  That being the case, as revolutionary relativists we would cease to believe as we 
previously did, and instead we would form new beliefs which are in line with the available 
evidence.  Nothing about the beliefs on which revolutionary relativism relies has been shown 
to be false by the arguments for error theory, and so no compartmentalisation or 
maintenance of false beliefs is required for an error theorist to become a revolutionary 
relativist.  Revolutionary relativism does not require that we develop a previously 
unmanifested ability to hold genuine beliefs at will.  Neither does it require us to be able to 
simultaneously hold mutually contradictory beliefs, yet to only pay heed to one of them in 
any given context.  In this way, revolutionary relativism is preferable to conservationism 
because it avoids reliance on implausible models of belief. 
In summary, conservationism assumes moralgood, and in moralgood it is vulnerable to at least 
two criticisms described above and in §4.2.160  Revolutionary relativism avoids both these 
criticisms.  Thus I conclude that, even if we grant Olson’s claim that traditional morality is 
beneficial on balance, revolutionary relativism avoids the criticisms which render 
conservationism untenable and is therefore the preferable WNP response. 
6.2.2.  Revolutionary relativism vs. conservationism in moralbad 
Turning to the situation I have labelled moralbad, my argument is very straightforward indeed.  
It is impossible for conservationism to be prudentially beneficial if moralbad obtains.  This is 
because retaining our traditional moral beliefs means that we will also retain any negative 
consequences of regulating our behaviour in accordance with those beliefs.  Recall that the 
motivation for conservationism is that retaining traditional moral beliefs is supposedly 
 
160 For further criticism of conservationism, see Jaquet & Naar 2016.  I have omitted discussion of 
whether revolutionary relativism can cope with their criticisms of conservationism in the text above 
because their argument takes place only after accepting something like OC3.  Since I reject Olson’s 
argument before it gets that far, Jaquet & Naar’s criticisms of conservationism do not apply to my 
proposal. 
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prudentially beneficial.  Olson’s argument is that if we accept a moral error theory, our lives 
will go better if we continue to have traditional moral beliefs – even though we know they are 
false - than they would if we had any other (or no) kind of moral beliefs.  In moralbad, it is 
understood that having traditional moral beliefs is harmful.  Therefore retaining those moral 
beliefs will also be harmful, and the prudential motivation for conservationism is entirely 
undermined. 
Thus conservationism cannot be of net benefit in moralbad, and therefore depends entirely 
on the claim that traditional morality is of net benefit.  Unless we are given much better 
reasons to rule out the possibility of moralbad than have been offered to date – and as I 
argued in §6.1, it is unlikely that sufficiently convincing reasons could be offered – 
conservationism fails in this scenario.  Alternatively, conservationists could try to come up 
with some kind of selective variant of their position, according to which only prudentially 
beneficial moral beliefs were retained.  However, this would likely be a fraught affair since it 
would result in a hybrid of conservationism and abolitionism.  And even if this were attractive 
to conservationists, there would be significant difficulties involved in showing which moral 
beliefs were beneficial and which were not – as I argued in §6.1 above, this latter issue is 
precisely why we must consider moralbad as I am doing here. 
To illustrate this, consider Garner’s claim that ‘morality inflames disputes and makes 
compromise difficult, it preserves unfair arrangements and facilitates the misuse of power, 
and it makes global war possible’ (2007 p. 502).161  Remember that we are now comparing 
conservationism and revolutionary relativism in moralbad, and so we are granting for the time 
 
161 Garner is not alone here.  In the quoted text he is overtly drawing on Mackie.  And as I discussed in 
chapter 4, Hinckfuss also argues at length for a similarly dismal view of morality (1987).  As a more 
recent example, Goodwin & Darley (who are neither error theorists nor abolitionists, as far as I am 
aware) suspect that ‘(c)ulture wars that are fought over fundamental ethical values may become more 
intractable to the extent that each side of the debate harbors an objective view of the truth of its own 
beliefs’ (2008 p. 1361). 
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being that having traditional moral beliefs does cause these prudentially harmful effects.  That 
being the case, then responding to the WNP by advocating the wholesale retention of the 
same first order moral beliefs we had before we became error theorists must necessarily lead 
to the same negative effects. 
By contrast, revolutionary relativism is largely neutral on which actions should be forbidden 
or required by the moral* standards of a given moral* community, and hence which moral* 
beliefs are true or false.  I am proposing only that the moral* beliefs we should adopt are 
beliefs about which actions are forbidden or required by the moral* standards accepted by a 
moral* community.  The only constraint imposed by revolutionary relativism on what those 
standards are is that acting in accordance with them should plausibly be of net prudential 
benefit to the community.  To be as explicit as possible: on revolutionary relativism, the 
ascription of moral* beliefs to agents presupposes or requires that the agents in question 
have certain commitments.  These include a commitment to the principle that a generalised 
policy of acting in accordance with the relevant moral* standard will prove to be prudentially 
beneficial.162  Accordingly, it is a requirement of sincerity that utterances which express 
moral* beliefs can be understood to pragmatically express this commitment.163 
This, of course, provokes questions about what exactly the relevant commitment is, and what 
follows from agents being so committed.  As I laid out in chapter 5, a commitment in the sense 
I have in mind involves a set of attitudes.  In the present context there are two salient features 
of the attitudes involved.  First, there is element i) of ACCEPTANCE: that agents who make 
moral* judgements thereby commit themselves to being disposed to be motivated or 
planning to act in accordance with the judgement in question.  My proposal must include this 
in order to account for agents’ beliefs actually resulting in action – without something like 
 
162 See §5.3.4. 
163 See §5.3.2. 
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this, it may be controversial whether moralbad could obtain in the first place because it would 
be unclear that agents’ moral beliefs could result in prudential harms.  Including element i) of 
ACCEPTANCE in my proposal puts this beyond doubt.  And second, there is GOOD CITIZEN: a 
plan or intention that, should it become known that there is an available, more prudentially 
beneficial norm, agents will be ‘good moral* citizens’.  This means that agents will engage 
with one another to reappraise the norms they accept, in an effort to come to accept only 
those norms which plausibly conduce to the optimal prudential outcomes. 
With the above established, I am now in a position to offer a story of what would follow if we 
were to adopt revolutionary relativism and then realised that we were in moralbad.  
Discovering that holding or acting in accordance with a given moral* belief leads to harm 
would make it impossible for us to keep the moral* code (i.e. the system of moral* norms the 
community accepts) of our community unchanged, specifically because of our commitments 
to ACCEPTANCE and GOOD CITIZEN.  According to my proposal, this would trigger a process 
of reflection aimed at restoring equilibrium between the moral* norms the moral* 
community accepts, the beliefs of members of the moral* community, and the commitments 
implicated by those beliefs.  The possible outcome of this process which is most relevant to 
the present argument can be laid out as follows:  1) the moral* community would cease to 
accept the standard in question, acting in accordance with which had been shown to be 
harmful, 2) the relevant beliefs would therefore go from being true to being false, 3) the 
moral* community would accept a new standard, acting in accordance with which was 
prudentially beneficial, 4) new, true beliefs would be adopted.164 
 
164 I say that new true beliefs would be adopted (as opposed to could be) because I take it that the 
considerations around direction of fit I discussed §2.1.2 (and revisited above in §6.2.1) mean there is a 
natural tendency towards having true beliefs about matters on which evidence is available.  To analyse 
this prediction in more detail would involve too great a digression here, but I consider the point 
sufficiently intuitively plausible to assume it here. 
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To see how this might work in practice, let us take a concrete example, and consider the 
morality* of private property.  Consider the principle that owning private property is morally 
permissible.  Pre-error theory, according to typical error theorists, to accept this principle was 
to have a belief, call it B: 
 B [owning private property is morally permissible] 
After we come to accept error theory and adopt revolutionary relativism, to accept the same 
principle would involve having a slightly different belief: 
B* [owning private property is permissible according to the moral* standards 
accepted by our moral* community] 
Alongside having this belief, accepting the principle would also involve having the further 
attitudes described by ACCEPTANCE and GOOD CITIZEN.  For present purposes, the relevant 
features of these further commitments can be summed up by saying that that agents who 
sincerely believe that B* are committed to the principle, C, that: 
C [acting in accordance with the standards referred to in B* is plausibly prudentially 
beneficial, and if we find that it is not, we will accept new, prudentially optimal norms 
instead] 
Note that the phrasing here is not a carbon copy of the terminology I used in §5.3.  The 
individual, S, is replaced with a community, the action involved is deemed permissible as 
opposed to wrong, and elements of both ACCEPTANCE and GOOD CITIZEN are brought 
together in C.  This is intentional, in order to show how revolutionary relativism would work 
in practise, rather than in terms of verbatim, textbook-style definitions.  But it should be clear 
that B* and C amount to a description of the practical application of the attitudes laid out in 
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§5.3. 
Now imagine that it is shown to be the case that abolitionists are right about the morality of 
private property.  In this situation, the way most people currently think about property and 
theft actually entrenches inequality and leads to deprivation for the many while ensuring that 
disproportionate resources find their way only to the powerful few.165  I will assume that this 
is an uncontroversially negative outcome in prudential terms.  What happens next?  
Remember that conservationism is weak here because it makes no provision for doing 
anything other than persisting with false moral beliefs inherited from our pre-error-theory 
selves, and so perpetuating any associated harms.  However, were this harm to be discovered 
within a revolutionary relativist community, it would not of itself render B* false.  But it would 
violate the relevant commitment, C.  This in turn would lead to a reappraisal of which moral* 
standards it was prudentially beneficial to accept, and to the accepting of new standards 
which were beneficial.  Following this reappraisal, the belief B* would become false, and a 
new true belief, B** would be adopted: 
B** [owning private property is impermissible according to the moral* standards 
accepted by our moral* community] 
Alongside B**, accepting the relevant principle would involve having further commitments 
which we can sum up as: 
C* [acting in accordance with the standards referred to in B** is plausibly prudentially 
beneficial, and if we find that it is not, we will accept new, prudentially optimal norms 
 
165 I take this to be close to what Garner has in mind when he mentions the preservation of inequality 
and the misuse of power (2007 p. 502).  Hinckfuss takes a similar point further, seeing the same 
mechanism as potentially resulting in revolution (1987 especially §2.5 and §3.5).  The history of Russia 
in the early 20th century would seem to go some way towards supporting his view. 
 177 
instead] 
Note the near-identical nature of C and C*.  As a result of the process described, equilibrium 
is restored between the standard accepted by the moral community, the true beliefs of 
members of that community, and the relevant further commitments of the members of the 
community. 
In summary, we can see that in moralbad conservationism condemns us to prudentially 
negative outcomes.  Whereas revolutionary relativism offers scope for the revision of our 
beliefs in order to avoid harm and to promote prudentially beneficial outcomes.  I therefore 
conclude that in moralbad, revolutionary relativism proves superior to conservationism as 
defended to date, and seems likely to remain so.  Taking sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 together, I 
conclude that revolutionary relativism is a better response to the WNP than conservationism. 
6.3.  Revolutionary relativism versus revolutionary fictionalism 
In §4.4 I discussed and rejected the proposal that error theorists should adopt revolutionary 
moral fictionalism.  Joyce proposes that error theorists retain aspects of traditional morality 
because they are useful, principally the feature of traditional morality which he argues helps 
us combat weakness of will.  This can be done while avoiding error, Joyce argues, by taking a 
fictive stance towards morality – that is, by continuing to speak and think largely as moral 
realists do.  But instead of holding and expressing genuine moral beliefs, Joyce proposes that 
we should entertain moral thoughts (a.k.a. make-beliefs or quasi-beliefs), and that our 
apparently moral utterances should not be assertions, but rather quasi-assertions.  For Joyce, 
these moral thoughts are largely the same as genuine moral beliefs, excepting that we will 
remain disposed to dissent from them in sufficiently critical contexts.  This latter exception 
means, according to Joyce, that our moral ‘thoughts’ would not be moral beliefs, and 
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therefore we would avoid the error of having false beliefs.  So long as we thoroughly immerse 
ourselves in this practice, thinking and speaking as if moral realism was true in all but our most 
critical context(s), Joyce believes that this will mean that when confronted by weakness of 
will, we will nonetheless be motivated to do the right (prudentially speaking) thing. 
As was the case with conservationism, Joyce assumes that we are currently in moralgood.  As 
I argued in §6.1, I believe this cannot be assumed.  Thus I will argue that revolutionary 
relativism is a better response to the WNP than revolutionary fictionalism in both moralgood 
(§6.3.1) and moralbad (§6.3.2). 
6.3.1  Revolutionary relativism vs. revolutionary fictionalism in moralgood 
There were several reasons why I rejected Joyce’s proposal: i) revolutionary fictionalism 
necessarily involves dishonesty in problematic ways, ii) fictionalists cannot satisfactorily 
specify which moral quasi-beliefs we should adopt, and iii) error theorists cannot adopt the 
required fictive stance towards moral beliefs in a way which preserves the immersion on 
which revolutionary fictionalism depends.  In this subsection I will tackle each of these 
objections in turn, first giving a brief recap of the details of my objection, and then showing 
why revolutionary relativism fares better than revolutionary fictionalism does. 
On dishonesty, I argued that we might see Joyce as addressing his advice to individuals, to 
small groups, or to everyone, everywhere.  In each case, either dishonesty follows (which 
Joyce himself says is unacceptable (2001 p. 214)) or the proposal becomes self-undermining.  
Remember from chapter 2 that it is a commitment of Joyce’s error theory that most people 
intend and interpret typical moral utterances assertorically.  Remember also that error 
theorists typically agree that most people typically use moral discourse to express beliefs.  Yet 
fictionalism is defined by the non-assertoric use of apparently moral language, which in turn 
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means that fictionalists do not express beliefs when they participate in apparently moral 
discourse.  This has the upshot that the lone fictionalist will intend to withhold assertoric force 
from their apparently moral utterances, but their audiences will typically interpret those 
utterances as assertions about the fictionalist’s beliefs.  According to a quite standard 
definition, this means that fictionalists would unavoidably be lying.166  Thus the source of my 
dishonesty worry was Joyce’s recommendations as regards assertoricity and the genuine 
expression of beliefs.  
Moreover, since meaningful conversation requires both parties to be able to understand what 
is being said in the sense in which it is intended, individuals cannot unilaterally withhold 
assertoric force (as Joyce observes himself, 2017 p. 82).  And since revolutionary fictionalists 
would know this, on an individual level, Joyce’s proposal seems unintelligible. Turning to 
groups, this may make fictionalism tenable within the group, but I observed that groups will 
always come up against outsiders, and so the problem faced by the lone fictionalist will always 
loom.  And if Joyce proposes that everyone, everywhere becomes a fictionalist, this simply 
cannot be done – not everyone will be able to grasp the required material, and even if they 
could, the inculcation costs could well be so enormous as to outweigh the prudential benefits 
which were the motivation for Joyce’s proposal. 
Virtually the same dishonesty objection could be made to my theory. Theoretically, if error 
theory is true, then the ideal outcome from the point of view of my proposal is that everyone, 
everywhere should become a revolutionary relativist.  But even if the error theory is true and 
my proposal is inarguably the best response to that truth, this will not happen instantly.  So 
for the foreseeable future anyone who adopts my proposal will frequently come up against 
 
166 For ease of reference, the definition of lying I used in §4.4.3 was ‘to make a believed-false statement 
to another person with the intention that the other person believe that statement to be true’ (Mahon 
2016). 
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people who are not (yet, at least) revolutionary relativists.  It is a commitment of error theory 
that most people are not currently moral relativists, since arguments for the error theory 
typically target the supposed objectivist features of moral facts or moral normativity.167  Thus 
even if we set assertoricity and genuine beliefs aside, it could still be objected that when 
speaking about moral matters with others, revolutionary relativists will mean one thing while 
their audience takes them to mean another.  To make matters worse, it is likely that the 
revolutionary relativists would know that this was the case, while their audience would not.  
Therefore, the objection runs, dishonesty is still a problem for my proposal just as it was for 
fictionalism. 
To make this objection explicit, my opponent could say that when a revolutionary relativist, 
let’s call her Cassandra, utters ‘torture is wrong’, she expresses a belief, BRRev, with roughly the 
content that: 
BRRev [torture is forbidden because it contravenes the practical norms accepted by my 
moral* community] 
When others who are not revolutionary relativists utter the same sentence, my opponent 
could observe that according to error theorists they will typically be expressing a different 
belief, BFOLK, which can be understood as having roughly the content that: 
BFOLK [there are non-institutional categorical reasons to refrain from torture] 
Thus, when Cassandra says ‘torture is wrong’ to Helen, who is not a revolutionary relativist, it 
is clear that there is a mismatch between Cassandra’s intended meaning and the meaning 
 
167 See chapter 2.  Revolutionary expressivists would also face a similar problem, and I suspect it would 
be even trickier for them to respond to it.  However, since I reject revolutionary expressivism for other 
reasons, I set aside further discussion of this point. 
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Helen infers from Cassandra’s utterance.  Plus, as a self-aware revolutionary relativist, 
Cassandra is likely to know this.  So there arguably is a dishonesty worry here, and Cassandra 
may be lying, or at least talking past her audience.  Indeed, it may seem that Cassandra cannot 
help but intend Helen to come to have a belief which Cassandra deems false.  The challenge 
for me is therefore whether I can successfully argue that when talking with outsiders, despite 
Cassandra expressing beliefs with different contents to those inferred by her audience, there 
is sufficient agreement between the parties about what is being said to support the claim that 
the parties are not lying or talking past one another in a problematic way.  And in order for 
this answer to be satisfying in the present context, it must also be an argument which is 
unavailable to fictionalists.  I believe I can respond in a way which does both of these things. 
The first thing to note is that I see no way around conceding that there are differences 
between Cassandra’s intended meaning and the meaning inferred by others, and this means 
that to some extent, Cassandra is talking past her audience.  My argument is instead that the 
relevant differences are so slight as to be unproblematic, and may in fact occur routinely in 
traditional moral discourse without incident. 
Several features of moral* discourse according to my proposal support my claim that the 
differences in meaning are only slight.  On my proposal, moral* discourse is typically used to 
sincerely express genuinely held beliefs.  Moral* discourse is also typically assertoric.  And 
while BRRev and BFOLK have different contents, they are alike in one important respect – they 
both have practical import.  That is to say, they are both beliefs concerning what is to be done. 
This is one reason why I can claim that Cassandra is not lying when she says to Helen ‘torture 
is wrong’ – Cassandra does not intend Helen to believe BFOLK (which would make Cassandra a 
liar).  Rather, in everyday contexts, Cassandra is not interested in whether Helen comes to 
have a belief which could be technically analysed as BRRev or BFOLK.  She cares only about what 
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Helen’s practical stance towards torture is (or the practical stance of people in general).  
Therefore Helen and Cassandra may have technically different beliefs, but their beliefs are 
very similar in that they have the same practical import. 
Now it could be replied to this that fictionalists can claim virtually the same thing – when they 
utter apparently realist sentences, they don’t care whether their audience comes to have 
realist beliefs, so long as their audience responds appropriately on a practical level.  And to an 
extent, this would likely be correct.  But under scrutiny, this reply falls apart.  On my proposal, 
Cassandra’s view can be made more precise by saying that although on an everyday level she 
is neutral as regards the technical details of Helen’s beliefs, on a metaethical level, she would 
prefer Helen to have BRRev than BFOLK.  That being the case, Cassandra is free – and perhaps is 
even motivated to some extent – to have metaethically critical discussions and explain this to 
anyone willing to engage with her, without in any way threatening the stability of her own 
position.  By comparison, fictionalists must guard against doing so in everyday contexts for 
the sake of preserving their vital immersion in the fiction.  Therefore they cannot help but 
intend that their audience will have BFOLK most of the time. 
The similarities I have described make it the case that when specifying exactly what she means 
by utterances such as ‘torture is wrong’, Cassandra can ‘go most of the way’ along with the 
non-revolutionary relativist before encountering a difference.  And this kind of specification 
crops up much more frequently than highly critical metaethical discussions in philosophy 
seminar rooms.168  For example Cassandra can respond to questions which are problematic 
for fictionalists without issue – when asked ‘Do you really believe that? Is it really wrong to do 
that?’, she can happily and truthfully reply ‘Yes, I really do believe it and yes, it really is wrong’.  
My point here is that in everyday terms, Cassandra and Helen actually do mean the same thing 
 
168 This point is similar to Olson’s argument that fundamental moral disagreements are in fact quite 
prevalent and frequent (2010 §4.1). 
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to the extent that most people think about such matters, most of the time.  And those 
everyday contexts include quite natural questions to which Cassandra can respond freely, yet 
fictionalists cannot. 
It only becomes apparent that Cassandra and Helen are talking past one another once we ask 
whether the concept of wrongness they are each using is an objective concept or a relative 
one. Yet we learn from experimental philosophy that talking past one another on this 
metaethical level is likely a commonplace phenomenon which most people do not even realise 
is happening, and which poses no threat to the intelligibility of moral discourse in everyday 
contexts. 
Geoffrey Goodwin and John Darley conducted a series of experiments to determine whether 
‘lay individuals’ (2008 p. 1339) are intuitive metaethical objectivists or relativists.  Their results 
show that most subjects were actually objectivists about some of their moral judgements, and 
relativists about others.169  This may not be the metaethical bombshell it appears, because of 
course this finding is entirely compatible with the truth of both objectivist and relativist 
metaethical theories, since the subjects may simply be mistaken in either direction.170  But it 
must be noted that this finding does not cause a metaethical crisis by rendering traditional 
moral discourse unintelligible at various unpredictable times.  Rather, it shows that in most 
contexts, people can get on with moral discourse just fine without knowing whether their 
interlocutors are relativists or objectivists, or even knowing which they are themselves. 
 
169 Note that although Goodwin and Darley drawn their distinction between objectivism and 
subjectivism, which is usually understood as an agent-centric form or relativism, the way they frame 
subjectivism is also compatible with group-focused forms of hermeneutic relativism. 
170 Lest it be worried that I am in violation of the RC constraint here (see §5.2.2), note that this is 
perfectly compatible with error theorists’ commitments that relativism is false as a hermeneutic theory.   
I am not claiming that most people are right to be hermeneutic relativists about some moral matters. 
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In highly metaethically critical contexts, the differences between BRRev and BFOLK may be more 
important than the similarities I have discussed here.  In such contexts it would often be 
appropriate to further clarify utterances of ‘torture is wrong’ with further statements such as 
‘by which I mean to say…’ even without being prompted to do so by others.  But the vast 
majority of moral discourse takes place in less metaethically critical contexts than the 
philosophy seminar room.  Therefore I suggest that when Cassandra and outsiders use 
sentences such as ‘torture is wrong’ in everyday contexts, the similarities are more important 
– without any further clarification being required, both parties understand one another to be 
making assertions, to be expressing sincerely held beliefs, and that those beliefs include the 
same practical import.  I submit that these similarities are sufficient to support the claim that 
in most contexts the parties would not be talking past one another to an extent which derails 
my proposal. 
This account is unavailable to revolutionary fictionalists for the reasons I discussed in §4.4.3.  
When uttering the sentence ‘torture is wrong’, fictionalists in principle do not make an 
assertion, and they do not express a belief at all.  Where my proposal offers sufficient 
similarity with traditional morality to at least make the above argument against the dishonesty 
objection, revolutionary fictionalists have no such response.  Furthermore, should any 
confusion arise, Cassandra can happily discuss with outsiders every aspect of what she means 
by moral sentences.  It may be quite time consuming, but doing so does not imperil her 
metaethical position in any way.  In contrast, revolutionary fictionalists must guard against 
spending too much time discussing their metaethical position in case this threatens the 
immersion on which revolutionary fictionalism relies.  
Finally, on the points I raised in my dishonesty objection, if we read Joyce as recommending 
his proposal to everyone, everywhere, I objected that the huge educational resources 
required to implement this could undermine any prudential benefit which becoming 
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revolutionary fictionalists could provide.  To an extent this problem is again shared by 
revolutionary relativism.  But the problem is not as daunting for revolutionary relativism as it 
is for fictionalism.  As I mentioned above, there is convincing evidence from experimental 
philosophers that most people already have a basic understanding of moral relativism, and 
may already have some relativist moral beliefs (see e.g. Goodwin & Darley 2008).  That being 
the case, my proposal may even begin to look somewhat more modest – I am simply 
suggesting that we make all of our relevant beliefs work in a way that some of our beliefs 
already do.   
Admittedly revolutionary relativism is a distinctive and novel kind of relativism, and no one 
yet has beliefs which conform entirely with the view I laid out in chapter 5.  Thus the 
inculcation costs of revolutionary relativism cannot be ignored.  But contrast revolutionary 
relativism with revolutionary fictionalism on this point - it is not believable that most people 
already have an understanding of any variety of moral fictionalism, assertoricity and so on.  
Yet the proposal is that all of our moral beliefs should be replaced with some kind of mental 
state which is thus far quite unlike any moral beliefs we currently have.  Thus the task of 
educating everyone, everywhere about revolutionary relativism would plausibly be 
significantly simpler than teaching everyone, everywhere about fictionalism.171   
Overall, then, while revolutionary fictionalism and revolutionary relativism both face issues 
around potential dishonesty and cost of implementation, these issues are much less 
problematic for revolutionary relativism than they are for revolutionary fictionalism.  On 
balance thus far, this indicates that revolutionary relativism is the better choice. 
 
171 I will discuss this issue in more detail in §7.4.  It is worth noting that the other WNP responses would 
also require significant educational resources for the same reasons. Even conservationists, despite their 
advice to retain existing beliefs, would still have to explain error theory, doxastic voluntarism, and so 
on.  However, since I reject the other WNP responses for independent reasons, further consideration 
of the various comparisons in terms of educational resource costs is superfluous here. 
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On the ‘which morals?’ issue, I argued in §4.4.4 that the most pressing problem for fictionalists 
is that, even if fictionalists can successfully separate moral and non-moral rules, it is unclear 
which moral rules we should adopt as fictions, and why.172  Alternatively put, even if we were 
to adopt fictionalism and hence equip ourselves with a means to resist temptation, it would 
remain a pressing question which temptations we should wish to strengthen ourselves against 
giving in to.  Joyce advocates adopting ‘the most useful’ (2017,p. 83) moral rules as fictions.  
But I argued that we will be unable to settle on the desired outcomes of adopting fictionalism 
– i.e. what the moral fictions we might adopt should be useful for.  For example, recalling §6.2, 
should we prefer a world in which people do not steal, or one in which people have a radically 
different view of property and do not recognise stealing as such?  If the fictionalist stipulates, 
as they perhaps might, that the moral fiction(s) we immerse ourselves in should be useful for 
achieving the best prudential outcomes, then which of these worlds is prudentially best?  Joyce 
gives us no way of answering these questions (see §4.4.4 for further discussion).  And even if 
we can agree which outcomes to pursue, I objected that we will then find it impossible to 
determine which specific moral fictions we would need to adopt in order to promote the 
agreed-upon outcomes. 
Revolutionary relativism is preferable to fictionalism here because it takes the ‘which morals?’ 
question out of the metaethicist’s hands entirely, and places it in the hands of each moral* 
community.  Thus my proposal removes the burden of answering the question at the 
theoretical level.  Simply put, Joyce needs to answer the ‘which morals?’ question, but I do 
not.  The reader may raise an eyebrow at this, but the reason why this is the case becomes 
 
172 In §4.4.4 I also raised a concern about how fictionalists could specify what counts as a moral vs. non-
moral fiction.  I noted in §4.4.4 that one potential way around this for fictionalists may be to say that 
moral fictions are whichever relevant fictions we feel it is appropriate to hold relevant reactive attitudes 
about, and so on – roughly, they are whichever fictions we respond to as if they were moral.  I still 
believe the point I raised in §4.4.4 demands a response, and that fictionalists cannot rely on the kind of 
response I mentioned unless they provide an argument to that effect.  But here I will grant for the sake 
of argument that something like this move is available to fictionalists and set this matter aside, simply 
for the sake of streamlining the discussion and concentrating on the most pressing problems at hand. 
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clear if we consider what to do immediately after deciding to adopt fictionalism versus 
revolutionary relativism.  If we follow Joyce’s advice, then after we see that error theory is 
true, we need to establish the prudentially optimal moral fiction to entertain.  For the reasons 
I just mentioned (and for further reasons which I will discuss in the next section), this would 
likely be extremely difficult, if not impossible.  Whereas if we follow the revolutionary 
relativist’s advice, deciding which moral* rules to accept is a matter for the collective 
judgement of each moral* community.  On revolutionary relativism, there do not need to be 
any specific moral* rules picked out at the theoretical level because each moral* community 
is free to arrive at what it considers the most prudentially beneficial rules to accept for itself.  
Admittedly this merely passes the buck from metaethicists to moral* communities.  But if in 
doing so it avoids a theoretical burden upon revolutionary relativism which fictionalism 
cannot avoid bearing, then this surely counts in favour of revolutionary relativism at the 
metaethical level. 
Taking the above arguments together, I believe that revolutionary relativism is a better 
response to the WNP than revolutionary fictionalism is in moralgood.  I will now turn to 
showing why the same is true if we are currently in moralbad as well. 
6.3.2. Revolutionary relativism vs. revolutionary fictionalism in moralbad 
We saw in §6.2.2 that conservationism was ill-equipped to deal with the possibility that we 
are currently in moralbad.  If traditional morality is harmful, then the conservationist’s advice 
that we should retain our pre-error-theory moral beliefs even after accepting a moral error 
theory necessarily involves perpetuating that harm.  But fictionalists may be able to do better 
here, because fictionalism may allow a degree of choice about which of our previous moral 
beliefs we adopt as fictions.  Despite implying in earlier work that we should ‘entertain’ 
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roughly our pre-error theory moral beliefs (2001 pp. 229-230), Joyce has also argued that we 
should entertain whichever moral beliefs are ‘the most useful’ (2001 p. 185, 2017 p. 83).   
While he does not discuss the possibility which I have called moralbad at any length, we may 
reasonably presume that at least part of what Joyce has in mind when he uses the term useful 
is that the beliefs in question should not be prudentially harmful.  Thus it is open to fictionalists 
to argue that, even if we are in moralbad, only a subset of our previous moral beliefs are 
actually harmful, and that there are other moral beliefs which are not. Then, fictionalists might 
suggest that we could at least in principle determine which moral beliefs lead to problematic 
outcomes and which do not, and then adopt only the latter - the right moral beliefs, as Joyce 
puts it (2001 p. 185) - as fictionalist moral make-beliefs.173 
Unfortunately, I do not believe that fictionalists can make this argument successfully.  The 
flaw in the argument is that it is implausible that fictionalists could ever have sufficient 
information to correctly determine ‘the right moral beliefs’ in advance of adopting them as 
make-beliefs.  And they would need to do so in advance, as I will explain.  A majority of those 
who have published on the matter disagree that moralbad obtains as things currently stand – 
the endeavour of calculating now which specific moral beliefs might result in demonstrable 
harm or benefit in the future is highly problematic.  Remember that although certain moral 
beliefs may intuitively seem uncontroversially beneficial under normal circumstances, we are 
for the time being setting aside those intuitions and granting that we may be in moralbad. 
Therefore, if we are to adopt as make-beliefs whichever moral beliefs can deliver prudential 
 
173 In case it should be thought that I am putting a poor argument into fictionalists’ mouths, given that 
I immediately go on to disagree with it, I must point out two things.  One, the strategy I suggest here is 
consistent with what Joyce says in response to abolitionists about selecting the ‘right’ beliefs.  Two, I 
will go on to make a similar (albeit in my view more successful) argument on behalf of revolutionary 
relativism below, and again at somewhat greater length in §6.4.2. 
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benefits while avoiding harmful outcomes, surely this must be a cautious process in which 
make-beliefs should be subject to revision.   
Yet the flexibility required for this revisionary process is incompatible with fictionalism.  To 
see why, recall section 4.4 and my discussion of immersion.  A central plank of the fictionalist 
argument is that only by turning a habit of making judgements and speaking as if our moral 
beliefs were (capable of being) true into a ‘life strategy’ can we secure the behaviour-
regulating benefits of traditional morality.  Without essentially forgetting that we are 
fictionalists in all but our most critical contexts, we will fail to reap the claimed rewards in 
terms of beneficial regulation of our behaviour.    It seems clear to me that any process of 
revising our decisions about which moral beliefs we entertain, according to the positive or 
negative outcomes they turn out to promote, must break our immersion in the fictional 
morality.   
This means that fictionalism presents us with a window in time between accepting a moral 
error theory and immersing ourselves in a particular (set of) moral fiction(s).  Once this 
window has passed, revising the moral fiction threatens the mechanism via which fictionalists 
claim their proposal can deliver prudential benefits.  Repeated revisions, which the careful 
process of tailoring our moral make-beliefs to avoid harm would surely demand, must render 
the required immersion untenable. 
By comparison, fictionalism’s failure to cope with moralbad demonstrates why revolutionary 
relativism can succeed here: revolutionary relativism allows a degree of flexibility and offers 
scope for the revision of moral* rules according to the benefits or harms which eventuate 
from acting in accordance with them.  On my proposal, the moral* status of actions (i.e. 
whether actions are right or wrong) is not permanently or objectively fixed.  This is what 
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makes my proposal relativistic – the moral* status of actions is relative to the attitudes of the 
agents in the moral* community in question.   
What this means here is that, if there is an appropriate shift in the moral* rules which 
participants in a moral* community accept, then actions which were previously deemed 
morally* permissible will on my proposal become morally* impermissible, or vice versa.  Thus 
revolutionary relativism can offer flexibility where fictionalism cannot.  This flexibility does 
not by itself mean that revolutionary relativism can cope adequately with moralbad, however.  
What is required is that moral* rules can be flexible in response to the prudential issues raised 
by moralbad.  And this is precisely what revolutionary relativism delivers, as I explained in 
§6.2.2.   
Therefore I conclude that, if we are in moralbad, fictionalism’s inflexibility is its downfall, 
whereas revolutionary relativism’s flexibility is its strength – revolutionary relativism is a 
better choice for error theorists if we are in moralbad.  Taking this together with §6.3.1, I 
submit that revolutionary relativism is a better response to the ‘what now?’ problem than 
fictionalism is, regardless of whether moralgood or moralbad currently obtains. 
6.4.  Revolutionary relativism versus abolitionism 
In §4.3 I discussed and rejected abolitionism, a response to the WNP defended most 
prominently by Garner today (e.g. 2007, 2019), and previously by Hinckfuss (1987).  
Abolitionists argue that current morality (i.e. the view of morality most people have before 
potentially becoming moral error theorists) is prudentially harmful.  I will recap some of their 
reasons for claiming this below, but the upshot is that abolitionists advocate jettisoning moral 
thought and discourse, and that accepting an error theory gives us the ideal opportunity to 
do so. 
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While I discussed problems with more recent defences of abolitionism, my principal reason 
for rejecting abolitionism was that it rests on a claim which cannot plausibly be proven – we 
cannot be sure that current morality is not of net benefit, and save for an impractically large 
scale experiment, we never will be sure.174  However as I argued in §6.1, I believe that 
abolitionism must be taken seriously as a challenge to all WNP responses.  It is insufficient to 
dismiss the possibility that we are currently in moralbad.  I will therefore explain why I believe 
that revolutionary relativism is a better choice of response to the WNP than abolitionism in 
moralbad (§6.4.2) as well as in moralgood (§6.4.1). 
6.4.1. Revolutionary relativism vs. abolitionism in moralgood 
My argument that revolutionary relativism is preferable to abolitionism here could not be 
simpler.  Abolitionists advocate abolishing all moral thought and discourse.  If moral thought 
and discourse were prudentially beneficial, at least on balance, then doing as abolitionists 
suggest would necessarily mean we lost out on any and all of the benefits involved.  This is 
something of a mirror image of §6.2.2 above – where conservationism depended entirely on 
the claim that traditional morality is of net benefit, abolitionism depends on traditional 
morality’s being harmful.  Thus if my arguments in the last chapter that revolutionary 
relativism can deliver prudential benefits were correct to any extent at all, then revolutionary 
relativism is preferable to abolitionism in moralgood to the same extent. 
However, the other WNP responses assume that moralgood obtains, which means that the 
meat of their arguments, and therefore of my responses to those arguments, share that 
assumption.  Abolitionism is different, since it proceeds from the claim that we are currently 
 
174 The other problems with abolitionism I discussed (concerning the impossibility of implementing 
Marks’ variant, and the confused nature of Blackford’s) I will set aside here.  I have already discussed 
implementation in this chapter, and will return to this theme more fully in chapter 7.  And my proposal 
is (hopefully!) not fraught with confusion in the way Blackford’s is.  Thus it is more fruitful to 
concentrate here on the provability point. 
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in moralbad.  So in the case of abolitionism, the majority of the philosophically interesting 
material comes into play when we consider how revolutionary relativism and abolitionism 
compare in moralbad, as I do in §6.4.2. 
6.4.2. Revolutionary relativism vs. abolitionism in moralbad 
According to abolitionists, unlike other WNP respondents, we are currently in moralbad.  
Abolitionists hold that current moral beliefs actually cause us to harm one another in ways 
which we could avoid if we jettisoned moral thought and discourse.  As I discussed in §4.3, 
the locus classicus of this view is Hinckfuss’ The Moral Society (1987).  Hinckfuss argues that 
morality systematically fosters and entrenches elitism, for example, because moral 
psychology and education include a kind of brainwashing of the less powerful majority in 
society to make them believe that society should be structured in a way which actually harms 
their interests and benefits only the powerful minority (1987, sections 2 and 3). 
Another of Hinckfuss’ accusations is that because there is a plurality of apparently credible, 
mutually exclusive moral views, and because moral judgements purport to capture objective 
moral facts, morality impedes conflict resolution in the direst situations, and even paves the 
road to war (1987 section 4).  Further examples include those discussed by Garner (2007), and 
referred to in §6.2.2 above.  Abolitionism is therefore claimed to be prudentially beneficial 
because it removes the mechanism by which these harms come about. 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, I do not contest this.  If we are currently in moralbad, then I 
agree that it is likely that we would be better off than we are now if we abolished traditional 
moral beliefs, very possibly along with their related thought and discourse.  Rather, my 
argument here is that even though becoming abolitionists would be beneficial in moralbad, 
adopting revolutionary relativism would be even more beneficial. Revolutionary relativism 
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allows us to both avoid the harms of traditional morality, and, I will argue, to gain coordinating 
benefits which are unavailable to us on abolitionism.   
The reason I make this claim is grounded in the same flexibility I discussed in §6.2.2.  My 
argument begins by observing that it is not plausible that every individual moral rule is 
unavoidably harmful, and I do not take abolitionists to claim this.  For example, it is highly 
plausible that a policy of acting in accordance with the judgement that it is wrong to allow 
one’s own children to starve to death when one does not have to do so is prudentially 
beneficial under virtually all circumstances.175  Rather, I take abolitionists to argue that current 
morality is harmful as a whole because certain aspects of morality lead to (often unintended 
or unforeseeable) harm.176  This does not mean that there are no practically normative 
judgements which may be of prudential benefit.  Rather abolitionists suggest that we would 
be better off getting rid of the moral part of our discourse and deliberations, and thinking 
instead of what we have the best prudential reasons to do in ways which do not invoke moral 
terms (Garner 2007 pp. 511-512).   
However this is perfectly compatible, I suggest, with the claim that traditional morality is 
nonetheless potentially of some benefit.  It is simply that those benefits are, for abolitionists, 
outweighed by the tendency to result in harm which is an inalienable part of traditional moral 
thought and discourse.  Thus to help us formulate the abolitionist proposal without glossing 
over these potential benefits – insufficient though they may be to offset the harms of morality, 
according to abolitionists – we might observe something like the following:  at the heart of 
 
175 It may, with sufficient effort, be possible to come up with circumstances in which it might, according 
to some moral realists, be right to allow one’s children to starve – perhaps a powerful alien has ensured 
that unless they starve, they will die in an even more awful way.  But any such circumstances will be so 
exceptional that I set aside this possibility here. 
176 I say unintended and unforeseeable because I consider it compatible with moralbad that e.g. agents 
think they’re acting in a prudentially beneficial way when they oppose theft, even if in fact their 
attitudes to property entrench prudentially undesirable elitism. 
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the abolitionists’ proposal is an implicit claim that non-moral prudential reasons and 
motivations can provide a sufficient proportion of the benefits of traditional morality, without 
incurring the associated harms, that our lives will go best on balance if we abolish morality, 
and rely entirely on non-moral prudential reasons and motivations. 
What I want to argue is that revolutionary relativism can similarly avoid the harms of 
traditional morality, but can also offer some of the benefits which even abolitionists must 
acknowledge are plausible.  We saw in §6.3 and in previous chapters that Joyce highlights the 
ability of moral beliefs to help us overcome akrasia.  To this benefit I would add that traditional 
morality almost certainly can help to facilitate coordination between members of a society 
(even if, as abolitionists claim, it often fails to actually do so).177  Simply put, a society seems 
likely to function more smoothly if its members share a similar framework of actions to be 
avoided, responsibilities towards others, expectations of justified censure for transgression 
and so on.  Traditional morality plays a role in this, as do legal systems or professional codes 
of practise, for example.   
I am not contesting the abolitionist’s obvious rejoinder that traditional morality may indeed 
foster coordination in service of a prudentially harmful belief system.  What I am claiming is 
that revolutionary relativism not only offers a way to avoid the harms of traditional morality, 
it also offers similar coordination benefits, benefits which are not available if we jettison all 
vestiges of morality and rely only on non-moral prudential reasons as the abolitionists would 
have us do.  If, like abolitionism, revolutionary relativism can avoid the harms of morality, then 
the contest between the two proposals in moralbad results in a draw.  But if revolutionary 
relativism can also offer benefits which abolitionism cannot (or at least cannot to the same 
extent), then revolutionary relativism becomes the better choice for error theorists. 
 
177 See e.g. Joyce 2006, DeScioli & Kurzban 2009 & 2013. 
 195 
On the first point, the avoidance of the harms of traditional morality, I appeal to the 
arguments I gave in §6.2.2.  There, I showed that revolutionary relativism allows for flexibility 
in the face of discoveries about the harmfulness of accepted moral* standards and moral* 
beliefs.  This in turn allows post-error-theory moral* thought and discourse to evolve towards 
a harmless, purely beneficial situation.   
I will concede that this means that any harms caused or inherited by adopting revolutionary 
relativist beliefs will not be removed overnight.  The evolution of revolutionary relativism 
towards a system of beliefs which causes no discernible harm is a process, and depends on at 
least two things.  One, any harms must be discovered before they can be eliminated.  This 
cannot be guaranteed, at least in the short term – if it could, there would have been no reason 
for Hinckfuss to write his 1987 book, and it seems likely that it would be self-evident that non-
abolitionist philosophers would be forced to take abolitionism much more seriously, rather 
than this being a matter for arguments such as mine in §6.1.  Two, benign beliefs would have 
to ‘win out’ over harmful beliefs, and be accepted by moral* communities.  It is conceivable 
that this may not occur – perhaps the gifted orators in a community could unanimously and 
unknowingly defend harmful norms, and thus persuade the other members to accept norms 
which are actually harmful. 
I do not think that this is problematic for revolutionary relativism, however.  For one, neither 
can abolitionists claim that the adoption of their proposal would bring an immediate end to 
morality’s harms.  For all that Garner claims that it would be easy to adopt abolitionism (2007 
pp. 511-512), moral prejudices are deeply ingrained in society.178  Even if nobody ever judged 
anything morally wrong again, it is unlikely that our non-moral attitudes would change quickly 
or without resistance.  For example, even if Hinckfuss is right that traditional moral beliefs 
 
178 Let us not forget that Garner’s fellow abolitionist Joel Marks admits that he has found it nearly 
impossible to suppress his ‘moralist reactions’ despite years of trying to do so (2019 p. 101). 
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about property are harmful, I do not expect that abolitionists would change their non-moral 
attitudes towards property ownership at a stroke.  A sense that others should not take our 
possessions without our permission is simply too embedded in most cultures to be so swiftly 
overturned.  Thus the fact that it might take some time for revolutionary relativist 
communities to evolve their beliefs away from those which might cause harm does not count 
against my proposal in comparison with abolitionism in any significant way. 
Turning to the requirements for the discovery of harm and the acceptance of the ‘right’ norms, 
my response is that I believe we have cause to be optimistic that revolutionary relativist 
communities could meet these requirements.  This is because my proposal makes it explicit 
that the moral* norms a community accepts should always be plausibly beneficial rather than 
harmful.  This in turn requires that communities collectively think very carefully about the 
norms they accept.  It therefore seems natural that the nature of my proposal would lead to 
an increased awareness that moral* beliefs could potentially be harmful, and so metaethically 
aware members of moral* communities would be more open to and more vigilant for 
unintended harms caused by moral* beliefs.  This means that moral* communities would be 
much more likely to identify any harmful beliefs than was the case with traditional moral 
beliefs.  Having done so, and having made appropriate revisions to the accepted norms in light 
of any harms discovered, it seems reasonable to think that the resultant beliefs would be 
harmless – at the very least equally as harmless as the non-moral beliefs we would expect 
abolitionists to hold. 
On the second point, the coordinating benefits of morality, a way of drawing out the issue is 
to consider the so-called free rider problem.179  To describe this idea simply, consider a 
 
179 For an overview of the free rider problem (also known as the n-prisoner’s dilemma), see e.g. Shafer-
Landau 2010, pp. 190-194 & Russell 2013. 
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communal good such as a rail service.180  The rail service provides us with a good which we 
desire - transport facilities.  The continued provision of the service depends on most travellers 
paying for a ticket and thereby contributing towards fuels costs, maintenance etc..  Yet it is 
often possible to get away with not purchasing a ticket, and ‘free riding’.  While, collectively, 
we have an interest in people not free riding in this way (and thus endangering the continued 
availability of transport facilities), individually we each have a prudential reason to exploit the 
service whilst trying to get away with not buying a ticket.  This is because the prudentially 
optimal outcome for each individual is to be able to travel whilst keeping the money they 
could have spent on a ticket.  Yet if everyone acted according to their individual prudential 
reasons, the good would cease to be available. 
So, how do we balance the desirable continued availability of the communal good with the 
apparent prudential reasons for each individual traveller?  One way to do so is by using the 
law to impose punishments on those who try to ride for free.  This goes at least some way 
towards bringing the individual’s prudential reasons into alignment with the collective’s 
reasons, by giving individuals a prudential reason to avoid punishment, and therefore pay for 
their ticket.  And abolitionists can consistently go along with this.  But it may still not be 
enough to dissuade free riders in sufficient numbers to safeguard the rail service’s future.  
After all, policing such laws can be expensive, and lots of people could still successfully ride 
without buying a ticket. 
Traditional morality is arguably beneficial here.  If individuals judge that free riding is morally 
wrong, then by providing a mechanism for the censure of wrongdoers, some degree of 
motivation to do the right thing, and so on, it is easy to believe that morality helps individuals 
to overcome the temptation to free ride, and facilitates a prudentially beneficial coordination 
 
180 Rail services are just one example one might use.  Others could include clean air, water supplies, the 
welfare state, and so on. 
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in ticket buying behaviour.  In the WNP context, of course, moral reasons for action are off 
the table.  But as I argued in the previous chapter, revolutionary relativism can go some way 
to reclaiming these coordinating benefits by explicitly linking moral* judgements to 
motivation, censure and so on.  I do not necessarily wish to claim that revolutionary relativist 
moral* judgements are motivating in exactly the same way as traditional moral judgements.181  
But to any extent that they are motivationally efficacious at all, then to that same extent, 
revolutionary relativist moral* judgements offer coordinating benefits which are unavailable 
to abolitionists.182 
Lastly in this section, I will draw attention to a point which I did not raise in chapter 4 as a 
problem for abolitionists, but which nonetheless counts in favour of revolutionary relativism 
over abolitionism.  Garner is confident that abolitionism would be quite simple to adopt, 
claiming that,  
For amoralists, that is, error theorists who have already come to believe in 
the falsity of all moral judgments, cutting back on moral pronouncements 
will be no more difficult than cutting back on swearing, and not nearly as 
difficult as getting rid of an accent. (2007 p. 511-512, emphasis original)  
But this is far from an uncontested claim.  Nolan et al. believe that abolishing moral thought 
and discourse is likely to be much harder than Garner claims (2005 p. 307), and Olson agrees 
 
181 I will go into somewhat more detail about motivation shortly in §6.5.1. 
182 Hinckfuss or Garner could perhaps respond to me that one of the key harms of traditional morality 
is that it leads to the escalation of conflicts (see e.g. Garner 207 p. 502).  And on my proposal, people 
could still have moral* disagreements and therefore conflicts could escalate.  I do not think this is 
problematic for me, however – I take it that the reason why traditional morality leads exacerbates 
conflicts (according to some abolitionists) is that both sides in conflicts believe they have access to 
some kind of objective truth.  The relativistic nature of revolutionary relativism should help avoid this 
(since both sides would have to agree that there is no objective truth to be had).  And even if it does 
not, escalating conflicts are clearly not prudentially beneficial, and so the mechanisms I have already 
described would lead to alterations in the moral* norms people accept such that the conflicts would 
not escalate (potentially including resolving not to have any moral* rules about the relevant issues and 
instead treat them as abolitionists would). 
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(2014 p. 181).  As I mentioned previously, one of Garner’s fellow abolitionists admits that he 
has found it is exceedingly difficult to suppress his ‘moralist reactions’ (Marks 2019 p. 101).  
And Strawson (1962) and Streumer (2013a) both go so far as to doubt that eliminating moral 
thought and discourse is even psychologically possible.  While I do not wish to digress into 
exploring the limits of moral psychology, suffice it to say that for error theorists who 
sympathise to any extent with Garner’s opponents here, revolutionary relativism should be 
more attractive than abolitionism.  This is because, while I do not propose that we retain moral 
thought and discourse unaltered, revolutionary relativism does preserve much of the 
vocabulary and deliberative methods of traditional morality.  Therefore it would plausibly be 
much more psychologically straightforward to adopt revolutionary relativism than 
abolitionism, and therefore the preferable choice, all other things being equal. 
Taking sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 together, I conclude that revolutionary relativism is a better 
response to the WNP than abolitionism, regardless of whether moralgood or moralbad 
currently obtains.  This is because, as I have shown, abolitionism fails to be of benefit if we are 
in moralgood, and if we are in moralbad, revolutionary relativism can deliver benefits which 
abolitionism cannot.  Thus revolutionary relativism is a better choice for error theorists going 
forwards than abolitionism is.  In the next section, the last of the sections in which I compare 
revolutionary relativism with its competitors, I will discuss revolutionary expressivism. 
6.5.  Revolutionary relativism versus revolutionary expressivism 
In §4.5 I discussed and rejected revolutionary expressivism (hereafter frequently abbreviated 
to RE), principally as proposed by Svoboda (2015).183  Svoboda proposes that, if we accept 
 
183 Note that Svoboda prefers the name revisionary expressivism – see footnote 109 above.  Svoboda’s 
is not the only revolutionary expressivist view I touched upon – a related proposal by Köhler and Ridge 
was set aside because a) it seems to be at odds with moral error theory and WNP responses actually 
defended to date, and b) because despite the authors’ arguments to the contrary, the proposal was 
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error theory, we nonetheless have good prudential reasons to retain apparently moral 
discourse and some kind of moral thought.  For example he claims that moral discourse aids 
in the resolution of disagreements, and that this benefit can be preserved, whilst avoiding 
error, if we adopt revolutionary expressivism after we become error theorists.  Similarly, 
Svoboda claims that traditional morality ‘bolsters one’s commitment to act for certain ends, 
increases one’s self-control, and helps overcome weakness of will’ (2015 p. 20), and that his 
proposal preserves this benefit. 
Specifically, RE consists in using moral language in the post-error theory context to express  
desire-like attitudes, as opposed to beliefs.  Thus, for example, where we previously used a 
sincere utterance of ‘stealing is morally wrong’ to express a belief that there is a moral fact 
about stealing, Svoboda recommends that as error theorists we should henceforth use the 
same utterance to instead express a desire (or a similarly conative attitude such as a hope, 
expectation, demand, preference or plan) that people do not steal. 
I will compare revolutionary relativism and revolutionary expressivism in moralgood and 
moralbad, and show that my proposal wins out in each situation.  In each case I will summarise 
the problems I raised with RE in §4.5, and show why relativism either does not face the 
problem in question, or fares better than expressivism does in the face of the problem.184  This 
will be the last of the ‘head-to-head’ comparisons I will make in this chapter, and I will then 
 
found to be plausibly self-defeating (albeit not necessarily conclusively so).  See §4.5, especially 
footnote 108. 
184 I will assume here that revolutionary expressivists can either solve or avoid the Frege-Geach 
problem.  As I touched upon in §4.5, aspects of revolutionary expressivism may be somewhat 
provisional until a solution is found.  But since this is a very thorny philosophical matter which does not 
confront my own proposal, and since I take the arguments I gave in §4.5 to undermine revolutionary 
expressivism without grasping any of the relevant thorns, I set the matter aside.  Note that 
revolutionary fictionalism may also face something like the Frege-Geach problem, too - Oddie & 
Demetriou argue (2007) that fictionalists of various kinds face a relative of the Frege-Geach problem, 
which they call the acceptance-transfer problem.  For the same reasons, however, I omit further 
discussion of this issue as well. 
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go on to draw together the conclusions reached in this chapter and in the broader scheme of 
my thesis as a whole. 
6.5.1.  Revolutionary relativism vs. revolutionary expressivism in moralgood 
It is not necessarily obvious that Svoboda assumes that we are currently in moralgood.  This 
is because he sidesteps the question by characterising abolitionism as a view primarily 
motivated by epistemic worries about having false beliefs (2015 p. 9).  Since RE does not rely 
on agents having moral beliefs, the suggested epistemological abolitionist worry is supposedly 
defused without appearing to take a position on whether abolitionists are right that 
traditional morality is prudentially harmful.  I do not believe this characterisation of 
abolitionism is adequate (see footnote 151, above).  But setting that aside, I believe that we 
may reasonably infer that Svoboda assumes we are currently in moralgood since he 
recommends RE on the basis of preserving benefits of traditional morality rather than 
avoiding its harms (2015 §5). 
In §4.5 I argued that revolutionary expressivism is incapable of delivering the benefits Svoboda 
claims in the intrapersonal (i.e. motivational) and interpersonal (i.e. coordinative) contexts he 
identifies. Therefore my argument here will consist in taking these contexts in turn, and in 
each case providing a recap of my previous argument, followed by an argument that 
revolutionary relativism is a better response to the WNP in that context. 
i) Intrapersonal context 
In the intrapersonal context, Svoboda argues that traditional morality serves as a bulwark 
against giving in to temptation (2015 §5.2).  This is plausible – according to the view of 
traditional morality typically taken by error theorists, moral norms essentially ‘tell us’ not to 
do immoral things, even if we feel tempted to do them.  Thus if we judge that an action is 
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wrong, this judgement produces (or is otherwise intimately associated with – Svoboda uses 
the term ‘provide’ (2015 p. 20)) a motivation to resist giving in to any temptations we may 
feel to perform that action.  Svoboda claims that RE can preserve this benefit because on RE 
moral judgements, as desire-like attitudes, are inherently motivational.  I objected that 
revolutionary expressivism cannot deliver this benefit, at least not to the extent that Svoboda 
claims. 
To summarise my argument, consider an agent, A, who makes a moral judgement, M.  On 
revolutionary expressivism, we infer from this that A is motivated to act in accordance with 
M, since moral judgements, as desire-like attitudes, are inherently motivational.  Now 
consider what happens when A experiences a temptation, T, to act in contravention of M.  
How does A’s judgement that M affect their response to T?  I argued that a revolutionary 
expressivist understanding of moral judgement can explain what A’s motivations are at the 
point at which they judge that M.  But this says little of use about A’s motivations when they 
then experience T. 
This is because a reasonable way of interpreting T is as some kind of motivation to act.  So an 
expressivist reading of A experiencing T merely posits two contradictory motivations (M and 
T).  It offers no reason to think that the motivation implied by M remains compelling for A 
indefinitely, or that a prior motivation predominates a later one, or that moral judgements 
have any greater degree of motivational efficacy than any other kind of motivation.  Bluntly, 
desire-like attitudes may be motivational, i.e. they have to do with motivation.  But there is 
no clear picture of whether or how they are motivating over time or in competition with 
conflicting motivations.185 
 
185 My argument here contrasts with a related problem raised by others against hermeneutic 
expressivists, and which may apply to Svoboda’s proposal as well – that expressivism is flawed because 
it cannot allow for weakness of will at all.  See e.g. Smith 1998.  I will not pursue this here, however, 
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I do not wish to claim that adopting RE cannot furnish us with any way to resist weakness of 
will at all.  If I disapprove of some action in a ‘relatively fixed’ (Blackburn 1998a, p.68) way, 
but find myself tempted to perform that action, then the motivational component of my 
existing disapproval of the action in question may make me less likely to succumb to 
temptation.  This will be especially likely in a deliberative process where I consider my 
motivations, recall my disapproval, and so on.  I take it that something roughly like this is how 
Svoboda expects instances of weakness of will to work out on RE.  As I wrote in §4.5.2, I believe 
that this falls short of the account of weakness of will available on traditional morality.  For 
example, one could argue that if I am a moral realist and believe that an action remains wrong 
entirely independently of anything to do with my approvals, disapprovals, temptations or any 
other conative attitudes I have, this will have a greater impact on my ability to resist weakness 
of will than the account available on RE allows.  But even granting for the time being that 
adopting RE helps us resist weakness of will equally as well as we did as traditional moralists 
before we accepted error theory, I still believe that revolutionary relativism can do better 
yet.186 
This is because nothing in Svoboda’s proposal involves agents coming to have any new 
motivations (I use ‘motivations’ here as a shorthand for ‘desire-like-attitudes which have an 
inherent motivational component or effect’).  Svoboda proposes that ‘moral judgments 
should be transformed into desire-like attitudes, and moral utterances into expressions of 
such attitudes’ (2015 p. 15).  But he does not recommend that we make different first-order 
moral judgements, or that we should come to have a whole raft of new conative attitudes.  
 
since I prefer to focus on showing how my own objections to Svoboda’s proposal are sufficient to show 
that revolutionary relativism is preferable to revolutionary expressivism. 
186 I leave it to conservationists to take up the argument whether or not morality and RE are equal here.  
This is because conservationists would presumably want to argue that retaining our realist moral beliefs 
as they propose would mean we also retain exactly the same account and degree of anti-akratic benefit 
as is available on traditional morality.  They would therefore potentially have a greater interest than I 
do in arguing that the preserved benefits were greater than the similar yet diminished benefits available 
on RE. 
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He proposes only that we should replace our traditional moral judgements (which must, if 
they can help overcome weakness of will, be linked with motivations) with RE-style moral 
judgements which result in having the same practical motivations which we had as traditional 
moralists.  So it is not part of Svoboda’s theory that our motivations should change, just that 
we should use moral language to express them. 
Revolutionary relativism, on the other hand, via the attitudes I labelled BELIEF and 
ACCEPTANCE, brings in extra factors which bear on agents’ motivations, yet which are not 
necessarily part of moral deliberation on traditional morality as conceived of by error 
theorists, or on RE.  That is to say, adopting my proposal and coming to have moral* beliefs 
makes us think about things and bear things in mind which are not part of the deliberative 
picture on competing WNP responses, or even, necessarily, on traditional morality.  I will offer 
a couple of specific examples to highlight this. 
First, the BELIEF component of my proposal includes as an integral part of moral* judgement 
that agents are participants in communities, participation in which is conditional upon 
accepting and acting in accordance with certain norms.  This makes explicit the potential 
consequences of moral* transgression in terms of censure and ostracism in a way which is not 
necessarily the case for other proposals, or for traditional morality.  These considerations 
must feed into almost any agent’s deliberative process when facing temptation.  Granted, it 
may be open to revolutionary expressivists to claim that community-focused DLAs may be 
involved in moral deliberation if we adopt their proposal, but they do not play any necessary 
role.   
Likewise, moral* judgements necessarily involve the expectation of prudential benefits 
resulting from acting in accordance with the relevant norms.  I argued in §4.5.2 that we cannot 
simply come to have DLAs as we choose, even if those DLAs are in favour of beneficial actions 
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or policies such as eating healthily.  Yet moral* judgements necessarily involve the belief that 
acting in accordance with the relevant norms is prudentially beneficial.  If doing so is not 
beneficial, my proposal includes provision for abandoning prudentially suboptimal moral* 
norms, regardless of the occurrent DLAs agents might have.  Thus it is explicit at the outset 
that adopting my proposal may have consequences as regards our first-order moral/moral* 
beliefs, and that agents may have to reappraise their motivations.   
This means that the explicit link between moral* beliefs and prudentially beneficial 
consequences of acting in accordance with those beliefs may well help moral* judgements 
function as a better bulwark against weakness of will than the equivalent judgements on RE.  
This is because when tempted to act contrary to a moral* judgement, revolutionary relativists 
will be aware that this will most likely be prudentially harmful in comparison with acting 
otherwise.  On the other hand, as I argued in §4.5.2, it is unclear whether our DLAs naturally 
track prudential benefit.  As such it is plausible that revolutionary relativist agents who 
deliberate in the face of a temptation to act immorally* will be motivated by prudential 
considerations which it is not clear will enter into the equivalent deliberative process on RE. 
In these ways, adopting my proposal involves alterations in the factors which bear on our 
motivations.  And those alterations arguably put agents who adopt my proposal in a better 
position to resist akrasia than agents who adopt RE.  Even if all of this is wide of the mark, my 
proposal offers an account of akrasia which is very close to that available on traditional 
morality – beliefs about certain actions being right or wrong in a substantive sense, reactive 
attitudes towards agents who act contrary to those beliefs, links between judgements and 
practical motivations and so on.  As such, my proposal is on at least an equal footing with RE 
as regards weakness of will even if we grant – as I do not believe we necessarily must – that 
RE is on a par with traditional morality on this issue.  But as I have argued, I believe 
 206 
revolutionary relativism can go further than this, and is actually of greater benefit in this 
respect than Svoboda’s proposal.  
ii) Interpersonal context 
In the interpersonal context, Svoboda claims that RE ‘preserves [traditional morality’s] useful 
feature of accounting for normative and evaluative disagreement, because it can track these 
as attitudinal divergences’ (2015 p. 22).187  This feature of traditional morality is useful 
because it facilitates prudentially beneficial coordination among agents.  When we have moral 
disagreements, if we have an account of what we disagree about, and what the disagreement 
consists in, then we are more likely to be able to solve our disagreement than we would be if 
we had no such account.  Again, I objected that RE cannot deliver the benefits Svoboda claims.  
Or more accurately, I argued in §4.5.2 that RE can offer an account of moral disagreement, 
but it can do so only in a way which falls short of delivering the same benefits as traditional 
morality, and the benefits available on my proposal. 
To summarise, I argued that the traditional model of moral disagreement is useful because it 
analyses moral disagreements as disagreements in beliefs about matters of fact.  This is useful 
at least in part because in disagreements in beliefs about matters of fact, if the facts of the 
matter can be established, then in principle the disagreement can be resolved – any party 
whose beliefs do not match the facts must, according to standard accounts of beliefs, either 
change their beliefs or be irrational.  And when disagreements are resolved, it seems likely 
 
187 Svoboda also discusses RE’s ability to allow ‘for a kind of moral reasoning among various parties’ 
(2015 p. 21).  I set this feature of his proposal aside since his argument in defence of this claim leads 
directly into the Frege-Geach problem.  As I mentioned in §4.5, I take my own case against Svoboda’s 
proposal to be sufficiently strong to support my claim that revolutionary relativism is the preferable 
response to the WNP without sailing into such stormy philosophical waters. 
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that the parties will be better able and more likely to coordinate their behaviour (or at least 
cease to argue and hinder one another). 
This remains so even if it is metaethically controversial whether we can actually know what 
the moral facts are.  Error theorists are perhaps likely to have some sympathy with a view of 
traditional morality according to which we cannot come to know moral facts – see e.g. Mackie 
1977, p. 38-39 & Olson 2014 §5.2.  But in typical cases of moral disagreement, so long as the 
speakers can satisfy themselves that they have agreed at least approximately on what the 
moral facts are and thereby resolve their dispute, then morality has played a useful 
coordinative role, regardless of whether or not any genuine moral facts have been 
established.  The vast majority of moral discourse is between people who have little 
metaethical training, yet still competently use moral discourse in a way which is consistent 
with there being knowable moral facts, and which therefore seems to aid coordination. 
My objection to Svoboda’s proposal was that it accounts for moral disagreement as 
disagreement in attitude rather than as disagreement about matters of fact, and therefore 
cannot offer the same coordinative benefit as traditional morality.  The upshot of this is that 
rather than retaining the relevant feature of traditional morality, revolutionary expressivism 
involves replacing the conventional model of moral disagreement with a different model, 
which it is less certain can yield the instrumental benefit of disagreement resolution which 
Svoboda claims it can.  I did not therefore conclude that revolutionary expressivism yields no 
relevant kind of benefit, but that it is plausibly of less benefit than Svoboda advertises. 
In contrast, on revolutionary relativism disagreement must be approached in two distinct 
ways.  This is because we must distinguish disagreements between parties who are members 
of the same moral* community from disagreements between parties who are members of 
different moral* communities.  When moral* disagreement occurs between members of the 
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same moral* community, revolutionary relativism offers an account of moral* disagreement 
which is substantially similar to traditional morality.  This is because revolutionary relativists 
would view moral* judgements as beliefs about the normative standards the community 
accepts.  And on revolutionary relativism, there would be an empirical, descriptive fact of the 
matter about which standards are accepted by the community as a whole.   
While in real-world situations it may not be instantly and uncontroversially clear to all parties 
what the relevant facts are, it would in principle be possible to determine them.188  This is 
much the same as the way in which traditional moral realists can disagree about the moral 
facts, but there is always in principle a matter of moral fact which can be determined. Indeed 
given the explicit manner in which revolutionary relativist moral* facts would be established, 
we might expect the moral* facts to be even clearer to disputants on revolutionary relativism 
than traditional moral facts are.  If so, revolutionary relativism could actually improve upon 
the usefulness of traditional morality’s ability to account for moral disagreement. 
This picture is complicated somewhat by the availability on revolutionary relativism of a new 
locus of disagreement in comparison with traditional morality, namely disagreement about 
which moral* standards the community should accept.  For (most) moral realists, there is no 
question about what the moral facts should be, merely about what the moral facts are.  On 
my proposal, sincere moral* judgements implicate attitudes concerning which norms are 
plausibly most prudentially beneficial to accept, and therefore new questions are raised (see 
§5.3.4).  I do not believe that this is a serious issue for revolutionary relativism, because this 
 
188 This may not be as simple as having a straw poll, but it can in principle be done.  An analogy might 
be drawn to determining national attitudes towards contentious political issues – here, too, it would 
be simplistic to suggest that direct plebiscitary democracy is the only way to decide what is in the 
nation’s interests, yet government is nonetheless possible.  It should also be noted that outside of 
certain religious communities, even the staunchest of traditional moral realists can seldom point to a 
single, conclusively authoritative source for moral facts, and so revolutionary relativism is not 
necessarily any more vague on this point than the traditional morality we are trying to retain beneficial 
features of. 
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is still an empirical matter which is in principle soluble, even if this might be tricky in practise.  
As I discussed in §6.2 & §6.3, revolutionary relativism offers sufficient flexibility that finding 
the optimal moral* standards can be a gradual, iterative empirical process.   
Perhaps more significantly in the present context, however, the same issue confronts 
revolutionary expressivists, but may be harder for them to solve.  This is because Svoboda 
offers no guidance as to which desire-like attitudes revolutionary expressivists should have.  It 
may seem easy for expressivists to respond to this by suggesting that what agents desire and 
care most about (i.e. their DLAs) will naturally track prudentially beneficial outcomes.  But this 
cannot be relied upon – there are myriad examples of people who are passionately in favour 
of measures and practices which are demonstrably against their prudential interests.189  It 
seems to me that one of two things must follow from this.  Either 1) RE is neutral on the DLAs 
agents should have, in which case revolutionary relativism is preferable to RE on prudential 
grounds because it pushes agents towards prudentially beneficial outcomes while RE does 
not.  Or 2) the desire-like attitudes of revolutionary expressivists should somehow track 
prudentially beneficial outcomes, in which case RE is no better off than revolutionary 
relativism on this matter, yet owes us an account of desire-voluntarism (i.e. how we can 
choose to have certain desires and not others) which Svoboda does not provide.190 
When moral* disagreements arise between members of different moral* communities, things 
become somewhat more complicated.  But, again, I do not think this is problematic for 
 
189 Comparatively uncontroversial examples (i.e. without touching upon matters such as Brexit voting 
patterns in heavily EU-subsidised areas of the UK!) include anyone in favour of the availability of junk 
food, pro-smoking groups, ‘anti-vaxxers’ and those who engage in various forms of self-destructive 
behaviour involving substance abuse or self-harm. 
190 What is required here is some kind of account of why agents’ desire-like attitudes actually would 
track prudential benefit.  It may well be that agents’ lives will plausibly turn out better if those agents 
orient their desires in one way rather than another, and thus agents have a prudential reason to adopt 
desire-like attitudes which track prudential benefits.  But this does not mean that agents will desire 
those things.  Revolutionary expressivists may or may not be able to provide such an account.  But 
either way, such a potentially complicated argument would be better coming from revolutionary 
expressivists themselves than being assumed, possibly incorrectly, by others. 
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revolutionary relativism.  As we saw in chapter 5, I propose that we interpret moral* 
judgements primarily as beliefs about the moral* norms accepted by our moral* community, 
but that we also interpret sincere moral* judgements as implicating other attitudes as well.  
This means that when we encounter others who are not members of the same moral* 
community as us, beliefs about what our moral* community accepts may be considered 
irrelevant.  But we may still disagree with members of other moral* communities in virtue of 
holding conflicting attitudes among the secondary attitudes implicated by our moral* 
judgements.  This means that even if the factual model of disagreement available on 
revolutionary relativism fails when speakers are from radically different moral* communities, 
the model of disagreement in attitude which is available on RE is also available on my 
proposal.  Plus it may be possible over the course of the disagreement for the speakers to 
become part of the same moral* community, and so return to the factual model after all.191 
I conclude that revolutionary relativism is preferable to revolutionary expressivism in 
moralgood both in the intrapersonal context and, where disagreements arise between 
members of the same moral* community, in the interpersonal context.  In the interpersonal 
context where disagreements arise between members of different moral* communities, 
revolutionary relativism can draw on the same resources as RE, and may be able to improve 
upon them.  Therefore, revolutionary relativism is the preferable WNP response overall in 
moralgood.  I will now turn to the comparison between RE and revolutionary relativism in 
moralbad. 
 
191 I will have much more to say about disagreement in the next chapter, since it is a classic source of 
problems for hermeneutic forms of relativism, and so I will need to defend my proposal against such 
problems.  Therefore, while I take the argument here to be clear, if the reader requires more detail on 
this matter, for the sake of avoiding repetition I beg their indulgence until §7.1. 
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6.5.2.  Revolutionary relativism vs. revolutionary expressivism in moralbad 
If moralbad obtains, then the moral beliefs most people currently have actually led them to 
act in prudentially harmful ways (see §6.1, above).  Yet it seems reasonable to assume that if 
we became revolutionary expressivists, our first-order moral judgements would align with our 
prior moral beliefs, at least initially.  The term ‘revolutionary’ as I am using it here relates to a 
metaethical revolution, and Svoboda’s proposal is purely about how we interpret moral 
thought and discourse - he makes no mention of a wholesale revolution or even any significant 
change in our first-order moral judgements.192  Therefore if we are to avoid harm in moralbad, 
the question expressivists must answer is this: what scope does RE allow for our moral 
judgements to change such that they no longer lead to harm? 
As was the case with revolutionary fictionalism in moralbad, my argument here turns on 
flexibility, though it is a somewhat different flexibility argument to the one which I deployed 
in §6.3.2.  My argument here comes in the form of a dilemma related to what is sometimes 
called the moral attitude problem.193  In the present context, the dilemma concerns the nature 
of the desire-like attitudes which constitute moral judgements on RE.  Recalling Blackburn 
(1998b p. 196), are these desire-like attitudes akin to ‘mere’ preferences, and subject to 
change as we see fit?  Or is there nothing ‘mere’ about the desire-like attitudes in question, 
are they somehow resistant to change on a whim – and if so, why and how?  This creates a 
dilemma for revolutionary expressivists: the latter possibility, which seems preferable for 
expressivists in general, makes RE less capable of avoiding harm in moralbad than 
 
192 Svoboda does suggest (2015 p. 16-17) that revolutionary expressivists may wish or need to cut back 
on making apparently truth-predicating moral pronouncements, particularly to avoid misleading 
others.  But at the moment, we are interested only in how to best understand what revolutionary 
expressivists actually would say, not what they may not wish to say. 
193 For an excellent explanation and investigation of the moral attitude problem, see Miller 2013.  Miller 
discusses the problem at various points, beginning with §3.6, p. 39. 
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revolutionary relativism.  And the former possibility makes RE a poor response to the WNP 
overall.  Either way, revolutionary relativism is preferable to RE in moralbad. 
I will formulate my argument as simply as possible, while noting that the philosophical terrain 
here is significantly complex, and that I will be glossing over important issues in order to put 
my case in the kind of terms that the present context requires.  It is a commitment of typical 
error theorists that traditional moral thought and discourse (unsuccessfully) aim at capturing 
objective facts.  As such, moral judgements, when we think them true, have a compelling 
degree of apparent authority.  By contrast, one might worry that non-cognitive attitudes such 
as desires or preferences are somehow weaker.  If the wrongness of torture is somehow part 
of the fabric of objective reality, then it seems to follow that there is a stringent requirement 
that agents do not torture.  Whereas if an agent who says ‘torture is wrong’ is simply 
expressing a desire, then the implied requirement to refrain from torture may seem no more 
stringent than the requirement to refrain from serving sprouts to a dinner guest who dislikes 
the taste of sprouts.  
Now, if the desire-like attitudes which constitute moral judgements on RE were on a par with 
our gustatory attitudes concerning sprouts, this would bode well for RE in terms of flexibility 
in moralbad.  In order to avoid harm in moralbad, we could expect that agents would change 
their attitudes if it brought about an overall benefit in much the same way that the nutritional 
content of certain foods can motivate us to eat them even if we are not fond of the taste.  
Indeed it may be that once we became habituated to the change in attitudes, the new 
attitudes would become genuine preferences independent of any benefits they brought.  So 
long as we care about our wellbeing in a sufficiently stable and powerful way, we could acquire 
the moral taste, as it were.   
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This theoretical benefit would, however, come at the cost of making RE a deeply flawed 
response to the WNP.  For in order to be of any benefit in the post-error-theory context, it 
seems that moral judgements must imply a level of commitment greater than half-hearted 
gustatory preferences.  Otherwise moral judgements would fail to respect the Seriousness 
Constraint I discussed in §5.1, and thus fail to offer the benefits Svoboda claims – even aside 
from any arguments I have offered on the matter, they would surely lack sufficient 
motivational import to bolster us against giving in to weakness of will.  And while such 
judgements could be the basis of genuine disagreement in attitude, it seems unlikely that 
anyone would care very much whether such disagreements were ever solved. 
This is why, despite little on this matter appearing in Svoboda’s paper, expressivists more 
generally have been careful to explain that the non-cognitive attitudes which constitute moral 
judgements according to their theories are much more significant than ‘simple or ‘mere’ 
desires or preferences.194  Blackburn vividly describes non-cognitive attitudes as sometimes 
immensely powerful aspects of our characters and motivations, asking ‘If your attitude to me 
is one of contempt and disdain, or if you desire me dead, am I supposed to console myself by 
reflecting that these are merely attitudes and desires?’ (1998b p. 197).  Interpreting moral 
judgements as attitudes with the same level of impact and urgency as the desire to stay alive 
or the hope to remain free rather than be sold into slavery puts those judgements once again 
at the centre of the normative stage.  Understood in this way, moral judgements are not the 
same as beliefs about objective moral facts, but they are arguably no less compelling.  As such, 
 
194 It must be observed that Svoboda does not invoke, as I shortly will, Tiberius’ notion of resilience, 
Blackburn’s arguments from 1998, or any other argument along similar lines. However, given Svoboda’s 
claim that ‘Different versions of [revolutionary] expressivism are available, insofar as there are different 
versions of [hermeneutic] expressivism’ (2015 p. 15) it is reasonable in the present context to present 
a case which draws from well developed hermeneutic expressivist accounts on Svoboda’s behalf, at 
least until such a time as Svoboda or another revolutionary expressivist comes forward with their own 
view. 
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moral judgements on this account do seem potentially capable of playing the roles Svoboda 
describes, even if I disagree that they can successfully do so. 
However, the theoretical benefit of viewing the non-cognitive attitudes which comprise moral 
judgements on RE in such powerful terms threatens to come at the cost of flexibility.  For few 
people would plausibly be willing or able to change such deeply committed attitudes in order 
to avoid anything less than obviously catastrophic harms.  And the harms of moralbad, while 
potentially serious and certainly best avoided, likely fall short of this at least most of the time 
– even over centuries of traditional morality, history has not been exclusively and literally the 
story of bellum omnium contra omnes. 
This is part of the reasoning behind a ‘third way’, Valerie Tiberius’ notion of resilience. Tiberius 
argues (2012) that in order for our normative judgements, which she understands in 
expressivist terms, to be able to form a proper basis for our plans and for ‘good decisions’, 
those judgements must be ‘stable in the light of criticism and new experiences’.  But this does 
not mean that one’s moral judgements should be so stable that they cannot be altered.  
Rather, Tiberius advocates a degree of open-mindedness towards normative judgements 
which ‘is likely to occupy the mean between the vices of pig-headedness and dithering 
uncertainty’ (2012 p. 19). 
If we construct a form of RE which includes something like Tiberius’ view, this may seem to 
allow the degree of flexibility RE needs to be able to avoid harm in moralbad, while offering 
sufficient stability in moral judgements that they are not ‘mere’ desires.  Provided, that is, that 
we grant that most agents, most of the time would take the avoidance of moralbad’s harms 
seriously enough to reconsider their moral attitudes.  I think we should be willing to grant that 
they would, at least as a possibility.  Yet I nonetheless believe that revolutionary relativism is 
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preferable to revolutionary expressivism in moralbad even if the latter is elaborated upon by 
including something like Tiberius’ view. 
The reason I make this claim is that even if we accept Tiberius’ view, it seems that changes in 
moral judgements must be subject to considerable inertia.  It is natural for an expressivist 
view to be this way, in order to avoid any suggestion of ‘mereness’, as noted above.  As 
Tiberius herself puts it, ‘[o]pen-mindedness will, therefore, by constrained by other virtues 
such as proper conviction’ (2012 p. 19).  This means that moral judgements, even on Tiberius’ 
view, will be resistant to change.  Exactly how resistant to change normative judgements 
would be is subject to debate, but empirical examples of attitudes which persist among 
otherwise reasonable people even in the face of compelling contradictory evidence are not 
difficult to find.195  It seems clear, therefore, that changes in agents’ moral judgements would 
be slow, sometimes resistant to evidence, and require considerable persuasion.  The 
expressivist might respond by saying that we do not persist in our desire to eat some 
sweetmeat if we find out that it is poisonous.  But expressivists cannot have it both ways – if 
an analogy to gustatory desires gives insufficient weight to moral judgements as I discussed 
above, then moral judgements must be resistant to change commensurately with the 
considerable depth of commitment with which they are made. 
In contrast, revolutionary relativism has a much more direct route to the re-evaluation of 
accepted norms, if it should be discovered that those norms cause harm, as I laid out in §6.2.2.  
As I conceded in that section, the members of a community of revolutionary relativists would 
likely not change the norms they accept overnight.  There is a degree of what could be called 
inertia here as well.  But in essence, revolutionary relativism tells us that if we find that the 
 
195 One obvious example would be climate change, where those who do not endorse the view that 
climate change is caused by human activity – and there are many who do not - are opposed virtually 
unanimously by climate change scientists (see e.g. Cook et al. 2016). 
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norms we accept cause harm, then we must reconsider, cease to accept those norms, and 
replace them with norms which do not cause harm.  This is an imperative matter, built directly 
into the way my proposal works.  Whereas the best revolutionary expressivists can tell us, 
even with significant charitable embroidery, is that some revolutionary expressivists might 
argue that there are good reasons why we should consider changing our attitudes, provided 
that we subjectively wish to avoid harm.  Of the two proposals, therefore, both can respond 
to moralbad to some extent.  But when it comes to responding to the realisation that 
moralbad obtains, and then avoiding the harms implied by such a situation, I believe it is quite 
clear that revolutionary relativism is by far the better placed. 
Overall, then, revolutionary expressivism as presented to date has little to offer in moralbad, 
and requires significant supplementation from other (hermeneutic) expressivist views.  And 
even when supplemented appropriately, RE still seems to fall short of being able to offer the 
same benefits as revolutionary relativism.  Taken alongside the arguments in §6.5.1, I 
conclude that revolutionary relativism is preferable to revolutionary expressivism as a 
response to the ‘what now?’ problem.  This concludes the last of my comparisons between 
revolutionary relativism and competing WNP responses, and I will now move on to the 
concluding section of this chapter. 
6.6.  Conclusion 
In terms of the overall structure of my positive thesis, in chapter 4 I laid out the ‘what now?’ 
problem, and argued that it necessarily confronts all moral error theorists.  I then went on to 
explain how philosophers have sought to respond to this problem to date, and in each case 
argued that the response given was inadequate.  In chapter 5 I outlined my own new response 
to the ‘what now?’ problem, revolutionary relativism.  In the current chapter, I presented a 
dominance argument to the effect that revolutionary relativism is preferable to all other 
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responses to the ‘what now?’ problem.  To date, respondents to the WNP have given 
insufficient weight to the challenge represented by abolitionism: what should we do if 
traditional morality leads to harm?  Any response to the WNP must include a consideration of 
how the view would cope with the realisation that traditional morality is indeed harmful.  
Taking this into account, I compared each competing proposal with revolutionary relativism.  
In each case, I showed why revolutionary relativism was the preferable response to the WNP.  
Taking all of the sections of this chapter together, I conclude that revolutionary relativism is 
the best response to the WNP offered to date because it offers error theorists the best chance 
to secure the best prudential outcomes in response to the challenges presented by the WNP.  
If we accept the truth of moral error theory, the way forward which is supported by the best 
prudential reasons is to adopt revolutionary relativism. 
This concludes my positive case for revolutionary relativism.  In the next chapter I will defend 
my proposal against two kinds of criticism.  First, I will defend it against some of the most 
important objections which confront all relevant forms of moral relativism, regardless of 
whether they are hermeneutic or post-error-theory views.  Second, I will defend my proposal 
against key criticisms which apply specifically to my own post-error-theory formulation of 
moral relativism.  Following this, I will present the conclusion of my thesis as a whole.  

 219 
Chapter 7.  Problems and Counterarguments 
In this chapter, I will discuss a number of potential problems my proposal faces, and argue 
that they cannot derail my response to the ‘what now?’ problem.  In the first part of the 
chapter in sections 7.1 and 7.2, these will be problems which standardly confront most or all 
variants of metaethical relativism.  Naturally, readers with any knowledge of metaethical 
relativism will be concerned to know whether my proposal can cope with these objections.  
And more general readers will likely also find these problems and my attempts to deal with 
them useful in understanding the material and, hopefully, interesting.  In the second part of 
the chapter in sections 7.3 and 7.4, I will anticipate the most problematic objections I can 
foresee which opponents might raise against my proposal specifically, even if they may not 
typically be raised as objections to other forms of relativism. 
My aim in this chapter is to defend my proposal against the principal and most likely criticisms 
which might be made.  This task, of course, can never be entirely completed.  There is not 
sufficient space in a thesis such as this to consider every possible extant objection, and further 
objections which have not yet been formulated may always crop up in the future.  But I will 
defend my proposal against the most salient and strongest objections in the available 
literature, and against the strongest objections I anticipate that others could raise. 
Of the near-universal objections to hermeneutic moral relativism, several stand out as 
particularly troublesome.  The most important of these is disagreement – according to some 
opponents, moral relativism is deeply flawed because it makes genuine moral disagreement 
impossible.  I discuss this objection in §7.1.  Then in §7.2, I will discuss several more-or-less 
related issues around moral epistemology, involving moral infallibility, moral dissidence and 
arbitrariness. 
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In the second part of this chapter, I will turn to objections which confront revolutionary 
relativism specifically.  In §7.3, I will focus on what I call the Rational Choice Challenge, which 
concerns which moral* code(s) it would be rational for revolutionary relativist communities 
to adopt.  This objection recalls aspects of the ‘which morals?’ issue I raised in earlier chapters 
when discussing revolutionary fictionalism in §4.4.4 (and which I also touched upon in §4.5.3), 
but is formulated in a way which specifically challenges my proposal.  And in §7.4 I will discuss 
a problem which I foreshadowed in §4.4.3 concerning implementation – even if revolutionary 
relativism is fine on a theoretical level, it could be argued that my proposal would be so 
difficult and costly to implement that it would be impractical ever to do so. 
This will complete my thesis.  This chapter will then be followed by a final concluding chapter, 
in which I will draw together the ground covered in this project as a whole. 
7.1.  Disagreement 
Hermeneutic forms of metaethical relativism (e.g. Harman 1975, Wong 1984, Dreier 1990) 
have been thought for a century or more to face a potentially fatal objection (see e.g. Moore 
1922 pp. 333-334, cf. Dreier 2009, Finlay 2017).  This objection centres around disagreement.  
Consider the following conversation, which I will call DISAGREEMENT: 196 
Vladimir: It is wrong to torture people. 
Estragon: No, it is not wrong to torture people. 
A slightly stilted quality (for the sake of clarity) aside, we have the strong intuition that so long 
as they are being sincere, Estragon and Vladimir disagree.  And given the presence of the word 
‘no’, Estragon himself clearly thinks he is disagreeing.  Yet it is objected that relativist views 
 
196 I will use ‘wrong’ here just as an example.  The problem and the analysis which follows also apply, 
mutatis mutandis, to other moral terms such as good, permissible and so on. 
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seem unable to account for this disagreement.  In order to show why, and how revolutionary 
relativism can avoid this objection, I will approach the issue in three stages.  First, I will give a 
brief outline of what the objection consists in when aimed at hermeneutic forms of relativism.  
Second, I will describe the ‘building blocks’ of my argument.  And finally I will draw these 
blocks together to show how my proposal can deal with disagreement. 
7.1.1.  What the disagreement problem is 
Roughly speaking, traditional relativist views analyse the meaning of ‘wrong’ in moral claims 
as relativising the content of the claim to the moral code or system - i.e. the set of moral 
principles - accepted by either the speaker themselves (in the case of speaker relativism, a.k.a. 
indexical relativism or subjectivism) or by the speaker’s moral community (in the case of 
‘speaker’s group’ relativism, hereafter simply group relativism).197  Thus when Vladimir claims 
that torture is wrong, relativists argue that what he means is that torture is forbidden by the 
moral code he or his community accepts.  Likewise, when Estragon replies that torture is not 
wrong, relativists would have it that what he means is that torture is not forbidden by the 
moral code he or his community accepts.  In other words, according to relativists, despite their 
apparent disagreement, Vladimir and Estragon’s apparently contradictory claims could both 
be true at the same time.  
The problem is especially acute for forms of speaker relativism. On speaker relativism, 
speakers asserting apparently contradictory moral claims are each merely reporting 
something about themselves: Vladimir accepts one moral principle regarding torture, and 
Estragon accepts another.  Unless there is some extent to which their claims are mutually 
 
197 I borrow the term ‘speaker’s group relativism’ from Dreier (1990 p. 21), as it captures the required 
meaning without incurring complicating baggage which alternatives such as ‘cultural relativism’ might.  
Despite its appropriateness, however, the term is slightly awkward, and so I will abbreviate it as 
indicated in the text from here on. 
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contradictory, this is no more a case of disagreement than Vladimir claiming that his own car 
is red and Estragon replying that his own car is blue.  Rather than disagreeing, the pair are 
simply talking past each other.   
Group relativist views have an advantage over speaker relativism here, because if Vladimir 
and Estragon are members of the same moral community, then they are indeed disagreeing 
about a matter of natural fact – namely, whether their shared community’s moral code forbids 
torture.  So at least in these cases, where the speakers belong to the same moral community, 
group forms of relativism can accommodate disagreement in a way which speaker relativism 
cannot.  This being the case, and because revolutionary relativism is a kind of group relativism 
(even though I am still discussing hermeneutic views at this stage), I will henceforth set 
speaker relativism aside. 
This does not mean that group-focussed forms of relativism are off the hook, however.  For if 
in the example Vladimir and Estragon are members of different moral communities, then their 
respective uses of the word wrong simply assert non-mutually-contradictory claims about 
their respective moral communities - once again they fail to disagree and instead talk past one 
another. One way of illustrating this is to consider the following, slightly altered version of the 
conversation:198 
Vladimir:  It is wrong to torture people 
Estragon:  When you say that, what you say is true.  However it is not wrong to 
torture people. 
The disagreement objection points out that on relativism, Estragon’s response here is correct.  
Yet it is nonsensical. 
 
198 This is drawn from Björnsson & Finlay 2010, p. 19. 
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This matters for several reasons.  Most conspicuously, we are left with a phenomenon, moral 
disagreement, which definitely does seem to be part of moral thought and discourse on the 
one hand, and on the other hand a hermeneutic theory of moral thought and discourse which 
cannot account for that phenomenon.  More pressingly for my purposes, it is important to 
note that having some way to account for moral disagreement is almost certainly very useful.  
Where people disagree about matters as important as e.g. torture, it is highly plausible that 
having a way to understand what is happening when they disagree will substantially increase 
the chances of their reaching an understanding and possibly agreement.  This means that 
accounting for moral disagreement will help WNP responses deliver coordination among 
agents – one of the key putative prudential benefits of traditional morality which I am seeking 
to retain with revolutionary relativism.  Indeed, even if my proposal could not account for 
disagreement, but adopting the proposal nonetheless improved cooperation between agents 
anyway, this would be a benefit.  Finally there is the fact that moral disagreement is very 
psychologically familiar.  One of my aims is to make moral* thought and discourse similar in 
use (albeit not in theory) to their moral counterparts, and so make the adoption and use of 
my proposal less psychologically challenging.  Thus I have a vested interest in showing that 
revolutionary relativism can account for disagreement in a satisfying and intuitive way. 
7.1.2.  Coping with disagreement: Groundwork 
I will begin my argument that revolutionary relativism can account for disagreement by 
drawing attention to a number of familiar arguments and phenomena.  In simple terms, I will 
present my building blocks, and then go on to use them to construct my argument.  Before 
doing this I should point out that there are a number of ways in which others have sought to 
respond to the disagreement problem on behalf of relativism, especially in recent years.199  
 
199 See e.g. Dreier 2009, Björnsson & Finlay 2010, Finlay 2017, Khoo & Knobe 2018, Suikkanen 2019. 
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My own response is somewhat different because it makes use of features of the WNP context 
which may be unavailable to hermeneutic metaethicists.  But this does not mean that I am 
taking a position for or against any of those other views.200  Rather, I believe that the specific 
features of revolutionary relativism allow me to account for disagreement without for the 
most part getting involved in the debates active in the hermeneutic literature. 
That being noted, I will begin to build my own argument.  I will start with several observations 
and principles which may seem unrelated at first, but which will be brought together as we 
progress.  The first of the ‘ingredients’ for my account of disagreement is the pair of Gricean 
maxims of quantity.  In order to make what we say ‘conversationally suitable’, Grice urged 
that we should, and indeed do, respect two maxims of quantity (1975 pp. 45-46): 
i) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the purpose of the 
exchange). 
ii) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
Grice’s view is not necessarily universally accepted.  But it is so hugely influential and near-
enough ubiquitous in the relevant literature that I am content to treat these maxims as guiding 
principles here. 
It is important to note that despite their prescriptive formulation, Grice’s maxims are 
analytical, not prescriptive – they are not primarily instructions for how to make suitable 
contributions to conversations (though they may also be read as such).  Rather, Grice analyses 
conversations as  ‘cooperative efforts’ (1975 p. 45), and presents his maxims, parts of an 
 
200 There are three main varieties.  The first two, ‘disagreement in attitude’, exemplified in Björnsson & 
Finlay 2010, and the ‘metalinguistic’ view, in e.g. Khoo & Knobe 2018, are well summarised and 
discussed in Finlay 2017.  The third, the ‘proposition cloud proposal’ is very recent, and is set out in 
Suikkanen (2019). 
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overall ‘cooperative principle’, as norms which we have internalised and to which we all more-
or-less adhere.  This, Grice argues, facilitates the cooperation required for conversations to 
be intelligible and fruitful.  That is to say, we already do, as a matter of course and even if we 
are not consciously aware of it, adhere to Grice’s maxims both in formulating our 
contributions to conversations and in interpreting the contributions of others.  
Accordingly, we can put together a story about what happens in conversations which include 
remarks which do not, at least initially, appear to satisfy Grice’s norms.  When an interlocutor 
utters a sentence, we will typically initially expect to take it at face value.  But if that sentence 
appears to violate one or more Gricean maxims, and so seems an inappropriate contribution 
to the conversation, we will not immediately conclude that the speaker has violated the 
Gricean maxims.  Rather, we will typically charitably assume that what our interlocutor said 
would be an appropriate contribution to the conversation if it were looked at differently, and 
so seek to reinterpret their remark appropriately.  Thus if someone says something to us which 
appears to be insufficiently informative, given the context of the conversation, we will 
typically and automatically question whether the face value meaning of what the person said 
was really what they intended to convey, and seek further implied meaning in their remarks 
which would respect the Gricean maxim of quantity.  For example (drawing on Grice 1975 p. 
52), a job reference which mentions a candidate’s punctuality but which provides no useful 
information about the candidate’s suitability for the job in question will typically be taken to 
tacitly imply that the candidate is unsuitable for the role – hence the phrase ‘damning with 
faint praise’.  Only if no such intelligible conversational implicature is found do we typically 
conclude that the person’s utterance really did violate Grice’s maxim, i.e. that it was an 
inappropriate contribution to the conversation. 
A final note on this ingredient of my argument is that this Gricean story does not have to be 
infallible.  Perhaps sometimes we do simply jump to the conclusion that speakers are idiots or 
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nervous or otherwise failing to make suitable contributions to conversations by Grice’s 
standards.  We may not be as unfailingly charitable as the story I have described suggests.  
This is not a problem for me.  First, if we leap to judgement like this, we stand to miss 
important parts of what speakers are trying to communicate, so there is pressure to resist the 
temptation to form snap judgements.  Second, even if the course of events is not guaranteed 
to follow the above story every single time, the familiarity of the process described shows that 
we clearly do act this way often, smoothly, and even without noticing that we are doing so.  
And finally, remember that my argument in this section is in response to the objection that 
relativist theories are systematically incapable of accounting for disagreement at a conceptual 
level.  So if I can successfully argue that my invocation of Grice helps revolutionary relativism 
account for moral* disagreement at all then I am already ahead of the objection.  That Grice’s 
arguments are in fact widely accepted and clearly concern near-ubiquitous features of 
discourse just puts me further ahead. 
The second building block of my argument is the observation that the utterance of an 
apparently descriptive sentence can have both illocutionary and perlocutionary dimensions 
(i.e. such sentences can be used both to assert that something is the case and to seek to affect 
an audience).201  To capture the sense of this which I will draw on here, I will use the term 
expectation.  If a speaker utters an apparently descriptive sentence under the expectation 
that her audience will agree, this may admit of both a reading according to which she 
anticipates that some fact about her audience’s cognitive attitudes obtains, and also of a 
reading according to which she encourages her audience to agree with her.  Both aspects can 
be part of the communicative intention of the speaker.  Far from being a theoretical deus ex 
machina, this is a commonplace and familiar phenomenon.  For instance, consider a politician 
 
201 This point draws on Stevenson (1963 p. 23-24).  The example Stevenson uses is that of a mother 
who, in saying to her children ‘we all like to be neat’, rather than (or as well as) stating a descriptive 
matter of fact, tries to encourage her children to be neat.  My example here is somewhat different, but 
is nonetheless inspired by a generalised reading of Stevenson’s point.   
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who says ‘We are patriotic people’.  When a politician utters this sentence under the 
expectation that her audience will agree, it does not seem controversial that she both asserts 
a proposition about herself and her audience and seeks to arouse patriotic sentiments in that 
audience.202  More would need to be said about this notion of expectation to describe it fully 
(for example, whether the apparently exhortative/suggestive dimension is actually a 
prediction predicated on psychological suggestibility), but I think the meaning I have in mind 
is intuitively sufficiently graspable for present purposes. 
The third building block of my argument is to highlight that individuals are seldom if ever 
members of only one community, and this includes moral communities.203  This is significant 
for group forms of relativism because the truth values and/or contents of moral claims are 
fixed by what an agent’s moral community accepts.  Not all moral communities will accept the 
same moral rules, and it may even be that different moral communities in which a given agent 
participates accept mutually contradictory moral rules.204 
It would be possible for me to simply stipulate that on revolutionary relativism, individuals 
may participate in only one moral* community.  But this would be extremely ad hoc, and 
would not sit with the requirement that where possible, moral* thought and discourse on 
revolutionary relativism should map closely on to their traditional moral counterparts. 
 
202 At the time of writing, a particularly prominent example in recent political discourse in the UK is 
describing matters of policy (which by their nature are often highly contested and very much arguable, 
depending on one’s political leanings) as ‘the right thing to do’, thereby seeking to convince the listener 
that the rightness of the action in question is beyond question and should be accepted as fact. 
203 This point, alongside the FGM example which follows, was first raised in this sort of context by Shafer 
Landau (2004 chapter 10). 
204 An example which has attracted some attention in the West in recent years is the phenomenon of 
FGM, in which victims’ families or wider ethnic communities act in accordance with moral codes which 
permit FGM, and which are thus at odds with the broader society’s moral beliefs. One example among 
many of both the extent of this practice and the opprobrium which is directed at its practitioners by 
many people outside of the groups among which it is practised can be found in Topping & Carson 2014. 
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Therefore I must allow that the same multiplicity of moral* communities may apply to agents 
on revolutionary relativism. 
This multiplicity of communities cuts both ways – on one hand, it poses a problem for 
relativism because it may be unclear which community is salient when considering how we 
should interpret agents’ moral claims.205  On the other hand, the fluid multiplicity of 
communities in which a given individual may participate means that when individuals come 
together, while they may be members of very different communities in some respects, there 
is a high probability that there will also be some overlap in the communities they each 
participate in, and therefore at least one salient shared community. 
It is also important to note how participation in a moral* community might be defined.  Partly 
this must surely have to do with which communities agents themselves identify with.  But this 
cannot be the only factor.  Moral and therefore moral* communities are to some extent 
coercive.  For example, if the censure or approval of the members of a moral community 
exerts a psychological influence on an agent, then even if that agent would prefer not to 
consider themselves a member of the community in question, they are nonetheless to some 
extent a participant in it.  An agent cannot cease to be a participant in a community on a whim, 
and the exertion of psychological influence (in such a way that it aids cooperation and is thus 
of prudential benefit) on agents by communities is part of the aim of my proposal.  At the 
same time, this should not be taken too far – if members of a community which an agent 
categorically rejects persistently belittle that agent, for example, then it seems wrong to 
consider the agent a participant in that community simply because this bullying behaviour has 
produced a psychological effect, for example by making the agent miserable.  For present 
purposes, then, I will define participation in a community as follows:  when an agent regularly 
 
205 This is discussed as a problem for hermeneutic relativism by Shafer Landau (2004 chapter 10) and 
Suikkanen (2019). 
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engages with a community, and when there is a relationship of mutual psychological influence 
between the agent and other members of the community, then that agent is a participant in 
that community.  A sharper definition of participation may be preferable if there were more 
space available here to present it, but I believe this definition will suffice for present purposes. 
The fourth and final building block of my argument is to recognise that we routinely use ellipsis 
– i.e. we use terms which have explicitly relativised meanings without issue, even when there 
is no mention of the relativising parameters.  This is because we make an assumption that the 
relativity of the terms’ meaning is understood by speaker and audience. For example, if 
someone asks you which side of the road it is legal to drive on, you will not typically preface 
your answer with information about the judicial system, what country you are in, which 
countries’ laws prohibit driving on which side of the road, and so on.  You will typically simply 
answer left or right, depending on where you are.206  Partly this has to do with the Gricean 
maxims of quantity I mentioned a moment ago, and partly it is because the extra information 
about the context of relativisation is assumed. Competent users of legal terms are aware that 
such terms are frequently elliptical, and should an American and a Japanese person find 
themselves fruitlessly failing to disagree about which side of the road one must legally drive 
on, one of the ways of resolving the situation is to realise that part of the problem is the 
relative nature of the legal terms being used. 
7.1.3.  How revolutionary relativism mitigates the disagreement problem 
I am now in a position to offer my solution to the disagreement problem, and to show how it 
solves the disagreement problem in a sensible way.  As I observed above, for group forms of 
relativism, including revolutionary relativism, disagreement between members of the same 
 
206 This parallels what Harman calls ‘differences in situation’ (e.g. 1978 p. 143). 
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community is not problematic.  Thus my argument here is primarily directed at two things.  
First, I aim to show how revolutionary relativism can accommodate disagreements between 
members of different communities.  And second, I will show that we have grounds to question 
whether disagreements between members of different communities happen as often as it 
may appear. 
My argument begins by acknowledging that when revolutionary relativists encounter others, 
and particularly when they begin a moral* discussion, they will make an assumption about 
whether the other speaker is a member of the same ‘main’ moral* community.207  We typically 
make numerous assumptions about people we encounter, such as the assumption that people 
we encounter in our native country will probably speak the same language we do.  
Assumptions about the various other communities in which interlocutors may be participants 
are no different.  We tend not to expect centenarians to know a lot about video games, and 
we will not typically assume that natives in traditional dress whom we encounter in 
unexplored rainforests share our views on online privacy. 
My argument then proceeds from the following claim: when revolutionary relativist 
interlocutors begin a moral* discussion, it is plausible that they will be quite good at knowing 
whether the other person is a member of the same ‘main’ moral* community.  Partly this will 
be based on geographical experience, just as assumptions about languages are.  And partly 
this will be based on the things others say.  If an agent’s assumption about the community 
 
207 Recalling §5.3.1, by ‘revolutionary relativist interlocutors’, here I mean people who knowingly use 
apparently moral discourse consistently with my proposal (whether they are aware of my actual 
proposal or not) and have an intuitive or ‘working’ knowledge of what this involves.  I do not mean only 
people who also understand the full metaethical details of error theory, hold PhDs in philosophy etc. 
(though such people are also included).  This is similar to how typical error theorists might describe ‘the 
folk’ as moral realists (see chapter 2 of this thesis), despite moral realism being a potentially very 
sophisticated and nuanced view when considered from an advanced metaethical perspective.  
Likewise, we have decades’ worth of exceedingly sophisticated philosophical literature devoted to 
analysing what typical language users mean when using all manner of terms – yet none of this proves 
that only very highly educated theorists are competent users of the relevant terms. 
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membership of their interlocutor is incorrect, then it is also plausible that this would quite 
quickly become evident in the course of a moral* discussion. 
This leads to there being three situations in which apparent moral* disagreements such as to 
the example I labelled DISAGREEMENT above may take place:208 
1. The interlocutors correctly assume, or it becomes apparent, that they are participants 
in the same ‘main’ moral* community. 
2. The interlocutors correctly assume, or it becomes apparent, that they are from 
different ‘main’ communities, but there may be some overlap in the moral* norms 
their communities accept. 
3. The interlocutors correctly assume, or it becomes apparent, they are from 
communities so radically different that there is no overlap in the moral* norms they 
accept. 
In each of these three cases, a different chain of events will play out, marked by the building 
blocks I described in the previous subsection.  Note that I am not suggesting that revolutionary 
relativists should try to force this by approaching moral* disagreements with a mental ‘script’.  
Rather, I am arguing that, if we bear in mind and draw together the resources I described in 
chapter 5 and the building blocks I laid out in the previous subsection of this chapter, we will 
see that a certain chain of events will plausibly naturally play out.  My strategy here is simply 
to point out the stages and allow us to realise this.209 
 
208 Remember that the example labelled DISAGREEMENT in §7.1 was as follows: 
Vladimir: It is wrong to torture people. 
Estragon: No, it is not wrong to torture people. 
209 Naturally sometimes people will be wrong about various stages of this whole story.  In such cases, 
perhaps it will be the case that interlocutors think they disagree, but in fact they do not.  The point 
here, however, is to show that that on my proposal, speakers can genuinely disagree, even if sometimes 
they fail to do so. 
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I will lay out the ‘story’ in each of the three situations, highlighting where the various building 
blocks each come into play.  Beginning with situation 1, where the interlocutors are members 
of the same (denoted by the label S) ‘main’ community: 
S1. The speakers correctly assume, or it becomes apparent, that they are participants in 
the same ‘main’ moral* community. 
S2. As self-aware revolutionary relativists, they are aware of this. 
S3. Revolutionary relativists can interpret the speakers’ apparent disagreement as a 
genuine and successful disagreement about a matter of natural fact – namely, 
whether their shared community’s moral* code forbids torture.   
S4. Because they’re self-aware revolutionary relativists, the speakers know that they 
successfully disagree. 
As I noted in §7.1.1, step S3 is available to standard hermeneutic group relativist views, and 
revolutionary relativism is no different here in being able to use this step to account for 
disagreement among members of the same community.  Moving to situation 2, where the 
interlocutors are members of different (denoted by the label D) ‘main’ communities, but there 
may be some overlap in the moral* norms they accept, the ‘story’ runs as follows: 
D1. The speakers correctly assume, or it becomes apparent, that they are from different 
‘main’ moral* communities. 
D2. As self-aware revolutionary relativists, they are aware of this, i.e. that a standard 
reading of the moral* terms they employ would lead to them talking past one 
another. 
D3. Gricean maxims come into play – it would not be appropriate to rely on the standard 
meaning of the moral* terms used if this would lead to the interlocutors knowingly 
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talking past one another, because this would make their utterances insufficiently 
informative in the context of the conversation. 
D4. The speakers assume a non-standard interpretation of the moral* terms used: the 
speaker making a moral* claim that fing is wrong is claiming that fing is forbidden by 
a standard of some community both interlocutors belong to, albeit not the 
community each speaker would typically most readily identify as a participant in. 
D5. Further debate in the conversation then shifts to seeking a shared community to aid 
cooperation. 
D6. If such a community is identified, the disagreement proceeds as in the same 
community case above. 
D7. If no such community can be identified, the apparent disagreement shifts to situation 
3. 
This case is slightly more nuanced than the S1-S4 story above.  Again, nothing particularly 
unusual is going on here, but the reasoning involved can be usefully expanded.  To understand 
D4, consider that in the example of DISAGREEMENT, despite knowing that a standard reading 
of the moral* terms involved would result in talking past one another, Vladimir and Estragon 
nonetheless used the term wrong.  Therefore, following the discussion of Grice above, they 
should each interpret their respective uses of wrong in a non-standard way which allows their 
utterances to make sense as appropriate contributions to the conversation.  But why should 
they conclude that the appropriate non-standard interpretation of ‘torture is wrong’ is that 
‘torture is forbidden by the norms of some community we both belong to’?  Recall that part 
of the explicit purpose of moral* discourse on my proposal is to foster prudentially beneficial 
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cooperation. 210  I submit that given that this is the case, the interpretation suggested in D4 is 
the smoothest and most natural way to accommodate this Gricean aim.   
If that is true, then it is natural that in attempting to aid cooperation by facilitating genuine 
disagreement, the disputants would seek to identify the implied shared moral* community.  
If they can do so, they genuinely disagree.  On the other hand, if the speakers cannot identify 
a salient shared moral* community, the conversation shifts into the third category of 
disagreement, in which the interlocutors do not belong to any shared community at all. 
So finally we move to situation 3, where the interlocutors know from the outset that they do 
not belong to any shared community (denoted by the label R for ‘radically different’), or where 
step D5 above fails and no shared community can be established.  Here the story, again based 
on something like the example of DISAGREEMENT, runs as follows: 
R1. The speakers correctly assume, or it becomes apparent, that they are from different 
‘main’ moral* communities, and that there are no salient ‘non-main’ moral* 
communities in which they both participate. 
R2. As self-aware revolutionary relativists, they are aware of this, i.e. that a standard 
reading of the moral* terms they employ would lead to them talking past one 
another. 
R3. Furthermore, they are aware that no non-standard reading of the moral terms used 
would rescue them from talking past one another. 
 
210 This point draws on chapter 5 of this thesis.  The claim that there is an explicit reason for the 
existence of moral discourse is not available to hermeneutic metaethicists in the way the equivalent 
claim here is available to me.  This is because it is at best arguable whether moral discourse exists to 
foster prudential benefits – after all, depending on what kind of hermeneutic metaethicist one is, it 
could well be that one remains a target of abolitionists, i.e. it may be the case that moral discourse is 
actively harmful.  On my proposal, however, moral* discourse has an explicitly prudential purpose.  In 
making this observation, I put myself at odds with Suikkanen’s assumption that ‘the raison d'être of 
moral discourse and thought is to help us to avoid […] escalating vicious conflicts’ (2019 §4). 
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R4. The speakers grant that they are literally talking past one another, and there is no 
factual disagreement between them. 
R5. Gricean maxims come into play – it would not be appropriately charitable to interpret 
the speakers’ use of moral* terms in a way which would lead to the interlocutors 
knowingly talking past one another without there being a fruitful alternative reading, 
because this would make their utterances insufficiently informative in the context of 
the conversation. 
R6. The speakers assume a non-standard interpretation of the moral* terms used, which 
does not rely on there being any relevant shared community: ‘the other person is 
seeking to influence me by expressing disapproval of fing or trying to get me to 
become a member of a shared community’. 
In this situation, the speakers are forced to grant that they are talking past one another on a 
factual level.  But here Gricean maxims come into play once again – since the speakers know 
that there is no factual disagreement between them, yet nonetheless use moral* terms,  they 
must seek to interpret the use of those moral* terms in a way which makes sense and allows 
the utterances in question to be suitable contributions to the conversation.  Put simply, the 
speakers assume that even if there is no factual disagreement, they are still using moral* 
terms for a reason.  And the question then becomes: what could that reason be?   
This is where the final building block I referred to earlier enters the frame – the fact that 
apparently descriptive sentences can be used both as assertions and to seek to influence an 
audience.  In this situation, interpreting the speakers’ utterances as assertions of fact has 
failed to produce a fruitful conversation because the speakers are talking past one another on 
a factual level.  Yet the exhortative aspect of the conversational meaning of a sentence such 
as ‘torture is wrong’ remains.  Thus a speaker who sincerely utters such a sentence may 
thereby seek to express disapproval of torture, in spite of having been forced under the 
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circumstances to abandon any factual claims about torture.211  If this is the case, then the use 
of moral* terms in this situation still serves a purpose.  Making one’s attitudes clear in the 
deeply serious manner facilitated by moral* discourse is surely of prudential benefit because 
it can aid coordination among agents, and may even lead to the establishment of new moral* 
communities (or the acceptance of new or updated norms among pre-existing communities). 
Alternatively (or also), the speaker could be attempting to elicit agreement that torture is to 
be disapproved of, and thereby establish the wrongness of torture as part of the basis or 
context for the rest of the conversation – essentially seeking to make their interlocutor a 
member of the same community as themselves.212  Again, this is surely of potential prudential 
benefit, since the establishment of moral* community with interlocutors allows genuine 
disagreement to take place once again, and thus contributes to the realisation of the benefits 
offered by traditional moral disagreement in the first place. 
Note that while others may wish to analyse all moral disagreements in these ways (see Finlay 
2017 p. 191 for lists of those who might do so), for me these exhortative interpretations are 
‘fall back’ positions.  I expect that the vast majority of moral* disagreements among 
revolutionary relativists would be explained by the steps I have labelled S1-4 or D1-7.  Yet 
alongside these more common cases, revolutionary relativism also has the resources to 
 
211 Here I am drawing on what is sometimes called a ‘quasi-expressivist’ account (e.g. Finlay 2017 p. 
191).  This means an account of disagreement which is substantially similar to the ‘disagreement in 
attitude’ model Svoboda relies on (see the preceding chapter of this thesis), but which operates on a 
pragmatic rather than a semantic level (i.e. in terms of what the speaker is expressing, rather than what 
the words used mean). 
212 Here I draw on what is sometimes called a metalinguistic account of disagreement (see e.g. Plunkett 
& Sundell 2013, Khoo & Knobe 2018).  Roughly, this means an account of disagreement whereby to 
make a normative assertion that p ‘is to propose updating the context so that it is common ground that 
p is true in that context’ (Khoo & Knobe 2018 p. 25).  To interpret speakers as attempting to establish 
a moral* community with their audience is my gloss on updating the context in the relevant sense. 
 
 237 
account fruitfully for moral* disagreement between speakers who are not members of any 
salient shared moral* community. 
To sum up, revolutionary relativism can account for genuine disagreement between speakers 
who belong to the same moral* community in much the same way that group forms of 
hermeneutic relativism can. In cases of disagreement between members of different ‘main’ 
moral* communities, revolutionary relativism offers scope for reinterpreting speakers’ 
utterances in a way which allows genuine disagreement to take place.  And if no community 
can be established among the disputants, the revolutionary relativist use of moral* terms can 
still be of prudential benefit.  This means that on my proposal, at no point does moral* 
discourse become nonsensical in the way the disagreement objection to relativism implies.  
Therefore revolutionary relativism can meet the objection from disagreement – in the 
majority of likely cases revolutionary relativists can interpret apparent moral* disagreements 
as genuine factual disagreements, and even where revolutionary relativists must accept that 
no factual disagreement is possible, there are still prudential reasons to use moral* terms in 
line with my proposal. 
7.2.  Moral epistemology & related concerns 
I will now turn to look at several related issues which revolve around moral epistemology to 
varying extents, and which have been raised as objections against hermeneutic moral 
relativism.  Shafer-Landau captures well what many people intuitively feel is wrong with 
hermeneutic forms of moral relativism: 
…societies are sometimes based on principles of slavery, of war-like 
aggression, or of sexual, religious or ethnic oppression.  [Group] relativism 
would turn these founding ideals into iron-clad moral duties, making slavery, 
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sexism, and racism the moral duty of all citizens of those societies.  The 
iconoclast – the person deeply opposed to conventional wisdom – would, by 
definition, always be morally mistaken.  This has struck many people as 
seriously implausible. (2010 p. 279) 213 
There are several worries intertwined here which I will attempt to untangle and discuss in 
turn, showing in each case that revolutionary relativism cannot be derailed by the worry in 
question. 
7.2.1. Infallibility 
The first issue here is infallibility.  Many of us share an intuitive distrust of any claims to 
infallibility.  We feel that people and communities must surely be capable of making moral 
mistakes, and we will be suspicious of any metaethical theory which results in agents or 
communities being morally infallible.  Yet this is exactly what moral relativism seems to imply 
– if moral truth is defined by what a moral community accepts, then the community cannot 
be mistaken about what it is morally right and wrong to do.  So relativism doesn’t just leave 
open the possibility of moral infallibility (which would be enough by itself to make many 
people question relativist views), it actually implies the claim that the community is 
necessarily morally infallible.  This fails to accord with how we seem to use moral thought and 
discourse, because to most people moral error appears to be a very real and ever-present 
possibility.  And so this implicit infallibility undermines moral relativism as a hermeneutic view.  
 
213 Shafer-Landau uses the term cultural where I have used the term group.  As I noted in footnote 197, 
I am concerned that the term cultural relativism may carry unwanted baggage for some readers, and 
so prefer the term group relativism.  Therefore for consistency, in the quoted passage I have replaced 
Shafer-Landau’s term with mine. Nothing turns on the distinction between the two terms here. 
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In fact this infallibility seems wrong simply in and of itself - to borrow Blackburn’s phrase, it 
seems ‘unpardonably smug’ (1998a p. 318).214 
In order to cope with this worry, then, I need to show either that on revolutionary relativism, 
the moral* community is fallible, or that smugness is actually pardonable after all.  
Fortunately, on my proposal, the community clearly can be mistaken.  And in §6.2.2 I laid out 
a ‘story’ about how a revolutionary relativist moral* community can respond if mistakes are 
brought to light.   
Now I should admit that there is a twist here – on my proposal, what the community may be 
mistaken about is whether or not adherence to a given norm is prudentially beneficial.  This 
implies that the community cannot be mistaken about the moral* truth, since moral* truth is 
defined in terms of the norms the moral* community accepts, as I described in §5.3.2.   
There are two ways to respond here.  On one hand, I do not have to grant the implication that 
the moral* community cannot be mistaken.  Even though I believe the majority of matters will 
be clear enough, the finer details of right and wrong can be complicated and tricky to 
establish.  Determining right and wrong is often not about consulting a rulebook, but is more 
about having a degree of sensitivity and being disposed to act in certain ways.215  This is 
certainly the case with traditional moral beliefs, and I expect revolutionary relativism to be no 
different.  This means that agents could sometimes be mistaken about the moral* norms their 
community accepts, and so would not be morally* infallible. 
 
214 Blackburn is talking about quasi-realism, but the smugness sentiment extends to relativism, too.  By 
way of highlighting the importance of this issue to quasi-realists as well as relativists, Andy Eagan 
actually goes so far as to label one of the premises of his argument about Blackburn’s view ‘NO 
SMUGNESS’ (2007 p. 210). 
215 This point draws on Hooker (2000 pp. 88-92).  For example, ‘…figuring out whether a rule applies 
can require not merely attention to detail, but also sensitivity, imagination, interpretation and 
judgement’ (2000 p. 88).  Hooker is discussing consequentialism, but the point applies here too. 
 240 
But even if I forego this line of defence, remember that like other WNP responses, and unlike 
hermeneutic forms of relativism, the whole point of my proposal is to deliver prudential 
benefits.  Notwithstanding any notions of truth, any prudentially suboptimal norms a moral* 
community accepts must be reassessed and rejected once they are found to be prudentially 
suboptimal.  And when this happens, the moral* truth, defined by what norms the community 
accepts, changes.  Thus, albeit by a slightly indirect route, moral* communities may be 
mistaken about which norms are prudentially optimal, and if they are, the moral* truth will 
come to reflect this.  In the WNP context, where objective moral truth is ruled out and 
prudential benefit is all that is on offer, I believe this is an adequate response to the infallibility 
worry. 
7.2.2. Dissidence 
The second issue we can identify in the quote from Shafer-Landau is raised by the iconoclast, 
or as I prefer to call them, the dissident.216  This worry is closely related to the infallibility 
worry, and is that according to group relativists, the moral truth is defined by the community, 
and so moral dissidents – i.e. those who disagree with the rest of their community - must 
necessarily always be wrong.  This remains so even if those moral dissidents are motivated by 
what seem like good reasons rather than out of a desire to do morally bad things.  Yet we 
would typically want to leave open the possibility that even if all around them disagree, 
individuals who e.g. oppose slavery can be right to do so.  This is especially so in the case of 
revolutionary relativism, which depends for its vital flexibility on the possibility of individuals 
 
216 Again, a slight terminological change: Shafer-Landau uses ‘iconoclast’, but I will use ‘dissident’.  This 
is because I feel the latter term a) carries less religious baggage and b) better captures the motivation 
of an agent who sees things differently than her community does because she believes that there is a 
prudentially better position which could be accepted by the community.  This contrasts with the term 
iconoclast, which to me suggests opposition to convention for the sake of opposition itself.  Such an 
individual will frequently come out as morally wrong on most metaethical views in a philosophically 
uninteresting fashion which I do not believe is Shafer-Landau’s intended target. 
 241 
or groups within a moral* community being at least in principle able to influence which moral* 
rules their communities accept. 
I would respond that for revolutionary relativists, moral* dissidents would indeed hold moral* 
beliefs which are false according to their moral* community, and which are thus false, full 
stop.  But this does not prevent dissidents being able to advocate changes in the moral* rules 
which their community accepts, so long as those changes are plausibly prudentially beneficial.  
Accordingly, as noted above, I can grant that the community can be morally* infallible yet also 
mistaken about whether the practical policies which are accepted as moral* truths are 
actually prudentially optimal.  And given the prudential grounding of moral* rules described 
in chapter 5, this suboptimality necessitates a change in the moral* norms the community 
accepts, and thus a change in which moral* beliefs are true.  This means that moral* dissidents 
may in the first instance necessarily be morally* mistaken as Shafer-Landau suggests.  But this 
need not be a problem for revolutionary relativism, since my proposal provides a mechanism 
whereby prudentially beneficial norms advocated by dissidents can be accepted by moral* 
communities, and prudentially beneficial dissident beliefs thereby rendered true.  Thus the 
dissident is not ‘just plain wrong’.  Rather she is the linchpin of how moral* communities can 
evolve for the better. 
7.2.3. ‘That can’t be right!’ 
The third issue raised in the quoted passage is arbitrariness - many people feel very strongly 
that certain actions simply must come out as morally wrong, no matter which metaethical 
theory we consider true.  Therefore any metaethical theory which threatens to allow e.g. 
slavery or rape to be anything other than automatically wrong, no matter what any 
community might to say about it, will be viewed as suspiciously arbitrary or even dismissed 
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out of hand.217  Yet, again, this is what relativism seems to imply, and so any relativist theory 
which does not automatically rule certain actions out as wrong must be a bad theory.  Simply 
put, we are intuitively more sure that slavery and rape are morally wrong than we are that 
moral relativists can be right. 
In the post-error-theory context of this thesis, this cannot stand; since we are granting the 
truth of error theory, there is nothing – there can be nothing - which is morally obligatory, 
permissible or forbidden.  Thus there can be no moral grounds on which to object that a given 
revolutionary relativist community accepts the wrong moral* norms.  Opponents of 
hermeneutic forms of relativism are free to attempt to make some other kind of normative 
case that moral codes should or must proscribe e.g. slavery or else be incorrect or intolerably 
arbitrary.  But there seems little reason to expect them to succeed when categorically 
normative reasons are off the table as they are in the present post-error-theory context - the 
arbitrariness objection implied by Shafer-Landau’s remarks simply cannot apply if a moral 
error theory is true.  All that there is left to argue about in the present context is whether 
there might be prudential advantages in adopting certain practical policies – and that is 
precisely what revolutionary relativism deals in. 
Additionally, while I will not commit to any constraints on the moral* norms revolutionary 
relativist communities must accept, there are grounds to expect that most communities 
probably would accept norms which forbid certain practices.  For example, people who would 
accept norms which authorise letting babies starve to death would have to be very 
psychologically unusual in terms of whether they care about human suffering and so on.  
 
217 Compare this with Joyce’s constraint that ‘a theory of imperatives that managed to supply strong 
categorical imperatives – that located Foot’s “fugitive thought” – but for things like “Kill anyone who 
annoys you,” “Steal when you can,” etc., simply would not be a morality.’ (2001 p. 67, emphasis 
original).  Or later in the same book, ‘…a theory of moral imperatives had better get them “in the 
ballpark” of the kinds of things we uncontroversially consider such.’ (2001 p. 75). 
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Whether for evolutionary or any other kinds of reasons, our cares and concerns are generally 
rather more stable and robust than the objection implies.  And so even for communities which 
are radically different from ours, it is unlikely that their circumstances would be so radically 
different that they would give rise to prudentially beneficial norms which egregiously violate 
the ‘that can’t be right!’ sentiment.218 
As I said at the beginning of this chapter, it would be impossible to deal with all of the potential 
objections to my view.  But taking §7.1 and the subsections of §7.2 together, I believe I have 
shown that revolutionary relativism can cope with the most serious of the objections to moral 
relativism in general.  Therefore I will now turn to objections which may not apply to all forms 
of moral relativism, but which apply specifically to my proposal as a WNP response. 
7.3.  The Rational Choice Challenge 
As with any philosophical view, it is impossible to anticipate all of the potential objections to 
my proposal which could eventually be raised.  But we can be sure that some objections will 
apply to my proposal which do not apply to relativist views more generally, either because of 
the specific WNP context in which my proposal is made, or because of specific features of my 
response to the WNP.  Of those which I can foresee, two stand out as particularly problematic, 
and in §7.3 and §7.4 I will tackle them in turn.  The first of these challenges I call the Rational 
Choice Challenge (hereafter RCC). Aspects of the RCC may apply not only to other WNP 
proposals, but also to issues in other debates which fall outside the scope of this thesis.219  In 
 
218 I am aware of an existing isolated community which reportedly actually does sometimes leave 
mothers giving birth to babies to die, and even sanctions killing babies which appear healthy to 
outsiders (Everett 2008 chapter 6).  Yet even these actions are arguably based on a sense that members 
of that community must be tough to survive their harsh environment, and that protecting weak 
members of the community would place a burden on the other members so great that the community 
itself would be threatened. 
219 In the WNP context in general, something very like the RCC presented here may confront other 
responses – as I note in the text, the RCC is similar to objections I made myself to revolutionary 
fictionalism and revolutionary expressivism.  More widely, similar or related issues have concerned, for 
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the present context, the RCC may be understood as a challenge similar to the ‘which morals?’ 
challenge I levelled at other WNP responses (see §4.4.4, and the related argument in §4.5.2).  
But the RCC is a particular issue for revolutionary relativism for two reasons.  First, while it 
may be possible to level related challenges at other WNP responses, the formulation of the 
RCC I will give here is specific to my proposal because it makes use of moral* codes and 
community acceptance.  And second, the RCC can be thought to apply not only at the time of 
the WNP itself (as with would be the case with the variations on the theme of the RCC which 
might apply to other WNP responses), but also at key points in the process of flexibility, a 
process I discussed a lot in the previous chapter and on which the arguments I have made in 
favour of my proposal rely quite heavily.  As far as I am aware, the RCC has not yet been 
discussed as a challenge to WNP responses.  Yet since its targets include such a crucial aspect 
of my proposal, if it can be made into a substantive challenge to my proposal – as I believe it 
can – the RCC demands a response.  
To properly understand and formulate the RCC, we must take stock of where we are on the 
journey from accepting the error theory to forming a community whose members live 
consistently with my proposal.  One way to do this is to envisage three points in time.  First, 
we have the point at which we accept the truth of error theory, which we can label T1.  In one 
sense, T1 is the ‘revolution’, the point at which we break with traditional morality and move 
into new territory.  I am assuming that we have taken this step, and are now at a subsequent 
point in time, T2.  At T2, we realise that the revolution which occurred at T1 means that we are 
faced with a problem about what to do next – the What Now? Problem.  At our current point 
in time T2, then, we are looking towards the future, towards various situations which could 
potentially obtain at T3, and considering which potential future we have the best prudential 
 
example, philosophers working on theories of rational choice and justice, and others outside 
philosophy such as economists.  See e.g. Cudd 1996. 
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reasons to seek to bring about.  Naturally I have argued that the best prudential reasons 
support adopting revolutionary relativism at T3.220  But this is where the RCC comes into the 
frame: even if we accept that at T3 we should, prudentially speaking, live consistently with my 
proposal, we can still ask, ‘which potential revolutionary relativist community would it be 
rational for us to be?’.  Putting this more carefully, we can formulate the RCC thus: 
RCC: From the perspective of the WNP at T2, and looking to the future at T3, is there 
a specific moral* code, or are there specific features of multiple potential moral* 
codes, which it would be rational for us to adopt?221 
A key feature of the RCC which is implicit here is that the RCC concerns the content of the 
moral* beliefs which make up the moral* code accepted by a community.  This is distinct from 
the arguments for adopting revolutionary relativism which I have presented thus far, which 
largely concern the meaning of moral versus moral* terms, or the truth values of moral* 
beliefs, but say comparatively little about the content of moral* codes. So, for example, if we 
believed prior to T1 that murder was morally wrong, then adopting my proposal as defended 
thus far involves a change in the meaning of the term ‘wrong’: from a meaning which 
presupposes the existence of a certain type of categorical normativity to a meaning which 
relates to communities and the norms they accept. But adopting my proposal as defended 
thus far does not require that there is any change in whether or not it is murder which we 
 
220 Recalling §5.3.1, by ‘adopting revolutionary relativism’, I mean roughly living in accordance with my 
proposal, rather than necessarily critically engaging with every last metaethical detail.  While the more 
people who adopt my proposal understand of it the better, I am not saying that everyone should e.g. 
have a PhD in philosophy at T3.  The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for phrases such as ‘revolutionary 
relativist community’ or ‘moral* community’ in what follows. 
221 This is not the only such ‘rationality’ question we could ask at this juncture, but it is the most 
interesting one in the context of my thesis thus far.  Other questions include 1) at T2, is it rational to 
move to a T3 in which we live consistently with revolutionary relativism? And 2) for those who already 
live consistently with revolutionary relativism, is it rational for them to accept their community’s rules? 
I take it that 1) is sufficiently similar to whether we prudentially ought to adopt my proposal to be 
answered by my arguments in previous chapters.  And 2) would, in the current context, be a huge 
digression into general metaethical arguments rather than challenges to my proposal, and is thus 
outside the scope of this chapter.  Therefore I set these questions aside here. 
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judge to be wrong, whatever that judgement might consist in.  My proposal is about whether 
and how the judgement that murder is wrong can be true at T3.  The RCC, on the other hand, 
directly concerns the content of moral* beliefs.  It asks which moral* beliefs - i.e. beliefs with 
what content - it would be rational for us to have.  The RCC is therefore an extra challenge 
over and above the WNP, and would seem to require that I argue for the adoption of 
revolutionary relativism plus certain changes to the content of the moral* code which is 
accepted by the community. 
Perhaps the most natural suggestion for how to respond to the RCC is to argue that we should 
accept those moral* rules which maximise prudential wellbeing in an aggregate, overall sense, 
similar to the calculus underlying rule utilitarianism (see e.g. Hooker 2000, especially chapter 
2).222  A significant degree of the prudential benefits plausibly brought about by traditional 
morality, and which my proposal aims to deliver, have to do with coordination and 
cooperation among agents.  And my proposal is a group form of relativism in which 
communities en masse accept moral* rules.  This would seem to support an intuition that my 
proposal rules out accepting any moral* rules which might erode aggregate prudential 
benefit, regardless of the effects at the level of particular individuals.  All-in-all, then, thinking 
about the prudential benefits offered by accepting one rule or another at the community-
wide aggregate level seems at least a reasonable place to start. 
Yet this suggestion may be more problematic than it appears.  Many people have argued that 
following principles which seek to bring about the greatest benefits at the overall, aggregate 
 
222 This is, for example, roughly what I read Olson as advocating when he emphasises the societal and 
coordinative aspects of his proposed retention of morality: ‘human beings need morality to coexist 
peacefully, to prevent conflicts, to regulate and coordinate behaviour’ (2014 p. 197).  Similarly, Joyce 
recommends fictionalism to groups because of its usefulness to groups, rather than to individuals (2017 
pp. 82-83). 
 247 
level can lead to vastly unequal distributions of those benefits, which in itself is problematic.223  
For example it may be that 90% of the community decide to accept moral* rules such that it 
is morally* right, or at least permissible, that they enslave the remaining 10%.  The 90% then 
experience a considerable uplift in their wellbeing due to the reduced need for them to 
perform manual labour and so on, while the enslaved 10% of the community have a terrible 
time.  Yet because a large proportion of the community have nice, easy lives, and only a small 
proportion are forced into drudgery, the aggregate level of prudential wellbeing in the 
community is increased.   
This is a simplification, of course, but the point is clear – maximising the aggregate level of 
prudential benefit in a community could be prudentially bad for some individuals.  And so it is 
not clear that those individuals would have prudential reasons to accept the proposed moral* 
rule.  This gives rise to the issue which is at the heart of the RCC, and which is the essence of 
the challenge to my proposal – when considering whether there is a revolutionary relativist 
community such that it would be rational for us to establish or join it, are we talking about a 
proposal which must, or would, be rational for everyone to adopt jointly and severally, or only 
for most people to adopt? 
In order to respond to the RCC, in §7.3.1 I will begin by considering some ways in which there 
could be a moral* code such that all agents as individuals would be rational to adopt it.  I will 
consider four responses to the RCC along these lines, and reject them all.  After this, I will 
argue that we must reject the assumption that a good response to the WNP requires that the 
moral* code of a community must be such that all members of the community as individuals 
would be rational to adopt it.  I will then provide my own solution to the RCC. 
 
223 For a much more thorough discussion of this well-known problem than can be accommodated here, 
see Hooker 2000 §2.8. 
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7.3.1.  Rational for all agents? 
Let’s recap where we are in the latter stages of the overall story of this thesis.  As we confront 
the RCC, we are currently at the point in time I labelled T2 – we are in the aftermath of ‘the 
revolution’, and considering whether there could be a moral* code such that all agents would 
be rational to accept it at T3.  I am suggesting that one way to answer this is to consider how 
we might come up with such a code.  I can see four options here, each of which I will explain, 
and then briefly give reasons why they are problematic.  The four options are: seeking pareto 
optimality, egalitarianism, sufficientarianism and participating in rational bargaining.  Having 
outlined and rejected each of these, I will then explain why revolutionary relativists must 
approach the RCC differently, and show how this can be done. 
i) Pareto optimality 
To find a moral* code such that it would be rational for all agents to accept it, first, we might 
suggest that a satisfying WNP response must require that so-called pareto improvements to 
the moral* code are made wherever possible (most likely from a starting point of the moral* 
code being a moral* equivalent of putative traditional moral ‘truths’).  Named after economist 
Vilifredo Pareto, a pareto improvement is defined as an improvement which can be made to 
a situation whereby one or more agents benefit, and no agents lose out.  A situation is pareto 
optimal when no pareto improvements can be made.  This applies most obviously to the 
distribution of material wealth or goods, but it can also apply to moral* rules.  For example, 
accepting a rule against stealing plausibly conduces to fewer people having their possessions 
stolen, but it does not obviously result in anyone losing any of their possessions.224  It would 
 
224 Some people might disagree with this theft example, especially some kinds of communist and those 
who I have described as abolitionists.  Or thieves, for that matter.  But I take it that the theft example 
illustrates the point sufficiently intuitively to satisfy more neutral readers for the time being.  Since I 
will shortly reject the pareto optimality option for other reasons anyway, an intuitive illustration such 
as stealing will suffice for present needs, even if it may not survive sophisticated scrutiny. 
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therefore be a pareto improvement to accept a rule against stealing if one was not already 
accepted.   
Since pareto improvements by definition mean that some people gain while no-one loses 
anything, it seems that it would be (instrumentally) rational for all agents to adopt any 
measures (including e.g. accepting moral* norms or changes to the moral* code of their 
community) which conduce to pareto improvements and thus contribute to bringing about a 
pareto optimal situation.  And since we are dealing with prudential normativity in the WNP 
context, it seems unarguable that it would be rational for all agents to agree to implement 
any available pareto improvements to the current situation.  This manoeuvre would appear 
to prevent the introduction of slavery, for example, as slavery would represent a change to 
the moral* code which caused some agents to lose out significantly.  Also, seeking pareto 
optimality would satisfy the intuitions about aggregate dis-benefits I mentioned above, since 
the pareto improvements made en route to pareto optimality necessarily involve no loss of 
wellbeing or other prudential benefit for any agent.  In the search for a situation which all 
agents would be rational to act so as to bring about, then, this seems a promising start – we 
can establish that any such situation would have to be pareto optimal, otherwise it would not 
be rational for all agents to seek to bring it about. 
But the pareto optimality response is nonetheless problematic.  This is because all manner of 
situations could be pareto optimal, yet many of them would fail to respect my proposal’s 
requirement to adopt whichever moral* code is prudentially optimal, rather than pareto 
optimal (see chapter 5).  To take an extreme example for the sake of illustrating the point, 
imagine a situation in which a catastrophically narcissistic or psychopathic ‘master’ somehow 
enslaves and is served by the whole of the rest of their community.  Despite obvious 
prudential shortcomings for the vast majority of agents, this would be a pareto optimal state, 
since no relevant changes could be made - for example, by introducing a moral* code which 
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forbids slavery – without the ‘master’ losing out, even if only to a very minor extent.  And 
pareto improvements by definition cannot result in anyone losing out at all.  Yet it is a situation 
which almost no agents would be rational to seek to bring about – the only agents who might 
be rational to do so are the prospective master, and perhaps some similarly psychologically 
unusual agents who crave servitude. 
Setting aside such extreme examples, even if we start with the world as it currently is, there 
are still issues of what we might call ‘wellbeing distribution’ which could not be solved by 
making pareto improvements.  This is part of the motivation for abolitionism, as we saw in 
chapter 4.  The upshot is that there is no one unique pareto optimal situation.  And even if 
there were, pareto optimality is no guarantee that it would necessarily be rational for all 
agents seeking prudential benefits to bring that situation about.225  Ultimately, then, despite 
a promising start, the pareto improvement model is unsatisfying as a guide in finding a moral* 
code which it would be rational for all agents to accept.  On reflection, it turns out that 
conduciveness toward pareto optimality may be a necessary feature of the moral* code we 
are looking for, but it is not a sufficient one. 
ii) Egalitarianism 
The second way we might come up with a moral* code such that all agents would be rational 
to accept it at T3 is by adopting a norm of egalitarianism.   Thus at T2 we envisage various 
potential T3 states, T3-a, T3-b…. T3-n and seek to realise one in which agents are equal in the 
senses we consider important.  Egalitarianism can take many forms, but for example we might 
focus on potential T3 states where the moral* code conduces to equal distribution of wealth 
and liberty, perhaps by including norms outlawing ownership of other agents, norms 
 
225 The ‘maximum aggregate’ solution I mentioned in §7.3 is also pareto optimific, yet was also rejected. 
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promoting individual freedoms and norms relating to redistribution of wealth.226  This would 
avoid the apparent gross injustice of permitting slavery, and would comport well with many 
people’s intuitive sense of moral fairness.  That being so, perhaps egalitarianism can guide us 
towards a T3 which all agents would be rational to bring about. 
Unfortunately, egalitarianism would also involve ‘levelling down’ to the extent that some 
agents might end up only slightly better off or even in some cases worse off than they would 
without morality*, and so it would threaten their prudential motivation for adopting 
revolutionary relativism.227  Certainly, there may be net benefit in sacrificing some personal 
advantage in order to live in a more generally equal community.  Yet it is unlikely that all 
agents would experience sufficient net benefits of this kind that it would be rational for all 
agents to bring about an egalitarian T3.  For example, it seems unlikely that many individuals 
who are very wealthy at T1 would consider it rational to promote the acceptance of norms at 
T3 which would result in most of their wealth being redistributed equally to others.228  Thus it 
is unlikely that egalitarianism could be the basis for a moral* code which it would be rational 
for all agents to adopt. 
iii) Sufficientarianism 
Third, we could insist on principles of sufficiency to guide moral* rule acceptance.229  This 
approach targets a hybrid between individual and aggregate prudential benefits, in order to 
 
226 This is of course only a sketch of egalitarianism, which is a sophisticated and vigorously debated view 
in its own right.  See Arneson 2013 for an overview. 
227 For a classic treatment of this kind of reasoning, see Parfit 1997. 
228 Though I do not necessarily aim to endorse it here, a further argument could be made that pareto 
improvements are still possible even in a state of equality, along the lines of Rawls’ ‘difference principle’ 
- social and economic inequalities may actually be prudentially advantageous, so long as everyone ends 
up better off as a result of them (see e.g. Rawls 1999 chapter 2, §12).  Thus, again, it would be 
prudentially irrational for all agents to promote equality. 
229 Again, this is merely a sketch of a much more sophisticated view.  See e.g. Crisp 2003 for a fuller 
discussion of these and related issues. 
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offer rational motivation for all agents.  The initial step would involve establishing a minimum 
threshold of wellbeing.  The precise nature and extent of wellbeing would still be debatable, 
but in the sense relevant to this thesis, this threshold could perhaps include acceptance of 
moral* norms promoting at least limited autonomy for all agents and norms which forbid 
excessive predation upon other agents, for example.  Only moral* codes with these features 
would be deemed sufficient.  Having established a basic minimum standard of what must be 
included in a moral* code, we could rule out any potential T3 states which did not include 
acceptance of a moral* code with these features.  Then, among the remaining potential T3 
states, we could seek to bring about whichever T3-x would plausibly yield the greatest total 
aggregate degree of prudential benefit.  By guaranteeing that all agents experience an 
acceptable minimum degree of prudential benefits, and then maximising the total sum of 
benefits above this level, perhaps some form of ‘sufficientarianism’ can guide us to a moral* 
code such that it would be rational for all agents to accept it. 
There are several problems with this kind of sufficientarianism, two of which I will highlight.  
First, there seem to be no convincing grounds available in the WNP context for settling the 
question of what is and is not sufficient in the relevant sense.  What we are looking for here 
is a moral* code which conduces to a T3 state such that it would be rational for all agents to 
accept that code.  But a reason for all agents  - even cruel and predatory agents who would 
be happy to own slaves - to ensure an absence of slavery at T3 would have to be some kind of 
categorical, objective reason.  Yet this is precisely the kind of categorical objective reason 
which is ruled out by error theory.  It seems likely that for any suggested standard of 
sufficiency, the same would apply – setting standards of sufficiency is incompatible with the 
truth of the error theory.  The second problem with sufficientarianism is that, like 
egalitarianism, it also involves a kind of levelling down – again, we are looking for rational 
motivation for all agents to accept a moral* code, yet the contented oligarch has little interest 
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in accepting sufficientarianist moral* norms because she may lose out as a result of e.g. the 
redistribution of wealth required to guarantee the sufficient standard for everyone else. 
iv) Rational Bargaining 
Finally, fourth, we could insist that the best way to find a T3 which it would be rational for all 
agents to bring about would be to rely on a process of rational bargaining.  The notion of moral 
bargaining has been discussed in a relativist context by Gilbert Harman (see e.g. Harman & 
Thomson 1996 chapter 2).230  But what I have in mind here is more similar to the view 
advanced by David Gauthier in Morals by Agreement.231  The idea is that agents can realise 
greater advantages by cooperating than by living in isolation.  This is easy to illustrate with a 
simple example, though naturally the picture can be much more complicated in real life.  Think 
of two farmers.  If each exclusively farms their own field, then each can grow 50kg of produce 
per year, making a total between the two of them of 100kg.  Yet if they cooperate, for example 
if they work at different times of day and therefore more efficiently scare off birds which 
would otherwise eat the seeds sown on the fields, then between them they can grow 120kg 
of produce.  Thus cooperation yields a 20kg ‘cooperation dividend’.  This dividend can then be 
divided between the farmers as they see fit.   
Morality* comes into the picture through the norms which encourage this beneficial 
cooperation, and those which govern the distribution of the cooperation dividend.  That 
 
230 It may be expected that since Harman is a relativist, and I am advocating a form of relativism, I would 
discuss his model of moral bargaining in preference to what I go on to discuss instead - Gauthier’s view.  
But I read Harman’s discussion of bargaining as primarily hermeneutic, intended to explain how we 
might have arrived at traditional morality, warts and all.  Naturally in the present context, we are 
considering responses to the WNP, so such explanations are somewhat redundant.  Gauthier’s view, 
on the other hand, promises to offer a more direct response to the issues under discussion here. 
231 Once again, the view mentioned here is necessarily only the roughest sketch of a much more 
developed view, most famously presented in Morals by Agreement (Gauthier 1987).  But broadly 
speaking, I believe what I call a ‘Gauthierian’ response here is sufficiently in keeping with the spirit of 
what he says to merit the adjective.  For a third party source which can provide more information and 
analysis than space here permits, again see e.g. Cudd 1996 
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morality* should promote cooperation is no surprise.  But in this example, different moral* 
codes could also lead to different distributions of the dividend.  For instance, imagine that the 
applicable moral* code placed more emphasis on rewarding time spent working, and less 
emphasis on people’s needs.  In that case (which is roughly similar to traditional morality in 
the modern West), it would be considered morally* right that the farmer who worked the 
longest hours would receive a larger share of the dividend, even if she had no family to feed 
while the other famer has hungry children.  Conversely, if the applicable moral* code primarily 
emphasised helping those with the greatest need, then it might be thought right that the 
farmer with a family should receive a greater proportion of the dividend even if he worked 
fewer hours.  More balanced moral* codes could have a more nuanced view, and more agents 
cooperating will open up more complex distributive considerations, and so on.  The question 
we are seeking to answer in this subsection therefore becomes a matter of what moral* code 
would yield a division of the cooperation dividend which it would be rational for all agents to 
agree upon. 
The Gauthierian response is that it is rational for all agents to ensure that their maximum 
concession – the amount of the dividend which they agree should be taken by others – is as 
small as possible.232  Thus agents may bargain with one another in an attempt to arrive at an 
agreement over the norms of distribution which facilitates further cooperation and which also 
allows each agent to minimise the portion of the dividend which they agree to concede to 
others.  So long as the bargaining agents are rational, sufficiently informed, and free of 
 
232 Gauthier has subsequently updated his view (2013).  But I will set this aside here, as while his earlier 
work is a widely influential classic in the field, there are reasons to be much more skeptical about his 
later view in the current context.  For example, the later view assumes that agents are predisposed to 
cooperate (2013 p. 610), whereas WNP respondents are typically trying to promote cooperation among 
agents who are not so predisposed.  As such, it is better to focus on the ‘classic’ view here, and forego 
the considerable digression that further discussion of Gauthier’s later view would require. 
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coercion, this process of rational bargaining, it could be argued, is the best way to come up 
with a moral* code at T3 which it would be rational for all agents to accept. 
There are numerous problems with the rational bargaining view.  One of the objections I wish 
to raise is that it is built entirely from a mistaken, inadvertently biased first step.  In the 
background of the rational bargaining approach is an assumed view which is actually 
tendentious.   This view is that humans are in some important sense free of social ties and 
potentially asocial to begin with, and then as instrumentally rational agents they freely 
participate in society in order to gain advantages of some kind.  This view is hardly unfamiliar, 
and is taken as a neutral, uncontentious starting point by many philosophers - not least, as 
Holly Smith points out (1991 p. 230), Rawls and Hobbes.  Gauthier makes this explicit: ‘A 
person is conceived as an independent center of activity, endeavoring to direct his capacities 
and resources to the fulfilment of his interests’ (1987 p. 9).  A radical kind of individualism and 
a transactional view of the rationality of human interaction are baked into Gauthier’s 
fundamental conception of what it is to be a person.   
Yet this conception has been rejected by others for more than a century.  An example here is 
John Dewey, who argued that individual liberty could not be understood separately from 
agents’ social context:  
Society in its unified and structural character is the fact of the case; the non-
social individual is an abstraction arrived at by imagining what man would be 
if all his human qualities were taken away.  Society, as a real whole, is the 
normal order, and the mass as an aggregate of isolated units is the fiction. 
(Dewey 2008 p. 232) 233   
 
233 See Festenstein 2018 §2 for more on this aspect of Dewey’s thought. 
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The rational bargaining model rests on views of personhood and society which are by no 
means the obvious, philosophically neutral positions which they may seem.  In the present 
context of attempting to establish what it is rational for all agents to do at T2, a relatively 
uncontentious basis for any response to the RCC is required if we are to avoid considerable 
digression and backtracking through the arguments discussed in sizeable sections of this 
thesis.  That contradictory views exist about underlying assumptions as fundamental as 
personhood and society means that rational bargaining has no such uncontested basis. 
Even if we are willing to overlook this arguably profound misconception, there are other more 
immediate problems.  First, the Gauthierian response’s insistence that it is rational for agents 
to ensure that their maximum concession is as small as possible entails that in the bargaining 
process, an agent’s bargaining position makes a difference.  For surely she who contributes 
most, and who may therefore withhold the greatest future contribution if they are 
dissatisfied, must have the greatest say in how the dividend is distributed.  Perhaps we could 
charitably weaken this aspect of the response and say instead that agents are rational if they 
ensure that their maximum concession is as small as possible, unless they desire to receive a 
smaller concession for some reason contingent only upon their desires and not upon any 
external factors.234   
With this amendment in place, rational bargaining does not necessarily lead to the strongest 
or best resourced agents always getting more of the dividend than others – the most powerful 
bargainer could also be the most selfless person in the community.  But it does mean that 
 
234 This weaker version, including the slightly awkward ‘contingent only upon…’ aspect, may be 
required in the WNP context.  This is because the requirement that agents pursue maximum reward 
regardless of whether they may have desires to the contrary (e.g. relevant altruistic desires) is likely 
to be incompatible with the truth of error theory, and therefore violate the ROBET constraint I 
discussed in chapter 5.  Since I already have several independent reasons for rejecting the rational 
bargaining model, I do not treat this as a separate objection to the view.  But in other contexts, 
proponents of anything like the view I have described here may well have to confront this problem, 
too. 
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those in inferior bargaining positions may be forced to accept a bad deal.  For example, anyone 
who is very old, disabled, too young to work and so on sometimes cannot contribute as much 
as others to society’s dividend.  Yet if others do not contribute, then these groups stand to 
lose an awful lot.  On the other hand, very powerful groups or individuals may not depend on 
those less able groups’ contributions to the dividend at all, and so will be in a position to force 
a very bad deal on to those groups if they wish (and given human behaviour throughout 
history it seems inevitable that, at least some of the time, they will so wish). 
Our current society with its traditional moral outlook is often considerably more concerned 
with fairness and helping the less well off than this.  So, if we assume a rough moral* 
equivalent of currently widely held moral beliefs as a baseline, anyone who is old, disabled, 
too young to work and so on would not be rational to accept this response to the RCC.  
Therefore the rational bargaining model once again fails to offer a way to find a moral* code 
which it would be rational for all agents as individuals to accept. 
Drawing the findings in this subsection together, I conclude that it is not easy to see how any 
moral* system could be rational for all agents to accept.  As we look toward T3, then, we will 
have to take a different approach.  Therefore in the next section, I will lay out a different 
approach which is based around what moral* code it would be in a community’s interests to 
accept in order to bring about aggregate prudential benefits.  This, I will argue, is how we can 
best respond to the RCC and how we can most profitably understand the benefits of adopting 
revolutionary relativism. 
7.3.2.  The revolutionary relativist’s response 
To recap, the original question posed by the RCC is this: from the perspective of the WNP at 
T2, and looking to the future at T3, is there a specific moral* code, or are there specific features 
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of multiple potential moral* codes, which it would be rational for us to adopt?  This led to a 
further question of interpretation – whether we are talking about what it would be rational 
for all agents as individuals to do, or what it would be rational for moral* communities as a 
whole to do.  I examined the possibility of finding a moral* code such that it would be rational 
for all agents as individuals to accept, and found that no answer was satisfactory.  While my 
suggested strategies in this section may not be exhaustive of all the possible strategies, the 
conclusion (at least unless someone comes along with a more defensible position) must be 
that no answer to the RCC based on the rationality of all agents as individuals is likely to be 
successful. 
That being the case, it seems that the prudential benefits offered by adopting my proposal 
must be thought of in an aggregate sense.  Recall, though, that there was a worry about this.  
The example I gave above was where 90% of a community enslave the remaining 10% - the 
community may thereby be better off in an aggregate sense, yet this comes at a high cost for 
the 10% who are enslaved. 
To consider this clearly, let us imagine a group of people who are at T2, i.e. who are grappling 
with the ‘what now?’ problem.  They have resolved to adopt revolutionary relativism and thus 
constitute an emerging moral* community.  These people have not yet embarked upon a post-
error theory life, having been traditional moralists until their recent ‘revolution’.  So, as is 
consistent with traditional morality, the members of the group are variously well off in terms 
of material wealth, available opportunities, happiness, eudaimonic wellbeing and so on.  Let 
us suppose for the sake of argument that this means that each person has a roughly 
quantifiable degree of prudential goods, and that we could therefore identify variations in 
their prudential good ‘score’ at T2 versus at various potential T3 situations. 
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Now, imagine that this group accepts a moral* code M at T3 such that the aggregate degree 
of prudential goods enjoyed by the community is increased in comparison with T1.  Let’s say 
the prudential good score of each member of the group increases by 50 points at T3-M 
compared with the alternative possible T3s.  All members of the group, that is, apart from one 
individual.  This unfortunate individual, let’s call her Suzy, actually experiences a ‘prudential 
score’ fall of 5 points at T3-M compared with T1.  The overall effect on the group of adopting M 
is an aggregate increase in prudential goods, so it seems rational for the community as a whole 
to adopt M.  And the same goes for nearly all members of the group as individuals.   
This means that we may wish to place a constraint on all moral* codes which could instantiate 
M: the likely consequences at T3 of accepting M must be better than the available alternatives 
for sufficiently many members of the group to accept M that the community as a whole can 
be said to accept M.  Otherwise it would be impossible to bring about the desired level of 
cooperation and coordination at T3-M.235 
But it does not appear to be rational for Suzy to accept M.  So what about her?  Recall from 
§5.3.4 that on my proposal, acting in contravention of the moral* norms the community 
accepts is taken to justify reactive attitudes such as guilt and blame, and may lead to more 
severe censure.  Thus when the majority of our group of intrepid budding revolutionary 
relativists accept moral* code M because it is to their advantage as individuals, and to the 
group as a whole’s advantage on aggregate, Suzy will be dragged along because she faces 
censure if she does not comply.  This remains the case even if it is not rational for Suzy as an 
individual to accept M herself.  Thus Suzy is effectively coerced into accepting M, or at least 
into acting in accordance with M. 
 
235 This constraint is quite similar to the claim that in considering which moral* code to accept, 
communities must be what Railton called ‘socially rational’.  See Railton 1986, especially the second 
half of the paper. 
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Once M has become the accepted moral* code of her community, however, Suzy’s position 
changes.  Since she will face censure if she does not continue to toe the line, once at T3-M, it 
becomes rational for Suzy to accept M, or at least to act in accordance with it.  We might say 
that following the adoption of M by her community, Suzy is placed in a new ‘incentive 
structure’ – because of the attitudes of those around her, it comes to be Suzy’s in selfish 
interests to adhere to M.  This does not mean that Suzy must be resigned to her fate, however.  
Recalling chapter 6 (especially §6.2.2), if there were an amendment to M which could benefit 
Suzy – be that a pareto improvement for her individually, or a benefit to the community as a 
whole, including her - revolutionary relativism requires that the amendment be given proper 
consideration, and accepted if prudentially beneficial.   
Beyond this, I leave it to specific communities to decide what constitutes an acceptably 
beneficial moral* code.  It may be that within the constraint I have described, a community 
may conclude that some variety of pareto-optimific moral* code is best, or they may follow a 
sufficientarianist path which, for example, outlaws slavery, or they may choose any other way 
of settling the matter – I leave this to moral* communities themselves.   
Crucially, it should be noted that this is not an abdication of responsibility on my part.  Rather, 
this lack of specification is required if my proposal is to respect the ROBET and RC constraints 
(see §5.2.1 & §5.2.2).  I have defined prudential benefits in terms of the satisfaction of the 
practical desires which the fully informed, fully rational counterparts of current agents would 
have for their current selves.  And it is part of the argument for the error theory that the 
desiderative sets of current agents are sufficiently diverse that there can be no universally 
held desire among these counterfactually idealised counterparts of current agents (see §3.3.7 
& e.g. Joyce 2001 §3.8).  That being the case, to claim that there must be some universal 
desideratum is to claim that there are grounds for categorically authoritative practical 
reasons, which is obviously at odds with the truth of the error theory.  This means that there 
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can be no ‘one norm to rule them all’ at any point in my proposal – within the constraints I 
laid out in chapter 5 different communities must be free to decide first-order moral* matters 
as they see fit. 
This means that I reject the implication I mentioned near the start of §7.3 that I must advocate 
adopting revolutionary relativism plus moral* judgements with specific first-order contents.  
Revolutionary relativism remains a strictly second-order, metaethical proposal.  In response 
to the RCC, I do not offer a specific moral* code or set of moral* principles which must feature 
in the set of appropriate moral* codes.  Rather, I offer a constraint on appropriate moral* 
codes, and can go no further than this.  This is, however, a positive result – it gets us beyond 
the impasse of the negative conclusion reached at the end of §7.3.1.  It also offers scope for 
improving the lot of any potential ‘Suzies’ by highlighting how their position may be ruled out 
by specific moral* communities, and how their position may be improved if it is not ruled out 
by the norms accepted by the specific moral* community in which any given Suzy finds herself. 
My direct response to the RCC, then, is no, there is no specific moral* code which it would be 
rational for us to adopt.236  Nonetheless, in discussing how we might respond to the RCC, I 
have shown two important things.  The first is that it is not surprising that there is no such 
specific moral* code, since specifying a moral* code would be inconsistent with the error 
theory, and is therefore impermissible in the WNP context.  And the second is that 
revolutionary relativism nonetheless has the resources to get us further towards a response 
to the RCC which allows individual communities to respond as they see fit, including in ways 
which may help diffuse the worries which, on reflection, lie behind the RCC. 
 
236 Once again, for ease of reference, the RCC was formulated as follows: from the perspective of the 
WNP at T2, and looking to the future at T3, is there a specific moral* code, or are there specific features 
of multiple potential moral* codes, which it would be rational for us to adopt? 
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7.4.  Implementation 
The final potential objection to my proposal which I will discuss concerns implementation.  An 
opponent could argue that even if my proposal is entirely successful on a theoretical level, it 
would be so difficult and require such enormous resources or psychological stress to actually 
implement that it simply is not a practical response to the WNP.  And despite my 
concentration throughout this thesis on the theoretical (it is, after all, a philosophy thesis!), 
this is a realistic worry, certainly in comparison with some other WNP responses.  As an 
example, one variation of this might be to argue that conservationism may seem to fare well 
here because it requires that agents simply continue to have their familiar moral beliefs.  Thus, 
intuitively at least, conservationism seems comparatively easy to implement.  I will briefly run 
through the concerns this potential objection involves, and then show why revolutionary 
relativism either avoids the worry in question, or compares more favourably to competing 
WNP responses than my notional opponent may think. 
To state the objection as clearly and forcefully as possible, I would divide it into four related 
worries: 
i) Revolutionary relativism is very complicated, and it is implausible that 
sufficient numbers of people would be able to understand it. 
ii) Revolutionary relativism involves huge changes to how we speak and think 
about what were traditionally moral matters, so even if people could in 
principle grasp it, the educational resources required to implement the 
proposal would outweigh any prudential benefits of doing so. 
iii) Even if we thought we were intellectually capable of making the required 
changes to our ways of thinking and speaking, and we were willing to devote 
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the required effort to trying to do so, it may turn out that we are not actually 
psychologically capable of making those changes. 
iv) Other WNP responses could be so much easier than revolutionary relativism 
to implement that it would be worth overlooking any theoretical 
shortcomings and favouring them as the best WNP response instead. 
Since the objection can be understood in terms of these four related worries, I shall reply to 
each of these points in turn.  On the first point, I would reply by pointing to companions in 
guilt, and then by observing that all such companions are perhaps rather less guilty than it 
may seem.  The companions I have in mind are pretty much all metaethical theories, both 
hermeneutic views and WNP responses.  Metaethics in general is widely acknowledged to be 
a tricky and sometimes hard to grasp discipline, yet as a discipline, it is entirely aimed at 
understanding phenomena – moral thought and discourse – which are in evidence throughout 
almost all agents’ lives.  Virtually all mature human beings engage in moral discourse and 
make moral judgements by some definition or other, and virtually the whole of humankind 
manages to do so without finding themselves incompetent or under-qualified.  In the most 
basic terms possible, if views such as quasi-expressivism or non-naturalist realism are at all 
credible, then it cannot be the case that revolutionary relativism is ruled out because it is too 
sophisticated. 
Several times in the course of this thesis (in §5.3.1, and in footnotes 207 and 220) I have 
touched upon what it means to adopt my proposal, i.e. whether or not living roughly in 
accordance with my proposal would count, or whether adopting my proposal would require 
everyone to study advanced theories of metaethics.  Each time I have stressed that while a 
more sophisticated understanding would potentially be helpful, an intuitive awareness or 
even just living in accordance with the proposal whilst remaining apparently oblivious to the 
details would suffice.  To supplement and back up this claim, I again draw attention to an 
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article I discussed in §6.3.1 by Goodwin & Darley (2008), in which the authors show that ‘lay’ 
people are intuitive objectivists about some moral matters, and relativists about others.  
Despite the complexity of the many and various metaethical views which would come under 
the headings of objectivism and relativism, clearly lay people are competent users of moral 
terms.  And in many cases this is without being more than dimly aware of the distinction 
between objectivism and relativism at best, yet alone the full details of the various available 
metaethical analyses of their thought and speech.  This demonstrates that most people are 
capable of living consistently with advanced theories of metaethical relativism, even without 
training in metaethics.  On this level, my proposal may even appear quite modest – along with 
some theoretical tweaks which would not necessarily be particularly evident on an everyday 
level, I am simply proposing that we take roughly the way some of our moral beliefs already 
work and extend it to cover all of our relevant beliefs. 
In the WNP context more specifically, I would also argue that revolutionary relativism is not 
conspicuously more complicated than its competitors.  Naturally in this context we start from 
a position of accepting a moral error theory, which must involve a degree of metaethical 
awareness.237  And even then, the WNP response which it would arguably be most 
straightforward to adopt – conservationism, since it involves simply retaining the same moral 
beliefs we had before we accepted an error theory – is actually quite demanding of its 
adherents.  This is because even conservationist agents would need to understand some quite 
sophisticated details of conservationism, or else conservationism itself would threaten to 
disintegrate into propagandism – a view dismissed out of hand by virtually all who have 
expressed a view on it (including me, in §4.5).  Also, we must remember that according to 
error theorists, the correct hermeneutic view, based on how people actually use moral 
 
237 Here I leave out the possibility of the intuitive error theorist.  It is simply not believable that there 
are very many agents who are untrained in metaethics, yet when confronted with the full details of a 
moral error theory would reply ‘oh that – yes, obviously that’s the case, I thought everyone knew that!’. 
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language, is some kind of non-naturalist realism (see inter alia chapter 2 of this thesis for more 
specifics).  Therefore for post-error-theory agents to become any variety of fictionalist or 
expressivist would also require some quite extensive conceptual reupholstery for the majority 
of agents.  In fact, it is plausible that a form of relativism – even a novel and slightly unusual 
form – would actually be rather easier for most agents to grasp, if Goodwin and Darley are 
right that most agents start out as intuitive relativists about some matters.  And while 
abolitionists may be tempted to claim that simply abolishing moral thought and discourse 
would be conceptually straight forward, we saw in §4.3 that this can be seriously doubted.  
Overall, I reject the idea that the worry I labelled i) is a threat to my proposal. 
My response to point ii) is similar, in that experimental philosophy shows us that most people 
have an intuitive understanding of moral relativism in general terms, and so the educational 
resources required to implement my proposal should not be all that vast.  This must surely be 
the case in comparison with competing WNP responses.  Revolutionary fictionalism is quite 
unlike the view of moral realism on which the error theory is predicated.  Thus even in spite 
of potential ways of making it easier to explain (by analogies to acting, for example), Joyce’s 
proposal would likely require significantly greater educational resources to implement than 
mine.  The same goes for revolutionary expressivism – as a hermeneutic theory this criticism 
may not apply, but in the WNP context it has already been established that most people do 
not use moral discourse consistently with expressivism – rather, most people are intuitively 
moral realists of some kind.238  So implementing Svoboda’s proposal would need to include 
teaching huge numbers of people about a conception of moral thought and language which 
they do not intuitively grasp.  Despite Garner’s claims that abolitionism would be easy to 
adopt, as we saw in §4.3.2 (and touched upon again in §6.1), we have strong reasons to doubt 
this – at least one philosopher who has made a committed, long-term attempt to adopt 
 
238 As well as chapter 2 of this thesis, also see e.g. Enoch 2011a chapter 3. 
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abolitionism in everyday life has found it near-impossible to do so consistently.239  This implies 
that the education and training resources required to implement abolitionism on a significant 
scale would be prohibitive.  Given the above, I do not see how my proposal could be derailed 
by an objection that it would require excessive educational resources to implement. 
My responses to points iii) and iv) are blunt: not only are we psychologically capable of 
embracing moral relativism, we actually do so already, including without even realising it.  
Thus it is not credible that we would be unable cope psychologically with an amended version 
of moral relativism such as the one I propose.  And my responses to points i) and ii) show that 
at minimum, revolutionary relativism would be just as easy to implement as other WNP 
responses, if not in fact easier.  Taking the above worries and responses together, I reject the 
claim that foreseeable difficulties around implementation could derail my proposal, especially 
in comparison with competing WNP responses proposed to date. 
I wrote at the beginning of this chapter that it would be impossible to defend my proposal 
against every single existing or potential objection.  But I have offered defences against what 
I feel are the strongest and most pressing objections possible, both those drawn from existing 
literature and those anticipated but not yet raised elsewhere.  This concludes my defence of 
my proposal.  I will now go on to close out this thesis with a short concluding chapter. 
  
 
239 Indeed, it may even be impossible to do so – see e.g. Streumer 2017 chapter 9. 
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Chapter 8.  Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have argued that if we accept a moral error theory, we should adopt a new 
metaethical view, which I have called revolutionary relativism.  I began in chapter 2 by laying 
out how error theorists typically view traditional morality, in order to show the conceptual 
underpinnings of the moral error theory which would form the backdrop for the discussions 
which followed.  I explained that error theorists typically hold that moral judgements are 
beliefs, and that moral discourse is typically assertoric and expresses those beliefs.  Being 
beliefs, moral judgements are capable of being true or false, and error theorists typically claim 
that moral judgements are true only if the actions or situations they are about have some kind 
of property such that all agents have an inescapable, authoritative reason to act in accordance 
with the judgement, regardless of their desires or ends or any institutions they may be 
participating in.  I then explained that error theorists argue that no action or situation can 
have the kind of property required for moral beliefs to be true, and that as a result, all moral 
beliefs or utterances which ascribe moral properties are false. 
In chapter 3, I discussed how error theorists argue for the claim that nothing can have the 
relevant kind of property.  I very briefly discussed the arguments by probably the most well-
known moral error theorist, J. L. Mackie, and then moved on to two more recent and 
sophisticated arguments for a moral error theory, those of Jonas Olson and Richard Joyce.  
Both arguments focus on moral normativity, and the view that no agent can have an 
authoritative practical reason which does not relate to their desires, ends or to an institution 
which they are participating in.  I argued that Olson’s argument was less convincing than 
Joyce’s, and that Joyce’s is the most successful and influential argument for a moral error 
theory defended to date.  That being the case, I went on to treat the matters discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3 as the background assumptions throughout the rest of the thesis.  That is, I 
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went on to discuss what we should do if we accept an error theory roughly the same as that 
laid out at the end of chapter 2, for something like the reasons Joyce gives. 
In chapter 4 I argued that accepting a moral error theory means that we are confronted with 
an unavoidable and urgent problem, the ‘what now? problem, or WNP.  The WNP is 
unavoidable because whether we engage with it or not, we will do something after we accept 
an error theory, and we fail as philosophers if we do not try to understand what the options 
might be and how to judge which the best option is.  Some philosophers have argued that 
morality in general is a pernicious institution, and that we should therefore treat the WNP as 
an opportunity to rid ourselves of morality all together.  Others have argued that morality is 
so useful to us that we would be better off if we retain moral thought and discourse, or at 
least adopt something quite like them in an attempt to hold on to some or all of the prudential 
benefits which abolishing morality risks losing.  I outlined and discussed each of the main 
positions which have cropped up in the literature on this topic so far – abolitionism, 
conservationism, revolutionary fictionalism and revolutionary expressivism.  I found all of 
them to be problematic, and therefore concluded that we must seek a new answer to the 
WNP. 
In chapter 5, I offered my new response to the WNP, a proposal I call revolutionary relativism.  
I argued that we can respond to the WNP in a way which respects the commitments of error 
theory and which also avoids the pitfalls of the other WNP responses by replacing our previous 
moral beliefs with beliefs about practical norms which our communities accept.  These beliefs 
could not properly be called moral, since they do not entail or presuppose the existence of 
the kind of categorical normativity which error theorists argue does not exist.  But since they 
would be very similar to moral beliefs in use (if not on a conceptual level), I used the term 
moral*.  I unpacked this by defining prudential benefit in a way which is compatible with error 
theory, and by grounding the claim that we should adopt my proposal in its capacity to deliver 
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this kind of prudential benefit.    I then laid out what revolutionary relativism consists in – the 
structure, truth conditions and other commitments of moral* beliefs.  I explained that moral* 
beliefs are beliefs about norms which agents’ moral* communities accept, and that 
acceptance of a norm depends on adherence to that norm plausibly being prudentially 
beneficial.  I also built in to moral* belief certain further commitments intended to ensure 
that agents are motivated to act in accordance with their moral* beliefs, and that there is 
scope for the community to reappraise the norms it accepts in line with the prudential 
benefits or harms of adhering to those norms. 
In chapter 6 I began the defence of revolutionary relativism by comparing it with existing WNP 
responses in terms of how well it could cope with the problems I raised in chapter 4.  I argued 
that many of the philosophers active in this area have failed to take seriously enough the claim 
by abolitionists that traditional morality is harmful, and that we cannot be completely sure 
whether it is harmful or not.  I therefore compared my proposal with existing responses in 
two distinct scenarios – one in which traditional morality is not harmful, which I called 
moralgood, and one in which traditional morality is harmful, which I called moralbad.  I 
compared my proposal with each of the existing WNP responses in turn, in each case arguing 
that revolutionary relativism could better cope with the objections I had raised in chapter 4 in 
both moralgood and moralbad, and so was the preferable response to the WNP overall. 
Finally in chapter 7 I defended revolutionary relativism against the most pressing objections 
which I could foresee.  The first objection I discussed was one of the most intractable problems 
for hermeneutic relativists, that moral relativism renders moral disagreement unintelligible.  I 
argued that revolutionary relativism could account for moral disagreement in a way which 
copes with the disagreement problem.  I set out several ‘building blocks’ for my argument, 
drawing on Gricean maxims, features of moral language and views of community 
participation.  I then offered a story about how my proposal could accommodate various 
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different levels of disagreement, which would include the vast majority of likely cases of 
disagreement.  And even in those cases which are more tricky for my proposal, it nonetheless 
avoids  unintelligibility and provides scope for prudential benefit.  I also discussed traditional 
problems for relativism around infallibility, dissidence and arbitrariness, in each case showing 
that they could not derail my proposal.  I then moved on to respond to objections which may 
not typically arise for hermeneutic views, but which could be directed at my proposal because 
of its post-error-theory context.  I discussed how we might decide which set of moral* beliefs 
it would be rational to adopt.  I showed how this may be a more complex question than it 
appears, and considered various ways in which we might arrive at an answer.  I concluded that 
there is no one set of moral* beliefs which it would be rational to adopt, but that this is 
unsurprising because specifying that communities must accept one set of beliefs over another 
would be inconsistent with the truth of error theory.  Nonetheless, I argued that revolutionary 
relativism allows each moral* community to find its own optimally rational answer.  Finally I 
discussed the worry that it may be so difficult or costly to implement my proposal that any 
prudential benefits of doing so would be outweighed.  I argued that my proposal would be no 
more difficult to implement than any competing proposal, and may actually be easier to put 
into practise. 
Drawing together all of the above, I conclude that revolutionary relativism is the best available 
response to the ‘what now?’ problem, and that if we accept a moral error theory, we should 
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